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The concern of this dissertation is planning theory and practice; 
its purpose is to make planning more responsive to the problems of the 
city. The premise that the study is built on is that social planning 
must be in harmony with the nature of its subject matter, and that so­
cial problems is its subject matter. The supposition is that if we 
grasp the nature of social problems and build planning theory and prac­
tice on these insights, planning efforts will be more relevant and more 
effective. 
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The approach is a theoretical one; social problems are the start­
ing point. After urban problems--and poverty in particular--are exam­
ined from an historical perspective, a social systems framework is pre­
sented to clarify how problems are generated and maintained as well as 
to explain how responses to problems are shaped. The inquiry into the 
nature of social problems then draws upon sociological theory. This 
theoretical literature is found to focus on either the objective ele­
ments of social problems or on the subjective, that is, the process by 
which persons come to judge whether a condition is a social problem. 
Structural aspects of problems are not an important concern of the 
theorists. 
However, in this study a problem is considered as social only when 
its causes lie outside of individuals--when the sources or origins can 
be found in existing structural or institutional arrangements. Problems 
are conceptual ized as having two dimensions: objective and subjective 
ones. 
Social problems--specifically, their objective and su~ective di­
mensions--are related to social planning. It is contended that planning 
must deal with the objective elements of social problems, including 
structural aspects, as well as with the subjective dimensions. Or, in 
other words, social planning must (1) treat the structural causes of 
problems and also (2) address itself to the values, beliefs, defini­
tions, etc. that obstruct social change. 
In addition to this theoretical linkage of social problems and 
social planning, the dissertation situates planning in the context of a 
general theory of social reality. Drawing upon the work of Berger and 
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Luckmann (1966), planning is conceptualized as a process in which real­
ity is socially constructed. These theoretical concepts--the objective 
and subjective di'mensions of socia1 problems as the object of social 
planning and social planning as the social construction of reality-­
provide the basis for the model which is developed. 
Three components of the model are treated. First, characteris­
tics of the process are discussed, and it is contended that the social 
planning process must be IItask-oriented," "experimental,1I "cybernetic," 
dialogic, and collaborative. Second, roles and phases in the process 
are discussed and illustrated. : Consistent_ with the theoretical frame­
\"JOrk in which knowledge is considered as sociall'y distributed, citizen, 
planner, and decision maker have roles in each of the planning phases. 
Since no one has a complete view of social reality, each is seen as hav­
ing a distinct contribution to make in the task of defining the problem 
and its solution. Thus, resolving social problems requires that citi­
zen, planner, and decision maker collaborate and learn from one another. 
The planner's role is elaborated as the third aspect of the model. By 
planner is meant an interdisciplinary team whose role encompasses two 
main functions: (1) technical tasks that have traditionally belonged to 
the planner, and (2) interactional tasks. Although other planning the­
orists have outlined interactional tasks for the planner, his role in 
the collaborative model is lito promote mutual learning through dialog." 
This role, similar to that of a process consultant, is considered unique 
to the collaborative planning model. 
Although components of the model resemble those of other models, 
taken together, the characteristics of the planning process, planning 
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phases, and planni.ng roles differ from any other model. And important­
ly, the planning model grows out of a theoretical analysis of social 
problems as well as a broad theoretical framework. 
The model is normative in nature, and although it is not tested 
empirically, it is evaluated at a theoretical level. The collaborative 
model and seven other planning models are assessed in terms.of whether 
they are responsive to the nature of social problems. It is contended 
that the collaborative model is the only one that is responsive to the 
nature of social problems. 
This dissertation--its theoretical concepts and conceptual model-­
is seen as a contribution to an emerging planning paradigm--one that 
holds the promise that we can learn to deal effectively with the prob­
lems that confront our cities. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
I. THE URBAN CRISIS AND PLANNING 
IIlf we observe a society faced with a problem--poverty, riots, un­
safe cars--and formulating a program to deal with it, we can be sure that 
nine times out of ten the problem will not be solved. If we look again, 
ten or twenty years later, we shall find that the problem may have been 
trimmed, redefined, or redistributed, but only infrequently wil I it nave 
been treated to anyone's satisfaction. . •• In short, the capacity of 
societies to treat their own problems and to change themselves seems 
rat he r lim i ted II . ( E t z ion i, I 970 , p. 222). 
Although the contention that our capacity to treat problems is lim­
ited is open to debate, the other assertion--that societies rarely s91ve 
their problems--is less likely to be disputed. Few persons today would 
claim that the urban problems that concerned us in the 1960's have been 
satisfactorily solved. Cities are still plagued with problems: concen­
trations of the poor--especially minority poor, deteriorating and aban­
doned housing units, crime and unsafe streets, large numbers of unem­
ployed persons, possible financial collapse, and so on. Housing programs, 
poverty programs, Model Cities, and other programs of the sixties have 
not effectively dealt with the city's problems. But does this warrant 
the conclusion that our capacity to treat our problems is limited? 
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We believe that it does not. This dissertation is premised on the 
opposite bel ief: that we do have the capacity to treat urban problems, 
to change both ourselves and our institutions, and thus make our cities 
more 1ivable for all. While we do agree that our treatment of urban 
problems has indeed been ineffective--that our theory and practice have 
been inadequate in the face of the problems that confront us, we also 
contend that planning theory and practice can be made more relevant to 
the problems of the city. 
In maintaining that planning can be made more effective, the as­
sumption is that the planner has an important role to play in the task 
of confronting urban problems--not merely as a technician, drawing on 
special ized knowledge and skills, but also as a person committed to at-
taking urban problems so that more persons may share more fully in life 
in lithe good city.lI l 
Although some may disagree with casting the planner in the role of 
committed person--and particularly in the role of one who is committed 
to creating lithe good city," it is impossible for the social scientist 
lFor those interested in a philosophical and moral treatment of 
urban poverty, Haworth's (1968) is an excellent one. He raises the ques­
tion, "Why fight poverty?"_-a question that is closely related to "Why 
fight urban problems?" His answers fall into three moral categories: 
goodness, justice, and prudence--all of which are seen,as aspects of the 
effort to create ~ good £l!l. When poverty exists in a city, Haworth 
charges, it fails at being a "good city." His conception of lithe good 
city" is a structural one--a satisfactory life style is related to traits 
of urban institutions. In summary, a good city is "a community in which 
the participants are enabled to develop themselves as human beings in 
consequence of its richness, openness, person-centeredness, voluntari­
ness, flexibility, and controllability" (p. 38). 
Haworth a I so d i SCijsses 'Ithe jus t city, II as we 11 as prudent i a I rea­
sons for dealing with urban poverty. 
3 
2 
or planner not to take a value stance. A similar perspective is ex­
pressed by Dror (1968) who addresses the question of knowledge, moral 
commitment, and social change. He states: 
Insofar as knowledge that is relevant to human action becomes 
available, it is our moral duty, as well as our best bet, to 
use it as much as possible, with due humility but without giving 
in to the conservative biases so deeply rooted in most individ­
uals and social institutions. . . . The choice we face is either 
to try to change the public-policymaking system in the light of 
what we know and thus increase our chances of realizing our bas­
ic values more fully and of dealing better with the problems 
faced by society, or to leave the shaping of the future to the 
short-sighted (though not blind) forces of spontaneous histor­
ical evolution (p. 301). 
In expressing his conviction that we have a duty to change our 
policy system so that we can better handle societal problems, Dror sets 
forth the choice facing us: either work to improve our ability to plan 
for change, or let the future more or less shape itself. In this dis­
sertation we have opted for the first choice and will search for better 
ways of responding to our problems--aiming specifically to improve our 
abil ity to plan. 
If change is to occur, if problems are to be handled more effec­
tively, the planner must be devoted to making planning theory and prac~ 
2Although planner John Dyckman (1966, p. 74) argues for a positive, 
value-free social science, he recognizes that "radical social planners" 
on the one hand are calling for redistribution of power, and on the other 
hand that "administrative social planners" are aligned with powerful in­
terests. To protect citizens against the biases, condescension, and ar­
bitrariness of social planners Dyckman calls for the articulation of 
public goals (p. 75). Other planners consider it impossible to be "value­
free." The advocate planners definitely have sided with the powerless. 
See Davidoff (1965) for a treatment of this perspective. 
The impossibility of a value-free stance is widely recognized to­
day among sociologists. Becker (1967) discusses the issue in terms of 
"whose side are we on?". The position set forth in this dissertation 
closely resembles Gouldner's (1962, 1968). 
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tice more responsive and relevant to the needs and problems of the urban 
dweller. This is the challenge that this dissertation addresses. 
The first step will be to review the planning 1 iterature in the at­
tempt to identify key components of the planning process. The litera­
ture will also be reviewed for the insights it offers about the nature 
of social planning, and after assessing that literature, we will argue 
that there is a need to reconceptualize social planning. Finally, we 
will discuss how this dissertation approaches the task of improving our 
capacity to treat urban problems. 
I I. THE MEANING OF PLANNING: ESSENTIAL COMPONENTS 
Since a basic premise of this dissertation is that present methods 
of decision making are inadequate in the face of complex problems, it 
must be clarified why it is assumed that improving planning theory and 
practice will enhance our ability to cope with urban problems. There­
fore, the planning literature will be surveyed--with the focus on the 
meaning of planning. Three elements will be identified as essential to 
planning. They are: a future-orientation, a search for effective means, 
and an action-orientation. These elements, it is maintained, distin­
guish planning from other forms of decision making. 
Future-oriented 
Planning has been defined as I~ process where because of faith in 
the ability to influence the future, one uses foresight to achieve ~­
determined goals" (Bunzel, quoted by Kahn, 1969, p. 13). 
Another writer tells us that 
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to ~ is to gather our knowledge of our collective resources 
and to exploit our capabilities for change, thus modifying our­
selves in order to meet more adequately the needs of the pres­
ent and the future (Duh1, 1963, p. 302). 
Both these definitions express a belief in our capacity to effect 
change and both focus on planning as future-oriented. In the first def­
inition goal formulation seems to be placed outside the planning pro­
cess--goals are predetermined. Planning is seen as directed toward the 
achievement of goals. The second definition also seems to assume the 
prior existence of goals. In other conceptualizations of planning--and 
in this dissertation--goal formulation is problematic and considered in­
3tegral to the planning process. 
Because planning is future-oriented, that is, because it aims at 
effecting stated goals, improving our ability to plan will enable us to 
bring about a future in which problems are more effectively ameliorated-­
if not resolved. 
Search for Effective Means 
The two definitions cited above imply that planning is concerned 
with developing the means that will create change--that will reach the 
established goals. This aspect of planning will be our focus as we con­
sider other definitions of planning. 
Robinson (1972) too views planning as a process of determining 
goals, but he also considers designing means to achieve these goals es­
3Harris (1967) too recognizes the identification of goals as an es­
sential part of the planning process, yet also as a task that lies out­
side the realm of science. He maintains that planning draws on both 
"science ll and "humanism" for its knowledge and tools. His article sets 
forth what he sees as the 1imits of both. 
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sential to planning. According to him: 
Planning--whether it is for the development of a city as a 
whole, or the programming of its components (say, education or 
housing)--may be defined as the process of determining goals and 
designing courses of action by which these goals may be achieved 
(p. 	33). 
This definition then deals specifically with means-ends relation­
ships. Gans (1970) proposes a similar definition, but specifies more 
precisely that planning is concerned with effective means. For him plan-
n ing is 
a method and process of decision-making that proposes or iden­
tifies goals (or ends) and determines effective pol icies (or 
means)--those which can be shown analytically to achieve the 
goals while minimizing undesirable financial, social, and other 
consequences (p. 223). 
Effective means, according to this definition, are those that can 
be shown analytically to be effective. Gans, however, does not point out 
that determining what consequences are desirable and which are undesir­
able--and for whom--takes the planner and/or decision maker into the 
realm of value judgments. 
Planning is an intrinsically normative process, for both the spe­
cific goals to be pursued and the specific actions to be taken are se­
lected within a value framework. Because of this, analysis cannot be 
purely objective or scientific, but is intimately connected with values 
or subjective bel iefs. The notion of the analytical (llscientific ll ) as 
well as the normative nature of planning is concisely expressed in Kahnls 
(1969, p. 17) definition of planning as "pol icy choice and programming 
in the I ight of facts, projections, and appl ication of values. 11 
That values enter into the task of analyzing alternatives is recog­
nized by Webber (1963) who explicitly incorporates value implications in­
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to his definition. In his view planning is 
that process of making rational decisions about future goals 
and future courses of action which relies upon explicit trac­
ings of the repercussions and of the value implications asso­
ciated with alternative courses of actions, and in turn, re­
quires explicit evaluation and choice among the alternative 
matching goal-action sets (p. 320). 
This definition also associates rational decisions with planning-­
a concept that has evoked a good deal of controversy. A rational deci­
sion, according to Banfield (1959), is one made in the following manner: 
1. 	 The decision-maker lists all the opportunities for action 
open to him; 
2. 	 He identifies all the consequences which would fol low from 
the adoption of each of the possible actions; and 
3! 	 He selects the action which would be followed by the pre­
ferred set of consequences (p. 140). 
It is evident that decision makers in most cases cannot make a per­
fectly rational choice, 	 i. e., in terms of Banfield's criteria. Banfield 
himself admits that "no 	 choice can ever be perfectly rational" (p. 140). 
His "rational decision" 	is an ideal type and his model of rational plan­
4
ning is a normative one. They must be considered as such. 
It is our contention that planning does not require "rational" de­
cisfons, but rather involve~ ~ s~~tch for ef~ective means. Thfs ne~essi-
4Banfield (1959) explains and defends the rational model as a norm­
ative one. Several others have written on the limits of rational ity and/ 
or have criticized rational models. Friedmann (1967) uses the term 
"bounded rationality" to indicate the limits that circumstances place on 
rational decisions. He discusses environmental conditions, or the social 
context of planning, as "obstacles" to rational planning. March and Si­
mon (1958) also discuss the "cognitive limits of rationality." Lindblom 
(1959) attacks the rational-comprehensive model, thus providing the basis 
for his incremental model. Dror (1968) too offers a criticism of the 
"pure rational ity" model (pp. 132-41) and the "economically rational" 
mode I (pp. 141-42). 
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tates a consideration of alternative courses of action, the identifica­
tion of the consequences of each alternative, and an evaluation of each 
alternative in the I ight of the relevant ends (goals). The planner is 
confronted by limitations in each of the three steps identified by Ban-
field--and the more complex the situation, the more serious are the con­
straints. The planner is continually challenged to overcome these 1 imi­
tations and find effective courses of action. However, it is the search 
for effective means--not the effective means--that is an essential com­
ponent of planning. Because planning searches for effective means, it 
holds the promise that it can treat the problems confronting us. 
Action-oriented 
In the definitions of planning cited above planning seems to cease 
once a course of action has been designed (Robinson) or when it has been 
finally selected (Gans, Webber, Kahn). We will now examine the role that 
implementation--or action--has in planning. 
Lending support to the view that planning is only concerned with 
the design of means to reach goals is the distinction that is made be­
tween policy analysis, planning, community organization, and administra­
tion. These boundaries are delineated by Rein (1970) in the following 
way: 
Policy analysis--accounting for the development of publ ic pol­
icy and explicating the choices and assumptions underlying pres­
ent or anticipated programs, without necessarily attempting to 
alter the direction of policy or make specific and detailed 
choices ... 
Planning--converting value choices into concrete programs and 
plans for action by choosing among alternative patterns and lev­
els of allocating resources to reach some predefined goal. Some 
have tried to combine these activities when they discuss policy 
planning. 
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Community organization deals with the process of change either 
by drawing together diverse interests to facilitate reaching 
agreement on social objectives, or by organizing groups who are 
inarticulate and excluded from the decision process. 
Administration implements choices already made, but in the 

process of identification may shape the direction of policy, 

setting it upon a new or only sl ightly altered course (p. 5). 

Similar distinctions are discussed by Gans (1974) in a paper in 
which he explores the possibilities of integrating three social work 
specialities: social policy, social planning, and community organi'za­
tiona Theoretically, according to Gans, these specialties can be consid­
ered as follows: 
Social pol icy--as a goal-setting specialty aiming to correct 
the injustices of the market; 
Social planning--as a programming specialty which stresses ra­
tional methods for the conception of the means or programs to 
achieve the goals set by social pol icy; and 
Community organization--as an implementing special ity of organ­
izational and political skills to realize these programs (p. 19). 
The boundary distinctions drawn by both Gans and Rein relegate 
planning to a very narrow function. However, in this dissertation no 
distinction is made between planning and pol icy analysis. In theanaly­
sis of alternatives it is essential to explicate both values and underly­
ing assumptions if one is to evaluate them. Neither will the theoretical 
distinction Gans makes between social planning and social pol icy be used-­
for, as we have already indicated, goal formulation is considered inte­
gral to the concept of planning. 
Both Gans and Rein distinguish between planning and implementation. 
This distinction is theoretically justifiable as well as empirically val­
id, i. e., the administrator's role and the community organizer's role do 
differ from the:planner's. However, implementation is integral to the 
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concept of planning that is being presented here. 
Planning is premised on a bel ief that human activity can influence 
the future. The assumption is that people engage in planning in an at­
tempt to achieve goals. Planning is a purposeful activity. 
This view is similar to that of Davidoff and Reiner (1962). Plan­
ning as they define it is "a process for determining appropriate future 
action through a sequence of choice" (p. 11). For them "determining" is 
more than identifying and selecting appropriate courses of action--it is 
assuring the action as well. They argue that "effectuation" is a plan­
ning concern, and that action is the outcome of planning efforts. 
Friedmann (1969) has also fused action with planning. In his model 
plan formulation and plan implementation are not just merged, but are in­
distinguishable. His "action-planning" model includes "deliberation "and 
choice as pervasive, on-going activities, but these are not to be identi­
fied as distinctive phases prior to action: they are inseparably a part 
of it" (312). 
Considering action as an inseparable part of planning is essential 
to the concept of planning used in this dissertation. "Action" has a 
vital role to play in determining the effectiveness of our efforts to 
deal with problems." In our discussion of "the search for effective means" 
as a necessary element of planning, we did not consider how it is deter­
mined that one alternative will be more effective in achieving a goal 
than another--or. even if it will be effective. The evaluation of means 
in the light of ends has given rise to the assumption that planning should 
lead to the maximization of the attainment of relevant ends (Meyerson and 
Banfield, 1955, p. 314). This "maximizing" model has been highly criti­
11 
cized, of course. A "satisficing" model, "a successive, limited compar­
isons" or incremental model (Lindblom, 1959, 1965), and an optimal model 
(oror, 1968) have been developed and each proposed as more realistic 
than the maximizing model. 
Our point, however, is not to discuss or evaluate these various 
models;5 rather it is to indicate how it can be determined whether a 
means is effective. We propose that it is not analysis and evaluation 
that verify whether a particular course of action will be or is effec­
tive. 'IAction" is the test of whether means are effective, i. e., wheth­
er they lead in the direction of goal achievement. The effectiveness of 
the means can only be judged by practice. Do the means effect change? 
Do they lead toward goal achievement? Planning then is concerned with 
implementation--with action. 
In sunmary, it has been maintained that planning is characterized 
by three elements: (1) a future-orientation--a concern with future 
goals; (2) a search for effective means--a concern with devising ways to 
achieve goals; and (3) an action-orientation--a concern with the actual 
real ization of the goals. Because planning is a process characterized 
by these three components, it is a process that must be used and im­
proved if urban problems are to be solved--if lithe good city" is to be 
rea 1 i zed. 
5Simon (1957, Chapters 10, 14, 16) discusses the model of satis­
ficing man. March and Simon (1958) further develop this model. Alt­
schuler (1965, pp. 300-02, footnote 2) discusses the models of maximiz­
ing man and satisficing man. oror (1968, pp. 147~49) also considers 
Simon and March's satisficing model. 
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II I. THE MEANING OF SOCIAL PLANNING 
A future-orientation, a search for effective means, and an action-
orientation have been identified as characterizing the planning approach 
and a1so have been used to distinguish planning from other forms of de­
cision making and problem solving. The planning approach itself "is 
large1y neutral with respect to subject matter••.. Essentially the 
same processes may be appl ied in deciding how to deploy a military force, 
in guiding the activities of a corporation, in determining which social 
services are to be provided, or in deciding about the city's physical 
structure" (Webber, 1962, p. 320). 
Although the planning approach is "largely neutral 
" 
with respect 
to subject matter, we will now attempt to distinguish social p1anning 
from other forms of planning. To accompl ish this we will explore how 
definitions, boundaries, and goals of social planning have been treated 
in the planning literature. These meanings will be assessed, and anoth­
er conceptual ization of social planning--one used in this dissertation-­
will be proposed. 
A Review of the Literature 
Definitions. In reviewing the literature deal ing with social plan­
ning one finds that the ways of conceptualizing social planning are al­
most as numerous as the theorists who do so. A recent book by Ecklein 
and Lauffer (1972) deal ing with social planning illustrates this very 
well. The authors set forth nine ways that social planning has been de­
fined. 
1. 	 A way of concerting community influence towards achievement 
of a common goal. 
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2. 	 A process that gives effect to the wishes of the community. 
3. 	 A rational method of problem solving. 
4. 	 A process in which pol icy, determined by a separate polit­
ical process, is translated into a set of operational or­
ders for the execution of that policy. 
5. 	 A systematic ordering of the near future; a designing of the 
future. 
6. 	 Rational, goal-directed behavior, seeking the optimum adap­
tation of means and ends as guided by a limiting set of so­
cial values. 
7. 	 A process whereby the planner feeds more information into 
the decision-making system. 
8. 	 Program development based on a process of goal selection and 
the progressive overcoming of resistance to goal attainment. 
9. 	 A means of directing social change through some form of co­
ordinated program in order to further social well-being by 
attacking social and community problems (pp. 212-13, numer­
als added). 
The first eight "definitions" are inadequate in that they do not 
6distinguish social planning from other forms of planning. The last 
definition comes closest to identifying social planning, yet it needs 
further explanation jf it is to enhance our understanding of the concept. 
Little seems to be gained by listing these "definitions"--other than to 
indicate "fuzziness" in the conceptualization of social planning. 
Ecklein and Lauffer do not themselves define social planning; in­
stead they describe and discuss the kinds of social planning that are 
presently practiced. Their approach is not unusual, for few who write 
about social pl~nning attempt precise definitions. Neither do the writ­
ers 	even use the same terms in their conceptualizations, thus leading to 
the 	prol iferation and confusion of concepts. Various authors deal with 
6Many of these "definitions" do not even define planning, let alone 
social planning. For example, the second definition seems to describe 
the electoral process better than the planning process. 
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social planning and: its domain (Kahn, 1969; Gil, 1973), types (Gans, 
1968; Brooks, 1970), functional assignments (Dyckman, 1970), goals 
(Fitch, 1967), objectives (Perloff, 1962), substantive areas (Brooks, 
1970), core (Perloff, 1965), scope (Perloff, 1965; Brooks, 1970), ter­
rain (Rein, 1971), boundaries (Boulding, 1967; Rein, 1970). 
Not only is there a lack of precise agreement among various theo­
rists on the meanings and usage of these concepts, but even in reading 
just one person's writings one can experience this conceptual confusion. 
In one article Gans (1958b) states that social planning includes two 
kinds of planning: societal planning and social progranming.. He ex­
plains: 
Societal planning is concerned with broad goal determination 
for the society and with evaluation of programs on a broad lev­
el •••• The term social in social programming should be de­
fined loosely, and the scope .•. should be broad ••. so 
that programs can be developed for those societal goals which 
are not handled by economists, land-use planners, or architect­
designers ••• (p. 85). 
Gans then distinguishes between social planning and that done by 
economists, land-use planners, and architect-designers--making it quite 
clear that this second type of social planning deals with noneconomic 
and nonphysical phenomena. But in two subsequent articles Gans de~ 
nounces dichotomizing physical and social planning (1963, 1968a). He 
views the dichotomy as meaningless (1962, p. 245) and as theoretically 
unjustifiable (1968a, pp. 72-73). He asserts that "no goal can be de­
fined so narrowly that it is only physical or only social" (1962, p. 
245). He proposes "a synthesis of the so-called sociai and physical 
planning approaches" (1968a, p. 75). Then there would be only planning: 
"an approach which agrees upon the best goals and then finds the best 
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methods to achieve them" (1963, p. 245). Social planning is used by 
Gans in two contradictory or seemingly contradictory senses. 
In consulting the index of a book containing Gans' essays (1968, 
p. 393) for a definition of social planning, the reader is referred to 
Gans I descr ipt ion of what he terms p 1 ann i ng for "gu i ded mobi1 i ty. II Pro­
grams for guided mobility "seek to aid low-income people to change their 
fortunes and their ways of living, they are attempts to guide them to­
ward the social and economic mobility that more fortunate people have 
achieved on their own" (1962, pp. 232-33). In this very article to which 
we are referred for a definition of social planning, we find Gans urging 
that the terms, physical 'planning and social planning, be eliminated. 
What accounts for this seeming discrepancy of meaning in the writ~ 
lngs of just one man? The answer perhaps lies in a consideration of the 
various audiences that were addressed. 
"Memorandum on Social Planning" was originally prepared in 1958 
for the Social Planning Division (and its Social Planning Unit) in the 
Puerto Rico Planning Board. Gans was attempting to be of practical as­
sistance to an already established planning board.' Although reluctant 
to describe goals as either economic or social, he did use the term "So­
cial" as an administrative. category that would include noneconomic and 
nonphysical programs (p. 85). 
The 1963 paper was given to a conference of the American Institute 
of Planners and the 1968a article first appeared in the Encyclopedia of 
the Social Sciences. Both articles are concerned with city planning and 
"a new planning concept which places greater emphasis on economic and 
social methods of improving community I ife" (1963, p. 231). Gans was 
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critical of the tendency of city planning agencies to append social plan­
ning to physical planning, preferring instead a goal-oriented approach 
to planning. If city planning was to truly improve cities, then plan­
ning to do away with urban poverty and deprivation, i. e., programs for 
guided mobility, must be given a higher priority, according to Gans. 
Not only does the audience being addressed seem to influence the 
conceptualization of social planning, but the theorist's own field also 
affects the meaning that is given social planning. Mayer (1972) consid­
ers the meanings of social planning as used in four fields: social work, 
delinquency prevention, community mental health, and city planning (pp. 
7-19). We will not duplicate his efforts here, but his review of the 
literature from these various fields is instructive: no common agree­
ment exi.s.ts as. to what consti tutes social planning. 
In trying to find a meaning for social planning that transcends 
particular fields of specialization, Dyckman (1966) provides a useful 
starting point. He specifies three operational meanings of social plan­
ning: 
I. 	 At the societal planning level, social planning means the se­
lection of the social goals of the nation or state, and the 
setting of targets for their achievement. It requires a rank­
ing of these goals, an assessment of the cost (in terms of 
other objectives) of achieving them, and judgments of the 
feasibil ity of such programs. 
2. 	 Social planning, in a closely related meaning, involves the 
application of social values and action criteria to th~ as­
sessment of prog·rams undertaken in the pursuit of economic 
or political goals. Thus, it can mean the testing of the 
consequences--in terms of intergroup or interpersonal rela­
tions--of everything from broad economic development pro­
grams to specific redevelopment projects. 
3. 	 Social planning can mean specifically 'social' progranming 
arising from the broad social goals of the conmunity. The 
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traditional welfare activities of public and private agen­
cies have been the principal focus of such planning in the 
United States (pp. 67-68). 
In a more recent article Dyckman (1970) restricts social planning 
to two meanings: 
Social planning is either planning for social services or 
planning, whether economic or physical, which is sensitive to 
the social outcomes of its plans and which places differential 
value on these outcomes (p. 27). 
Expressing the same concept, but in different terms, Dyckman (1970) 
says: 
American planning that qualifies for designation 'social I is 
either that kind of planning, whatever its perspective, that 
deals with social services, or is planning for environmental or 
economic goals that takes into account the social consequences 
of its effectuation (p. 27). 
"Societal planningll is used by Dyckman to apply to 'Iplanning that 
seeks to directly restructure the society so as to alter its social rela­
tionshipsll (1970, p. 27). He acknowledges that very little " soc ietal 
planning" exists in American society. 
A conceptualization similar to Dyckman1s, but not as clearly ar­
ticulated as we will see, is found in the writings of Perloff (1963, 1965, 
1968). In his earliest article dealing with social planning Perloff 
(1963) offers no definition, but in expressing his personal concern about 
social and human resources problems, he seems to view social planning as 
planning for human services. But Perloff goes beyond the traditional 
notion of planning for human services, focusing on five social objectives 
for metropolitan regions--some of which deal with elements other than so­
cial services. He proposes a framework for social planning that includes 
the regional economy and social structure, and further'contends that it 
is necessary to integrate social planning with physical planning activities. 
------------------------------------------------~--~---------------/ 
18 
Perloff in a later article (1965) sets forth three organizational 
tasks that must be accompl ished in order to cope with metropolitan so­
cial problems. First, he says, there must be coordinated planning for 
welfare by both governmental and voluntary agencies. Second, social 
planning must involve economic forces "so that local attacks on problems 
of unemployment, underemployment, poverty, economic discrimination, and 
the 	like, can be carried out in a planned and coordinated fashion " 
(p. 	 298). And lastly, social and physical planning must be joined. 
Social planning, according to Perloff, must be joined with eco­
nomic and physical planning. Social planning, he declares, must in­
clude "all pertinent socio-economic and human-behavior considerations" 
(1965, p. 298). Social planning then would provide the human resources 
counterpart to physical city planning" (p. 299). This statement should 
not be taken to mean that social planning is restricted to the typical 
social welfare planning, for later in the article Perloff declares the 
need for an extensive redefinition of the scope of planning. He con­
tends that "a broad view which includes aspects of econ.omic, social, 
physical, political, cultural, and psychological concern is more appro­
priate than a view which deals with narrowly conceived 'health and wel­
fare 
' 
problems" (p. 299). 
This 	distinction between a broad view and a more narrowly con­
7ceived one moves Perloff close to Oyckmann's conceptualization of 
7Another way to distinguish a "narrow" view from a IIbroad lt view 
is to consider who is the target of planning. Fitch's (1967, p. 329) 
concern is with the "narrow" consideration of social planning which " re­
fers to policies and programs to raise the cultural and economic levels 
of certain population groups, mainly those who are not self-supporting." 
The broader view includes Iiall planning which aims to promote the general 
welfare, as contrasted to the interests of small groups" (p. 329). 
---------......._-----------_.....:.._....;..-----------;/ 
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soc i alp I ann i n g . 
The current meanings given to social planning have been thoroughly 
explored by Alfred Kahn, a professor of social work, who devotes an en­
tire chapter of1his book, The Theory and Practice of Social Planning 
(1969), to that task. 8 Although he discusses various approaches to a 
definition, he himself does not offer a definition of social planning. 
He maintains that: 
This is an early moment in the history of social planning, 
and any system of classification will soon be outdated. None­
theless, the listing of circumstances occasioning social plan­
ning, reconsidered in the light of the elements of the defini­
tion which has been presented, does permit the creation of a 
working typology (pp. 18-19). 
Kahn then proceeds to present in some detail the meanings that so­
cial planning has. According to him social planning at present can be: 
Planning within an agency or organization in social welfare. 
(This is properly seen as administrative planning.) 
Planning for a concert of services on a community level. (This 
is sectorial or categorical planning on the local level.) 
Planning to introduce (or correlate) social components into 
housing projects, or into local, city-wide, or regional hous­
ing and renewal activities. (This is the social in relation 
to physical planning.) ... 
Problem-oriented or social-trend oriented planning. This may 
also be seen as planning for the interrelationships among or 
restructuring of intervention systems, usually with reference 
to a broad national, state, or regional problem••.. 
Planning the social aspects of fiscal and monetary policy or 
other public programs not primarily defined as 'social I 
Planning the social aspects of balanced development. This phrase­
ology best suits United Nations usage. Others may prefer to talk 
of relating social concerns to economic planning or of social as­
pects of economic planning (pp. 19-20. 
8See Chap~er 1, "Wha t 1'1 Soc ialP 1ann i ng 1", for that extended 
discussion. \ 
---------------------------_......._------------/ 
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Although Kahn admits that this classification of the forms of so­
cial planning will soon be outdated, his classification of current usages 
is quite comprehensive. This application of the term "social planning" 
to a variety of situations indicates the breadth of its meaning. Its 
present usage in so many circumstances greatly complicates attempts to 
specify a more precise meaning for social planning--and one that will be 
acceptable to those involved~ 
Boundaries. Closely related to definitions of social planning is 
the issue of boundaries. In seeking to answer the question, IIWhat is 
social pol icy1 11 ,9 Rein observes that the definition of social policy is 
not settled (1970, p. 6), but rather than attempting to formulate a for­
mal definition, he instead explores the question of boundaries. Our ex­
amination of three boundaries--between social policy and the academic 
disciplines, between social policy and publ ic policy, and between social 
policy and social work--is based on Rein's analysis. 
In the consideration of what separates social policy from the aca­
demic disciplines, such as economics, pol itical science, and sociology, 
Rein discusses two views. One holds that because social policy draws up­
on the major social sciences for its body of knowledge, has minimal the­
ory, and lacks unique methods, it is a IIfield ll and not a IIdiscipline. 1I10 
9As was previously indicated, no distinction is made in this dis­
sertation between social planning and social policy. The literature 
that deals with social policy will be considered as applicable to social 
planning. 
10By social policy as a field is meant lithe development of collec­
tive action for social welfare in which scholars drawn from various dis­
ciplines try to clarify problems
" 
(David V. Donnison, quoted by Rein, 
1970, p. 8). 
/ --------------------------------------------------------~ 
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The other view is in disagreement--holding that because social policy is 
developing its own theory and methodology, it should be regarded as a 
discipline separate from the other social sciences. At this time no 
consensus exists on this boundary question. 
The relationship between social pol icy and public policy is a sec­
ond boundary issue. Rein expresses why he believes this boundary is an 
important one: "If we fail to establish the boundary between public and 
social policy, then the field of inquiry will be as broad as human wis­
dom and social experience itself" (p. 13). 
Boulding (1967) has attempted to del imit social policy from one 
aspect of public pol icy--the economic. He notes that "economists study 
primarily that segment of the social system that is dominated by ex­
changell (p. 5). He suggests tha t "perhaps, therefore, we can i dent i fy 
the Igrantl or unilateral transfer ... as the distinguishing mark of 
the social just as exchange or bilateral transfer is a mark of the eco­
nomic" (p. 7). This distinction by Boulding permits a consideration of 
social policy as lIintervention outside of the market system" (Rein, 1970, 
p. ]3). Yet Rein points out that this concept too has been challenged, 
for in practice the market is a mechanism that is used to supply some so­
cial services. 
Neither does regarding social policy as responsive to human need 
and public policy as having other immediate aims contribute to our under­
standing of either (Rein, p. 15). Thus, Rein holds that there is no 
satisfactory distinction between social policy and public policy. 
The third boundary issue examined by Rein is that between social 
work and social Ipol icy. This leads him to a brief review of the mean­
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ings of social work, personal social services,ll and social welfare. 
After defining social work Rein observes: liAs the theme of protection 
is stressed social work not only moves toward advocacy, but it presses 
into the broader areas of pol icy, planning, social reform, and social 
engineering" (1970, p. 16). 
Thus, as the definition of social work is expanded, it becomes im­
possible to make a clear-cut del ineation between social work and social 
pol icy. The exploration of this third boundary issue leads Rein to as­
sert that lithe broader the definition, the fuzzier become the bounda­
ries" (p. 18). 'Although Rein fails to find a suitable distinction be­
tween social work and social policy, he does narrow socia1 welfare pol­
icy to three possible meanings: 
all social services including those distributed in the market; or 
only the public and private transfer systems; or 
policies, broader than social services, which include those eco­
nomic and physical development policies directed at socia1 wel­
fare objectives (pp. 17-18). 
Rein's designation of these different activities of social welfare 
pol icy closely resembles the meanings Dyckman proposes for social plan­
•
nlng. 12 
This consideration of boundaries has offered us a different per­
spective on social planning, but we are forced to concur with Rein's 
conclusion that substantia1 difficulties exist in delimiting the bound­
11See Rein (1970, pp. 3-4) for a discussionof what he terms "the 
stubborn ambiguity" in the meaning of social services. 
12Refer topp. 16-17 of this dissertation for Dyckman's defini­
tions. 
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aries of social policy. This consideration of boundaries has not led to 
a more precise meaning for social planning. 
Objectives. In an effort to understand social planning, we have 
examined definitions and boundaries. Now we will consider what have 
been proposed as the goals or objectives of social .planning. Both con­
crete and abstract goals will be considered. 
Fitch (1967) is one planner who has specified concrete goals for 
social planning. Included in what he terms "achievement" goals are the 
fo 11 owi ng: 
1. 	 Education, including training and retraining of adults. 
2. 	 Income maintenance programs for those who are economical­
ly stranded through personal incapacity or from social mal­
functioning such as unemployment. 
3. 	 Social services and counseling for those who need outside 
personal assistance and counsel ing. 
4. 	 Medical services, both general and preventive; and specific 
remedial services. 
5. 	 The apparatus of law enforcement, penology, parole, etc. 
directed at the prevention of delinquency and rehabilitation 
of those who tend to get into trouble by committing various 
offenses. 
6. 	 Housing ..• a minimum essential ingredient of human re­
source deve10pment . . . 
7. 	 Employment ... has been considered to be a major concern 
of economic planning, but there is no point in talking about 
socia1 planning without considering employment •• 
8. 	 Measures to combat discrimination and segregation ••. 
9. 	 The who~e set of other aspiration, achievement and oerform­
ance goals •.. directed at improving the environment, bet­
ter to meet the physical and spiritual needs of the entire 
population •.. (pp. 338-39, emphasis added). 
Concrete objectives for social planning are also dealt with by 
Perloff. He sets forth five social objectives for metropol itan regions 
in his 1963 article. In an article (1965) that he C"onsiders an exten­
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sion and development of this earlier one Per10ff specifies six areas that 
social planning needs to be concerned with: 
1. 	 Jobs and incomes of fami1 ies . 
2. 	 Financial support to those who cannot become economically 
self-supporting. 
3. 	 Emotional support for individuals and family groups who 

need it. 

4. 	 A high level of social services, particularly education and 
health .•• 
5. 	 Decent housing and a satisfying physical environment for all 
f am i lies . . . 
6. 	 El imination of racial discrimination •.. (p. 299, emphasis 
added). 
Although these six areas are not expressed in the language of ob­
jectives, they closely resemble Perloff's earlier formulation of objec­
tives, and more easily permit a comparison with Fitch's goals. One 
finds that Fitch and Perloff are in close agreement--the only difference 
consists in Fitch's including lithe apparatus of law enforcement.. 
as a goa 1 . 
Another way to approach the matter of objectives is to treat them 
in a more abstract manner. Fitch (1967) does this when he proposes two 
"aspiration goals" for social planning: (1) the el imination of poverty 
and its causes and (2) the elimination of the long-standing evil of ra­
cial discrimination (p. 337). 
These two goals are included in the social objectives proposed by 
a British sociologist, Peter Townsend: 
1. 	 The achievement of social equality or justice, 
2. 	 The redistribution of wealth, 
3. 	 The adjustment of income to meet the needs of dependency, 

equality for women, 

4. 	 Equ.lity for people of different race or religion and so 

on (q uoted by Gil, 1973, p. 7). 

II 
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While there is close agreement on goals between Fitch and Town-
send, Fitch states the goals negatively, that is, in terms of eliminat­
ing poverty and discrimination; Townsend expresses them positively--em­
phasizing equal ity and redistribution. Both expressions support Rein's 
declaration: "A compel 1 ing case can be made to define social policy as 
planning for social externalities, redistribution, and the equitable 
distribution of social benefits, especially social services (1970, p. 5). 
In this brief review of the goals/objectives of social planning we 
have seen them expressed both in concrete and in more abstract terms. 
The concrete objectives, as formulated by Fitch and by Perloff, might 
easily be placed in Dyckman's categories of social planning: either as 
a form of the social services or relating in some way to environmental 
or economic goals. The abstract expressions--Fitch's aspiration goals, 
Townsend's objectives, and Rein1s expression regarding social policy-­
resist this kind of categorization. 
However, can a common thread be found in these varied expressions 
of goals/objectives? Redistribution, according to Titmuss (1968), an­
other British social policy theorist, provides that commonality. His 
analysis of the categories of social policy led him to the conclusion 
that redistribution underlies all social policy. He contends that all 
categories of social policy are 
concerned with changing the individual and family pattern of 
current and future claims on resources set by the market, set 
by the possession of accumulated past rights,·and set by the 
al locations made by Government to provide for national defense 
and other non-market sectors ... (p. 192). 
Redistribution is also seen by Rein (1971) as the principal objec­
tive of social pol icy. liThe primary subject matter of social pol icy,lI 
26 
he declares, is "egalitarianism--a concern with the problems involved in 
the more equitable di'stribution of social goods ll (p. 297). 
Thus, egalitarianism or redistribution seem to be the ultimate pur­
pose of social policy. This assertation, of course, is a controversial 
one. Many may reject it as a goal of social planning, or may reject so­
cial planning because this is its goal, and even those who accept it may 
well question the possibility of achieving much significant redistribu­
tion. But our purpose is not to argue for any particular goal or objec­
tive: rather we have examined this issue to illuminate the nature of so­
cial planning. Looking at goals-objectives of social planning has pro­
vided us with another perspective in our search to find a meaning for s9­
cial planning. 
The Meaning of Social Planning: An Assessment and Reconceptualization 
In the preceding pages the nature of social planning has been ex­
amined from three "perspectives: 1I definitions, boundaries, and objec­
tives. This review indicates that there are few attempts at formal def­
initions of social planning or social policy, and that boundarie~ are 
not clearly delimited either. 
Definitions, boundaries, and objectives ultimately converge on the 
subject matter of social planning. Brooks (1970), after reviewing the 
I iterature of socia1 planning, asserts that lithe 'socia1' in social 
planning refers, of course, to the nature of the substantive areas in­
volved" (p. 4). We have seen that consensus does seem to exist that so­
cial planning is concerned with the social services and with certain spe­
cific areas, such as education, medical services, housing, and manpower 
development (Perloff, 1965; Fitch, 1967; Kahn, 1969; Brooks, 1970). 
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The subject matter of social planning is regarded by many theorists 
as anything that touches the broad questions of equity and justice. Thus, 
lIit is not the social services alone, but the social purposes and ~­
quences of agricultural, economic, manpower, fiscal, physical develop­
ment, and social welfare policies that form the subject matter of social 
pol icy" (Rein, 1970, p. 4, emphasis added). 
Conceptualizing social planning either as referring to the nature 
of its substantive areas, i.e., social services or specific areas, or in 
the broader sense as any planning that touches the question of equity 
and justice, does accurately reflect current usage. However, it is our 
contention that these notions of social planning are i~adequate for 
three reasons. First, understanding the IIsocial" in social planning as 
referri.ng to the nature of substantive areas--the subject matter in­
volved--is not a precise meaning. In this usage if one is planning a 
service for people--be it education~ health, housing, etc.--it can be 
called social planning. Why not be more exact and refer to social ser­
vice planning, or educational planning, housing planning, manpower plan­
n i ng, etc. 1 
Second, when the term social planning is used broadly to include 
planning that takes social consequences into account, social planning 
becomes identified with any form of planning. All forms of planning 
should be sensitive to social outcomes and their differential impact, 
but that seems little reason to justify calling it social planning. 
Third, when considering the kinds of problems facing modern urban 
society, both conceptions--social planning as referring to the nature of 
the substantive areas and as that planning that takes social consequences 
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into account--are inadequate. 
For these reasons current usages of social planning are held to 
be inadequate ones. Social planning needs to be understood in another 
sense. In th is d i ssertat ion pI ann i ng wi 11 be cons i dered as "soc i a 1" on­
.!.Y.. when prob 1 ems ~ conceptua 1 i zed ~ s t ructura 1 terms and when the 21­
~tives that ~ formulated deal with these structural aspects. 13 
If social planning is conceptualized in these terms, planning for 
the unemployed, or for community mental health, or for the relocation of 
low-income persons, etc. will not necessarily constitute social planning. 
If planning focuses on the individual as the unit of analysis and/or the 
object of change, it is not social planning. The reconceptualization of 
social planning that has just been proposed is based on the belief that 
"the source of social problems lies somewhere in the social order, the 
organized set of relationships which exist among individuals engaged in 
a sys~em of interaction" (Mayer, 1971, p. 132). 
Since it is contended that the source of problems is structural, 
other concepts of social planning are held to be inadequate precisely 
because they do not require that the causes of the problem be confronted. 
Planning needs to deal with the organized sets of relationships that are 
involved, and when it does, it is social planning. 
13Social structure is defined as "the complex array of roles and 
statuses that define the behavior of individuals and their relations 
with one another." The term can also refer to "any patterned regularity 
of behavior or f'nteraction" (Chinoy, 1968, pp. 68-69). 
In Chapter II of this dissertation structure is discussed as one 
component of the social system. 
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IV. THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISSERTATION 
Major Premise and Approach 
We have stated that our purpose is to make planning more responsive 
to the prob1ems of our cities. In the early 1960's several artic1es ap­
peared that had the same goal--their authors focused on how to make ur­
ban planning more responsive to social goals and social problems. It 
was recognized that urban planners should be concerned not only with the 
physical environment of the city, but also that they had a responsibil i­
ty for social goals as we1l (Webber, 1963; Frieden, 1965). Others saw 
linking physical or urban p1anning with social p1anning as the necessary 
task (Gans, 1963; Perloff, 1965). 
Although the concern of this dissertation also is attempting to 
make planning more responsive to the problems of the city, we will not 
search for a limore comprehensive approach" to improving urban conditions * 
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as some have done (Frieden and Morri s, 1968), nor advocate that lithe 
city planning" and "social planning" and/or economic planning approaches 
be coordinated as others have advocated (Frieden and Morris, 1968; 
Perloff, 1968). Our approach to improving planning will begin with an 
examination of the nature of social problems, and then we will consIder 
the implications this has on planning to resolve these problems. 
This approach to planning theory differs significantly from most 
current approaches. Many who attempt to make planning more effective 
begin by accepting the existent p01itical and social context. For exam­
ple, Kahn (1969) accepts the real ity that planning is 1 imited by the ex­
istent political process (pp. vii-ix, 58-59, 339). It 1s within this 
framework, then; that he grapples with ways to make planning more rele­
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vant and responsive to social needs. Kahn endeavors to enhance the ra­
tionality of the planning process by taking political variables--that 
both constrain and facilitate planning--into account. A very realistic 
approach to social planning theory and practice--and one that is useful 
to planners. 
However, the starting point of this dissertation is very different. 
It is not: How can we improve social planning within a given social and 
political context? Rather our starting point is: Looking at social 
problems, what must be done to resolve them? What kind of planning the­
ory and model are needed if social problems are to be resolved. 
The first approach is recognized as a valid one. It is our belief 
and contention that the second is also a valid and potentially fruitful 
one. 
This approach to planning theory differs from contemporary approach­
es in yet another way. In analyzing current planning theories it is pos­
sible to distinguish between those that are concerned with procedure or 
the planning process itself and those theories that deal with the sub­
ject matter of planning (Hightower, 1969). However, it appears essen­
tial that ~ theory of social planning involve both process and subject 
matter. Our contention is that the subject matter of social planning 
must be examined before a procedural model can be developed. Thus, this 
is how theoretical concepts and a social planning model will be devel­
oped in this dissertation. 
The specific contribution of this dissertation lies l!!. ~ relat­
l.!!a the nature of social problems to .e.!.!.n!!l!:!.s. theory and practice. The 
premise we will build on is that social planning must be in harmony with 
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the nature of its subject matter--and that its subject matter is social 
problems. The supposition is that if we grasp the nature of social prob­
lems and build planning theory and practice on these insights, our plan­
ning efforts will be more relevant and more effective. 
Therefore, our approach is a theoretical--and normative--one. So­
cial problems are the starting point. After an historica1 and theoreti­
cal analysis of social prob1ems, we consider what implications their na­
ture has on social planning, and the theoretical concepts and a mode1 
are developed. { 
The theoretical concepts, then, grow out of a consideration of so­
cial problems, and the model is consistent with these concepts. The de­
velopment of the components of the model did not occur in a vacuum. A 
vast I iterature on planning and policy is available, and thus, the con­
cepts and models of numerous theorists have been studied--with elements 
borrowed or reconceptualized. Components of the model do resemble other 
models, however, in their entirety--characteristics of the planning pro­
cess, planning phases, and planning roles--differ from any other model. 
And, importantly, the model is related to theoretical concepts which are 
in turn related to a theoretical analysis of social problems. 
The model is normative in nature; it is not tested empirically. In 
assessing the model we will evaluate it at a theoretical level. Because 
our contention is that in order to be effective, a social planning model 
must grow out of a consideration of the content of planning and be re­
sponsive to the nature of that content, the model will be evaluated on 
that basis. 
We will now consider in more detail how we propose to develop 
these theoretical concepts and model. 
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Outline of the Chapters 
Since we intend to I ink social planning with social problems, we 
will first delve into the nature of social problems. Two chapters will 
be devoted to this exploration. Some of the historical responses that 
have been made to problems of poverty will be discussed in Chaptt?i II. 
A social systems framework is presented in order to clarify how problems 
are generated and maintained as well as to explain how responses to 
these problems are shaped. 
Chapter I 1I draws upon soc i 0 log i ca I theory for ins ight into the 
nature of social problems. They are conceptualized as haVing two dimen­
sions: objective and subjective--both of which must be taken into ac­
count in social planning. Definitions of problems are also related to 
the solutions that are offered for problems. 
The next two chapters, IV and V, focus on soc i a I p I ann i ng. In 
Chapter tv social planning is placed in a framework of· social theory and 
is. di.scussed as the social construction of real ity. Social planning is 
specifically related to social problems--with evidence from the examina­
tion into the nature of social problems supporting two propositions: 
I. If social problems are to be dealt with effectively, social 
planning must treat the structural causes of these problems. 
2. If social problems are to be dealt with effectively, social 
planning must address ~l~ to the values, beliefs, definitions, etc. 
that obstruct social change. 
Chapter V deals with components of the planning model. It is ar­
gued that the planning process must be a "task-oriented," "experimental," 
"cybernetic,11 dialogic, and collaborative one if social problems are to be 
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resolved. Roles and phases of the model, which is identified as a col­
laborative one, are discussed and illustrated. The planner's role is 
outlined tn some detail. 
In the last chapter our approach and conceptual model are assessed 
along with other approaches to improving the policy/planning process and 
several planning models. It is contended that the collaborative model 
developed in this dissertation is the only one that is responsive to the 
nature of social problems. This dissertation--its theoretical concepts 
and conceptual model--is seen as a contribution to an emerging planning 
paradigm--one that holds the promise that ~~ learn to deal effective­
.!1. with the problems ~ confront 2.!!!. cities. 
CHAPTER II 
SOCIAL PROBLEMS: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
I. THE CITV AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS 
Contemporary Urban Problems 
"We are citizens of the richest and most fortunate nation in the 
history of the world.... [Vet] there are mil 1 ions of Americans--one 
fifth of our people--who have not shared in the abundance which has been 
granted to most of us, and on whom the gates of opportunity have been 
c10sed" (Johnson, 1964, in Will and Vatter, pp. 9-10). 
In this speech President Johnson recognized the problems of inade­
quate education, broken homes, a hosti1e and squalid environment, racial 
injustice, crime, delinquency, disease, hunger, and the hopelessness and 
despair of those living in these circumstances. And so, .~ national war 
on poverty" was declared in March, 1964. 
Only three years 1ater violence erupted in twenty-three American 
cities. In appointing a commission to investigate these "civi1 disor­
ders," Johnson identified the conditions that breed despair and vio­
lence: "ignorance, discrimination, slums, poverty, disease, not enough 
jobs. 11 He again declared that "we should attack these conditions" (Re­
port of The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 1968, 
p. xv). Today in the 1970's these still remain serious urban problems. 
As one pages through history, poverty and its attendant conditions 
are ever-present--affecting both city dwellers and peasantry. A review 
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of two thousand years of thought about urban life reveals an ever-present 
distrust of the city and a concomitant admiration of agrarian life (Erick­
son, 1967). Writers from earl iest times have left negative images of 
cities--cities are viewed as centers of great evils, crime, and squalor. 
Anti-urbanism' and a superficial acquaintance with history--with poverty 
and the city--may give rise to the view that today's problems are simi­
lar to those of the past, and therefore, in some way are inevitably as­
sociated with urban life. 
In many ways the problems of contemporary cities, and especially 
the conditions of its poorest residents, are similar to those that have 
always plagued the city. Yet the problems of contemporary cities in the 
United States are also different: they are rooted in the nineteenth cen­
tury--in industrialization and its consequences. 
The historical roots of contemporary urban problems will be ex­
amined in this chapter. When seen in this context, contemporary prob­
lems do not appear to be necessari ly endemic to urban life. And it is 
our assumption that these problems are therefore amenable to resolution. 
Because poverty is intimately related to these problems, we will focus 
on it--using poverty, urban problems, and social problems as interchange­
lNot only is there a long history of an anti-urban bias, but some 
urban experts contend that anti-urbanism, as an ideology, has prevented 
us from constructively coping with the problems of the city.' For exam­
ple, see Hadden et al., 1967, pp. 118-24. 
Anti-urbanTSm-rs not the only ideology that prevents us from deal­
ing adequately with urban problems. Racism is also a bias that is an 
important factor explaining the neglect of the city. The concentration 
of large numbers of blacks in center cities and the flight of the white 
to the suburb must also be considered. For a discussion see the reports 
of The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968, 1969). 
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able terms. Our emphasis will be on the responses that have been made 
to problems; then we will seek to understand some of the factors that 
have shaped these responses. Finally, as a help in clarifying both the 
causes of problems and responses to them, a social systems model will be 
presented. This wil I serve as a basis for the theoretical concepts and 
planning model that will be developed in later chapters. 
Nineteenth Century Roots: Industrial ization and Urbanization 
A noted historian, Richard Hofstadter (1955), has observed: liThe 
United States was born in the country and has moved to the city" (p. 23). 
Hofstadter then proceeds to develop his thesis that American life--our 
ideas, values, and institutions--has been shaped in large part by our 
agrarian experience. Our concern in this section, however, is not with 
our agrarian beginnings, but rather with what prompted lithe movement to 
the city." 
Two hundred years ago at the birth of the nation, its citizens 
I i,ved primari ly in rural areas and were a nation of farmers. Today 
eighty per cent of the population live in urban areas. Americans have 
indeed moved to the city. Many factors explain this movement, but our 
focus will be on industrialization as the primary force behind urbaniza­
tion, and as the factor that distinguishes contemporary urban problems 
in the United States from those of other periods of history. 
lndustrialization--and the factory system--had taken root in Amer­
ica at the end of the eighteenth century_ By 1830 manufacturing was 
flourishing in the East, although industry was not yet 'concentrated in 
the factory system. At this time also only about seven per cent of the 
nation's population 1 ived in cities of over 8000 (Hofstadter, 1948, pp. 
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56-57). Manufacturing continued to grow. New inventions led to the ex-
pans ion and spread of the factory system. Growth stimulated the demand 
for cheap labor. Immigrants responded to the opportunities for employ­
ment in industry and in canal and railroad construction, as well as to 
the plentiful farm land that was avai lable. In some places of the coun­
try the immigrant was welcomed, yet as early as 1819 immigration was 
cited as the principal cause of pauperism in New York City, and it was 
feared that the city would be overwhelmed by the hordes of newcomers 
(B remne r, 1956, p. 8). 
The Know-Nothing Party and Nativist movement in the 1840's and 
21850's were reactions to the influx of foreigners. Immigrants were 
perceived as flooding the labor market--driving wages down, displacing 
native citizens from jobs or forcing them to accept work at subsistence 
wages. In 1837 the new mayor of New York City expressed fear at the 
possibil ity that the immigrants might generate "a plague by collecting 
in crowds within small tenements and foul hovels." He saw them "filling 
every part of our once happy land with squal id poverty and profligacy" 
(quoted by Bremner, 1956, p. 8). 
Others expressed a more sympathetic view. liThe mournful and dis­
gusting condition" of the thousands of the "laboring population" who 
2The Know Nothing Party first came into existence in New York City. 
It successfully elected James Harper as mayor in 1844. As a national 
party it existed for only a few years in the early 1850's. The party's 
slogan: "Americans must rule America!" 
The Nativist Movement (1820-50) grew out of the bitter opposition 
to immigrants. Morrison and Commager maintain that "for the most part, 
however, the hatred of immigrants was economic in motive. They com­
peted with mechanics who were trying to protect their standard of living 
by labor unions. Natives refused to work with newcomers, who were then 
forced into manual labor ..." (1957, Vol. 1, p. 502): 
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lived in New York City's slums in the 1840's aroused the concern of Dr. 
John H. Griscom, a pioneer sanitary reformer. In Boston William Ellery 
Channing denounced the practice of "letting ce11ars and rooms which can­
not be ventilated, which want the benefits of light, free air, and pure 
water, and the means of removing filth!" (Bremner, 1956, p. 5). The 
poor in other cities lived in similar conditions. 
The economic panics of 1819 and 1837, leaving large numbers unem­
ployed with no source of livelihood and affecting the I ives of many oth­
ers, reduced numerous Americans to levels of degradation previously un­
known in this country. By 1860 industrial and urban growth had given 
birth to problems of poverty--lInovel in kind and alarming in size" 
(Bremner, p. 4). Yet the United States was predominantly a rural soci­
ety with eighty per cent of its population living on farms. 
The explosive growth of industry and cities in the years following 
the Civil War extended and intensified poverty and problems of the cit­
ies and their residents. Between 1860 and 1910 the country's population 
increased almost sevenfold. Immigrants continued to pour in. By 1910 
over thirteen million inhabitants were foreign-born--one-seventh of the 
total population. 3 The expansion of industry was a major force behind 
3Between 1860 and 1910 the rural population grew from 25,226,000 
to 49,973,000 while the urban grew from 6,216,000 to 41,998,000. The 
most rapid growth occurred in cities of 100,000 or more (Hofstadter, 
1955, p. 174). In 1907 immigration reached a peak with 1,285,000 immi­
grants entering the country. A notable shift in the sources of immigra­
tion had occurred over time: from northwestern Europe to the peasantry 
of southern and' eastern Europe (Hofstadter, 1955, p. 177). 
See Wilensky and Lebeaux (1958, pp. 49-55) for a concise account 
of the relationship between industrial growth and immigration and for an 
explanation of how the immigrant emerged as "a social problem." 
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population growth, and specifically, behind urban growth. Industrial 
production increased phenomenally: the production of bituminous coal 
increased five times, crude petroleum twelve times, steel ingots and 
castings over one hundred forty times in the thirty years between 1870 
and 1900 (Hofstadter, 1963, pp. 1-2). 
The latter half of the nineteenth century was a time of immense 
industrial and urban growth (and immigration). More significantly, it 
was a period of transition: the United States was in the process of be­
ing transformed from a rural society into an urban one. A nation based 
on an agrarian economy with a comparatively wide diffusion of property 
and power was evolving into one based on an industrial economy with 
4
wealth and power concentrated in the hands of few persons. 
In this period of transition, the 1890's stand out as lithe water­
shed of American history," for it was during this decade, according to 
historian Henry Steele Commager (1970), that 
a full-throated recognition [came] of the crowding problems of 
agriculture, urban life, slums, trusts, business and political 
corruption, race prejudice, and the maldistribution of wealth, 
and with it, convulsive efforts to adapt a federal political 
system to a central ized economy, and a laissez-faire philoso­
phy to a program of social democracy (p. 46). 
These problems, though more widely recognized in the 1890's, did 
4For a further discussion of this shift in the distribution of 
wealth, status, and power that occurred after the Civil War, refer to 
Hofstadter (1955, pp. 135-36) and to Dye and Zeigler (1971, pp. 71-79). 
Hofstadter relates lithe status revolution" to the Progressive Move­
ment. He develops the thesis that many in the middle class became Pro­
gressives "not because of economic deprivation but primarily because 
they were victims of an upheaval in status" (p. 135). See Chapter 4, 
liThe Status Revo1ut ion and Progress ive Leaders,'1 for the deve lopment of 
this thesis. 
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not emerge then,5 but have existed in an incipient form since the very 
beginning of industrialization in this country. It w~sduring the 
1880's and 1890 l s that growing numbers of Americans--farmers, workers, 
small businessmen and others of the middle class--began to become cog­
nizant of their existence. And as shal 1 be discussed later, not only 
were problems recognized, but a major reform movement grew out of this 
recognition. 
In summary, at the turn of the century every large city in the 
United States had its slums where workers lived in crowded and squal id 
tenements in equally squalid neighborhoods. 6 Problems of housing, sani­
tat ion, disease, and other problems of the urban poor were intimately 
connected with inadequate wages, unsafe and unsanitary working condi­
tions (that produced high accident rates and occupational diseases), and 
frequent unemployment. These conditions of the laborer--men, women, and 
children--are an integral part of nineteenth century industrialization 
with its tremendous productivity and generation of wealth. Today's ur­
ban problems must be seen in this historical context. 
5After some historical research the student who is seeking to un­
derstand today's urban problems may conclude that these conditions are 
rooted in the second half of the nineteenth century. Two examples will 
illustrate why this inaccurate conclusion might be made. In their book 
which analyzes the impact of industrialization on social welfare ser­
vices in the United States Wilensky and Lebeaux (1959) begin with the 
problems emerging in the decades following the Civil War. (See Chapter 
3, liThe Early Impact of Industrial ization on Society.lI) Also after 
reading Hofstadter, the Pulitzer Prize-winning historian of the Progres­
sive Era, the student might perhaps infer that urban problems arose in 
the United States in the latter half of the nineteenth century. See 
both his The Age of Reform and The Progressive Movement: 1900-1915. 
6As late as 1910 the 10,000 persons living in the Hurigarian set­
tlement in Buffalo, New York, did not have a single bathtub (Powell, 
1968, p. 431). 
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I I. RESPONSES TO SOCIAL PROBLEMS: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
In our search to understand contemporary urban problems we will 
again take an historical approach as we consider both private and govern­
mental responses that have been made to problems of urban poverty. No 
attempt will be made at either a comprehensive or a strictly chronologi­
cal study. Responses to specific problems, such as housing, sanitation, 
public health, child welfare, labor problems, etc. will not be consid­
ered in any detail. Our consideration will be selective--focusing on 
key organizational responses in the nineteenth century, the reform move­
ment that culminated in 1915, the War on Poverty of the 1960's, and cur­
rent federal programs. The New Deal will be touched briefly as we ex­
amine the development of the federal government's role in coping with 
urban problems. 
Early Responses to Poverty 
Publ ic Responsibility. Long before the Industrial Revolution oc­
curred in the United States, methods had been devised to provide for 
needy colonists. In the 1600'scolonial assembl ies accepted the princi­
ple that the smallest unit of government had the responsibility to care 
for those who were unable to care for themselves. 7 The response of the 
colonists to the problem of poverty was influenced by British tradition 
and law, and especially by the Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601. 8 That Jaw 
7For a discussion of social welfare in colonial America, see 
Trattner (1974, 'Chapter 2). 
8For a further discussion of the Poor Law refer to Trattner (1974, 
Chapter 1), PoJanyi (1957), and Pumphrey (1965, pp. 28~29). 
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recognized the existence of various categories of the poor and provided 
accordingly: the aged and infirm (the "impotent" or helpless) were to be 
cared for (provided with "relief"), orphans apprenticed, and work was to 
be provided for the able-bodied. Family responsibil ity as well as pri­
vate charity were recognized, but when these proved incapable of meeting 
need, responsibil ity was placed at the lowest level of government--the 
town or the parish. 
After independence was gained, laws modeled after the British Poor 
Law were enacted. "As new states drew on the experience of older ones, 
the Poor Law was transmitted, with a minimum of change, across the con­
tinent. Modifications did not change the essential nature of the law 
unti I well into the twentieth century'l (Pumphrey, 1965, p. 26). 
Responsibil ity for the needy gradually began to expand beyond the 
local community.9 As early as 1701 Massachusetts colony recognized that 
meeting the needs of the poor was sometimes beyond the ability of the 
town and the colony assumed the responsibil ity of reimbursing towns when 
they provided for nonresidents. At the end of the eighteenth century 
the state of New York provided relief for persons who had been removed 
from their homes during the Revolutionary War and also granted funds to 
cities to assist the needy. In 1824 New York transferred responsibility 
for publ ic assistance from towns to the county. Special ized facilities 
for the deaf, dumb, and mentally ill began to be establ ished by the 
states. Although not assuming total responsibility states expanded 
90ne of the themes of the history of welfare in the United States 
that Pumphrey (1965) develops is the expansion of the geographic basis 
of welfare. Polanyi (1957, p. 95) discusses the same tendency in Brit­
ish social welfare policy. 
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,d 
their role in providing for the needy. 
Private Efforts. Throughout American history 	individuals and vol­
10
untary associations have responded to needy persons. After the Panic 
of 1837 a number of charitable societies were organized to meet the needs 
of those sufferi'ng, from the depression. Soon thirty to forty societies 
existed in New York City, and the demands on them were great. In 1843 
the Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor (A.I .C.P.) was 
founded. The A.I .C.P. was not just another charity agency, rather its 
aim was to coordinate the work of the many existing agencies. "Friendly 
visitors" called upon the needy and provided aid--either referral to an 
appropriate agency or help from the A.I.C.P. itself. The associati.on 
also worked to improve housing conditions, health, and child welfare. 
Housing surveys were conducted, model tenements built, and public sani­
tation and compulsory school attendance laws were promoted. 
Charity Organization Societies (C.O.S.) founded a generation after 
the A.I .C.P. sought to determine who were deserving of assistance and en­
deavored to provide more efficient service. The C.O.S. coordinated ex­
isting charitable organizations, sought to "encourage the investigation 
of appeals for assistance, prevent duplication of effort by different 
groups, discover imposters, and suppress mendicancy" (Bremner, 1956, p. 
51). Volunteers investigated the poor, referring them to an agency if 
they were found I'deserving." The ultimate goal of the visitors was to 
10For a survey of voluntary charitable activity see Robert H. 
Bremner (1960) who deals with philanthropy from colonial times to the 
mid-twentieth c~ntury. He also shows how attempts to lido good" by fur­
thering human welfare has sometimes confl icted with American bel iefs of 
individualism and opportunity. 
44 
stimulate the poor to become self-sufficient. The means: advice and 
example. 
A different approach to urban problems of the nineteenth century 
11 
was that of the settlement workers. In the 1880·s settlement houses 
were established in New York City and Chicago. By 1900 about one hun­
dred were in existence across the country. Young men and women, largely 
well-educated and middle- or upper-class, lived among the poor. Eager 
to assist individuals, they also worked to transform the environment of 
the slum neighborhood. Settlement houses originally provided a meeting 
place for neighborhood organizations, then in response to a variety of 
needs workers became involved in providing a broad range of services: 
playgrounds; kindergartens; classes in art, music, homemaking; clinics; 
and day nurseries. Investigations into poverty and its manifold dimen­
sions led settlement residents into social reform--campaigning for pub­
lic parks, playgrounds, better schools, public health services, better 
tenement laws, and other areas of advocacy. 
The Nationalization of Reform 
Throughout the nineteenth century countless individuals and groups 
labored to counteract the problems created or exacerbated by industrial­
ization and urbanization. As problems increased in both scope and in­
tensity, private organizations increased in number and size. In the at­
tempt to make charitable efforts more efficient, new methods were devel­
oped and efforts to coordinate agencies continued. Social work gradu­
110avis ( 967) explores the relationship between the settlement 
workers and the reform movement of the Progressive Era. In his view the 
settlement movement was in the vanguard of reform. 
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ally became a paid and professional activity. Cities continued to dis­
pense relief and responded in some ways to problems of housing, sanita­
tion, health, and other conditions. The role of the state too gradually 
expanded, with state supported institutions multiplying. But the feder­
al government had rejected any permanent role in social welfare activi­
ties. 12 We will highl ight the reform efforts from 1890-1915 that final­
ly drew the federal government into responding to the problems of indus­
t ria 1i za t ion. 
Populism. Interestingly, Populism, the first political movement 
to seriously attack the problems created by industrialization, origi­
nated--not in the city, but in the countryside. Subjected to unfavorable 
market and price conditions, farmers saw themselves as exploited by lithe 
Plutocrats," lithe money interests" (Hofstadter,1955, p. 58). liThe Pop­
..ul ists •. • according to Hofstadter, "were rebelling against the dom­t 
ination of the country by industrial ists and finance capitalists" (p. 
93). The federal government was seen as the only force capable of con­
fronting the problem, and thus the Popul i st Party demanded national re­
forms. Populism reached its peak in 1894 (Hofstadter, p. 100), but by 
then the demand for reform had spread from the farmers to the middle 
12Trattner (1974, Chapter 5) traces the development of " sc ientific 
charity" in private, voluntary organizations and at the state level. He 
indicates that although the federal government had concerned itself with 
education in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, on occasion had aided vic­
tims of fires, floods, and cyclones, and had also deeded public land to 
both private and publ ic institutions, it had rejected a permanent role 
in social welfare. President Pierce reinforced this lack of involvement 
by vetoing an 1854 bill that would have given states ten million acres 
of federal landfor mental hospitals. (Dorthea Dix was largely responsi­
ble for the passage of the legislation.) This view that the federal gov­
ernment should have no role in charity was to control federal-state rela­
tions in social welfare for fifty years. (Refer to Chapter 4 for this 
discussion.) 
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class and to the two major parties. 
Progressivism. During the 1890 l s growing numbers of the urban mid­
dle class awakened to the evils that had accompanied the tremendous in­
dustrial and urban growth. Those who had worked to alleviate problems 
in the city were well acquainted with these evils, but many now began to 
view them in a new 1ight. Davis (1967) notes the frustration of the 
settlement workers--feelings that were no doubt shared by other reform­
ers: 
For more than two decades they had campaigned for better hous­
ing laws, for shorter hours and safer working conditions, for 
parks and playgrounds, and for other reforms in the city.•.. 
They had tried to correct the abuses they sawall around them; 
occasionally they had joined political reform movements, but 
altogether they were disappointed with the results (p. 193). 
What had been the results? In spite of the efforts of so many, 
cities at the turn of the century were "industrial wastelands--centers 
of vice and poverty, ugly, full of crowded slums, badly administered" 
(Hofstadter, 1963, p. 2). Efforts of urban reformers "had often been' 
frustrated by unco-operative courts and politicians, and even when they 
had managed to elect an official or pass a reform bill, they had re­
mained dissatisfied and disturbed by the problems remaining" (Davis, 
1967, p. 194). 
Many had learned from experience that the power of voluntary asso­
ciations, city government, and the state was inadequate to cope with the 
major problems 'engendered by industrialization and urbanization. It was 
seen as essential to carry reform to the national level. This turning 
to the federal government for assistance in attacking problems created 
by industrialization characterized both the Popul ist and Progressive 
Movements. 
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While a diversity of social classes with a wide variety of issues 
embraced Progressivism,13 three broad goals can be identified: (1) lito 
reform the business order, to restore or maintain competition ... and 
to expand credit in the interest of the consumer, the farmer, and the 
small businessman;I' (2) I'to minimize the most outrageous and indefensi­
ble exploitation of the working population;,114 and (3) to institute po-
I itical reforms that would restore government to the control of the com­
mon citizen and strengthen the democratic process (Hofstadter, 1955, 
p. 238). 
Accomplishments. Reformers battled political bosses at local and 
state levels, and in many cases succeeded in enacting various democratic 
reforms aimed at returning government to the people. Progress was also 
made in social reforms. Tenement laws were adopted that required higher 
standards for construction, decency, and safety. States passed legisJa­
tion regulating the labor of women and children, enacted workmen's com­
pensation, and assistance laws. 15 
13The Progressive Movement is described by Hofstadter (1955"p. 131) 
as urban, middle class, and nationwide. "After 1900 Populism and Pro­
gressivism merge, although a close student may find in the Progressive 
era two broad strains of thought, one influenced chiefly by the Popu­
list inheritance, the other mainly a product of urban life. Progressi­
vism was characterized by a fresh, more intimate and sympathetic con­
cern with urban problems--Iabor and social welfare, municipal reform, 
the interest of the consumer" (p. 133). 
14While the second goal is based on the recognition that workers 
were exploited, reformers believed that there was nothing inherent in 
the system that caused class exploitation. The first goal clearly in­
dicates that the economy itself was accepted--granted it was in need of 
reform that would widen economic opportunity. 
15Refer to Bremner (1956, Chapter 12) for a discussion of tenement 
house reform and the crusade against child labor.' He also traces ef­
forts to regulate hours and conditions of women's work (Chapter 13). 
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In some states legislation was directed at regulating railroads, 
public utilities, insurance companies, and other businesses, but many 
times problems were beyond the control of the state. Reformers then de­
manded action at the federal level. These efforts led to federal legis­
lation regulating large corporations and railroads and were eventually 
16
successful in enacting tariff, banking, and credit reforms. 
In large part the laws were ineffective in dealing with the prob­
lems, yet the basis and precedent were established for further reforms. 
The federal government had accepted t~ wide and pervasive responsibility 
for the welfare of its citizens, and for the poor and powerless among 
them" (Hofstadter, 1963, p. 15). 
In the following pages we will focus on the federal government's 
role, analyzing the confl icting views of intervention in a market eco­
nomy. 
Role of the Government: Laissez Faire vs. Intervention 
The role that government should assume has been the subject of 
confl icting ideological views (Fine, 1956; Schottland, 1967). On the 
one hand, proponents of laissez faire and natural law have argued for a 
minimal role for government. On the other hand, others have argued that 
16The Sherman Act (1890) and the Clayton Act (1914) were anti­
trust measures aimed at monopolistic practices of corporations. The 
Pure Food and Drug Act (1906) and the Meat Inspection Act (1907) were 
designed to pro'tect the consumer. The Federal Trade Commission (1914) 
was established to prevent unfair trade practices. The Hepburn Act 
(1906) gave the Interstate Commerce Commission power to regulate rail­
roads. Tariffs were revised downward by the Underwood Tariff (1913)-­
tne first important tariff reform since the Civil War. Banking and 
credit practices were affected by the creation of the Federal Reserve 
System (1913). 
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government has a responsibi1ity to promote the we1fare of its citizens, 
and thus must intervene and modify the free p1ay of economic forces. We 
wil1 focus on these conf1 icting views of intervention in a market econ­
omy, tracing the movement from nonintervention to a negative role for 
government, and fina11y to a positive one. 
Nonintervention. The doctrine of 1aissez faire was a natura1 de­
ve10pment of the eighteenth century with its be1ief in rationality and 
natural law. liDo not interfere,1I I/l eave the market a10ne," and a11 will 
work toward the good of society. These notions fit we11 with the con­
cept of a mechanistic universe. 
Although first advocated by the Physiocrats with respect to the ex­
port of grain, it was through Adam Smith (Wea1 th of Nations, 1776) that 
laissez faire was given theoretica1 justification. Smith's "wh01e eco­
nomic phi10sophy stemmed from his unquestioning faith in the abi1ity of 
the market to guide the system to its point of highest return fl (Hei1­
broner, 1964, p. 53). 
A self-regulating market implies that a11 goods, 1abor, land, and 
money are for sale on the market, and that the price of each (prices, 
wages, rent, and interest) must be 1eft free to find its own natural 
level. Any interference with the market mechanism--so the theory went-­
would be at society's expense. 
The emerging capita1ist c1ass found the theory of a free and un­
fettered market much to their 1iking and advantage. This theory which 
re1egated government to the r01e of nonintervention was consistent a1so 
wi th the tradi tiona1 American distrust of governmenta1 power and the be-, 
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17lief that the best government is one that governs least. 
Intervention: A Negative Role for Government. Yet, according to 
Karl Polanyi (1957), in practice government cannot be relegated the role 
of strict nonintervention. The major thesis of Polanyi's book, The 
Great Transformation (1957),18 is that a self-regulating market is in 
actual ity an impossibi I ity, "a stark utopia. 11 Accepting the concept 
produced a dilemma, for "inevitably, society took measures to protect 
itself, but whatever measures it took impaired the self-regulation of 
the market, disorganized industrial life, and thus endangered society in 
yet another wayl' (Polanyi, pp. 3-4). 
Polanyi shows that continuous and increasing government interven­
tion was necessary to protect "free markets" (Chapter 12). Although 
Polanyi uses British policy to support his thesis, his analysis applies 
to nineteenth century America as well. Americans bel ieved in the com­
petitive order and accepted the market system, yet Jeffersonians and 
Jacksonians--even before the Populists and the Progressives--believed 
that government had a role to play in maintaining competition, in pol ic­
i ng the market. 
From the 1880's to 1915, which marked the end of the Progressive 
Era, the federal government was increasingly relied upon to regulate 
1711The distrust of authority" is cited by Hofstadter(1955, pp. 
228-29) as a "well-established trait in the national character." 
18 1n this book Polanyi analyzes the market economy of the nine­
teenth century and its social and pol itical implications. The key to 
the political and economic institutions of that time, he maintains, lay 
in the laws governing the market economy (1957, p. 3). He offers an in­
sightful analysis of these nineteenth century British institutions. 
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large corporations and railroads. This intervention was at first a re­
sponse to the needs of the entrepreneurial classes or those on the brink 
of entrepreneurship: lithe farmers, small businessmen, professionals, 
and occasionally the upper caste of the artisans" (Hofstadter, 1955, 
p. 305). Laws were enacted that affected the meat packing industry, a 
Pure Food and Drug Act was passed, a national conservation policy adopt­
ed, tariffs lowered, the Federal Reserve System created, and the Federal 
Trade Commission established. Although the federal government was more 
frequently intervening in the market, the role it assumed was largely 
. d . 19negative an preventive. 
Intervention and the New Deal: A Positive Role for Government. 
With the advent of World War I the reform movement that had assigned a 
more active role to government halted and seemed to disappear in the 
· f t h twenties.• But within a few years the depressionprosperity 0 e 20 
gave birth to anothe r per iod of reform: lithe New Dea I .11 
Hofstadter maintains that the New Deal differed from all other pe-· 
riods of reform in American history (1955, pp. 302-16). It was the only 
time when a leader of a reform party took office during a severe depres­
19Hofstadter (1948) discusses Wilson's "New Freedom" as Itan attempt 
of the middle class, with agrarian and labor support, to arrest the ex­
ploitation of the community, the concentration of wealth, and the grow­
ing control of politics by insiders, and to restore, as far as possible, 
compet i t i ve opportun it ies in bus i ness" (p. 260). In embrac i ng the pro­
gressive creed, Wilson admitted that he was not against big business, 
but against trusts; nor was he against free competition, but illicit 
competition (p. 256). Wilson, as other reformers, proposed "no funda­
mental alteration in the economic order. He ... aimed to preserve 
competition, individual ism, enterprise, opportunity •.. " (p. 259). 
20'n his examination of the 1920'5 Hofstadter (1955, pp. 272-301) 
asserts that about the only new concern of the federal \ government was 
the regulation of the production and distribution of liquor. 
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sion. 21 More significantly, other reform movements had dealt with " re­
forms of an essentially entrepreneurial sort and only marginally with so­
cial legislation" (p. 308). For the fi rst time the federal government 
assumed responsibility for the condition of the labor market, for social 
security, unemployment insurance, wages and hours. Fiscal policy was 
used to stimulate the economy. A federal housing act was also approved 
authorizing public housing. Although the program was a small one, in 
Charles Abrams' view, it was politically revolutionary (1965, p. 4). 
In this particular exercise of the welfare power the federal government 
accepted a measure of responsibil ity for an urban problem, and also 
chose to deal directly with the city. 
More significantly, the New Deal signaled the beginning of an era 
in which the federal government undertook a positive role in jnterven­
. . 1 • h lf f· .. 22tlon: active y promoting t e we are 0 Its citizens. 
The War on Poverty 
We have considered nineteenth century responses to urban problems, 
have traced the role that government--and the federal government in par-
ticular--assumed through the 1930'5. Now our focus turns to the Economic 
21p rogresslvlsm.. fl ourls. h d e d· time• 0 f comparative. prosperity,urlng a . 
while the reforms of the New Deal) of course, were initiated during a 
severe depression. See Hofstadter (1963, pp. 6-7 and 1955, pp. 302-16) 
for a contrast between these two periods of reform. 
22This view is consistent with Hofstadter's interpretation. Theo­
dore Lowi (1969) also maintains that the principle of positive government 
was established.by 1937. However, Lowi argues that we need to look at 
the purpose of the intervention: is it to maintain the status quo, or is 
it concerned with change, and if so, what degree of change? For that 
discussion see Chapter 3, liThe New Publ ic Philosophy: Interest Group 
L i be rali sm •II 
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Opportunity Act of 1964, more commonly known as the "War on Poverty." No 
attempt will be made to evaluate its programs, rather we will seek to an­
swer why a "warll was declared, what it was, and how this response com­
pares with previous responses to poverty. 
Origins. Several writers have traced what they consider to be the 
origins of the War on Poverty.23 There is no need here for a comprehen­
sive explanation, and indeed, the origins of the War on Poverty are not 
easy to explain (Levitan t 1969, p. 11). Thus, the remarks that follow 
seek only to place the legislation in its historical context. 
With the advent of World War I I and during the post-war period pov­
erty was largely forgotten. Some social legislation was passed, but on 
the whole, the nation was indifferent to poverty or issues of reform. 
General prosperity characterized 1963 and 1964: the economy was expand­
ing, incomes were rising (Levine, 1970, p. 45; Levitan, 1969, pp. 11-12). 
Yet an awareness was growing that not all Americans shared in the 
general economic well-being. Statistical analyses revealed that the num­
ber of persons living in poverty was actually increasing, and that the 
incidence of poverty fell heavily on certain groups: racial minorities, 
the aged, and those living in certain areas of the country. Michael 
Harrington's book, The Other America (1963), and an article by Dwight 
MacDonald that appeared in The New Yorker in early 1963 brought the phe­
nomenon of mass poverty before the public (Levitan, 1969, pp. 12-13). 
It was during this period of increased consciousness of the plight 
23The origins of the War on Poverty are discussed by Sundquist 
(1969), Donovan (1967), Moynihan (1969), Levitan (1969), and Levine 
(1970) . 
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I 
of the 	poor that the Economic Opportunity Actl-the federal government1s 
response to poverty--was enacted. However, Piiven and Cloward (1971) of­
fer another explanation for its passage--argu~ng t~t the Econ~ic Oppor-
I 
tunity 	Act, as well as other social legiSlati4n of the Kennedy and John­
.. . 24 ... d . . 1 Y • ff hson administrations, was Initiate prlmarl I In an e ort to strengt ­
en their political base in the nation's citie$. In 1960 ninety per cent 
I 
of Northern blacks were concentrated in cities in the ten most populous 
Northern states. liTo reach, placate, and integrate a turbulent black 
constituency, the national Democratic administrations in the 1960 l s 
II sponsored a variety of programs lito help blacks get more from 10­
cal government" (Piven and Cloward (1971, p. 281). 
Whether this was the political imperative, as Piven and Cloward 
cogently argue, is debatable. However, demographic facts as well as the 
growing civil rights movement no doubt made the Kennedy and the Johnson 
administrations more responsive to the issue of poverty (Levitan, 1969, 
pp.14-15). 
Goals and Programs. In Pre~ident Johnson's Message on Poverty on 
March 3, 1964, he declared that "for the first time in our history it is 
possible to conquer poverty." He also spoke of opening lithe gates of 
opportun i tyll for the one-fi fth of the nat ion who was poor (Wi II and Vat­
ter, 1970, pp. 9-11). Overcoming poverty and extending opportunity may 
24Besides the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 the Juvenile Del in­
quency and Youth Offenses Control Act of 1961, the Community Mental Health 
Centers Act of 1963, and Title I of the Demonstration Cities and Metro­
pol itan Develop~ent Act of 1966 are included as part of the federal 
strategy in the cities. For an extended discussion of federal interven­
tion in the cities see Piven and Cloward (1971, Chapter 9, liThe Great 
Society and Relief: Federal Intervention"). 
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be seen as the broad goals--and the stated goals--of the Economic Oppor­
tunity Act. 25 
There are many ways that the programs can be classified or dis­
cussed. Again, many writers have done this. Also assuming that readers 
have some famil iarity with these programs, we will not review the pro­
grams, but will only highlight three categories: 
l. The manpower programs: Job Opportunities in the Business Sec­
tor (JOBS), Job Corps, and Neighborhood Youth Corps (NYC)--whose objec­
tive was to provide training to improve the abil ity of the worker to en­
ter the labor market and increase his income; 
2. Educational programs: Head Start, Follow Through, and Upward 
Bound--whose objective was compensatory education or equalizing educa­
tional opportunity; and 
3. The Community Action Programs (CApl s ). Title I I of the Econom­
ic Opportunity Act authorized any activity that would give promise of 
el iminating poverty. Community action programs might aim at "developing 
employment opportunities, improving human performance, motivation, and 
productivity, or bettering the conditions under which people live, learn, 
and work." The programs were to be "developed, conducted, and adminis­
tered with the maximum feasible participation of resident~ of the area 
and members of the groups served." The CAP's could be under the auspic­
es of either publ ic or private nonprofit agencies (Clark and Hopkins, 
1968, pp. 6-7). 
25Levine (1970, Chapter 3) argues that the War on Poverty had two 
objectives: anti-poverty and equal opportunity. From his evaluation of 
its programs, he concludes that the stress was primarily on opportunity. 
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Operating under these broad guidelines, CAP's led to a variety of 
. . .. d . . 26programs: serVices, community organization, an community action. 
Comparison with Earlier Responses. Although the Economic Oppor­
tunity Act has been considered only briefly, some comparisons can be 
made between it and earlier responses to poverty and urban problems. 
Levitan expresses the bel ief that the 1964 legislation is rooted 
in the tradition of the Elizabethan Poor Law, as the title of his book, 
The Great Society's Poor Law (1969), indicates. After an evaluation of 
the implementation of the Economic Opportunity Act, Levitan concludes 
that society grudgingly provides help to the poor (po 318). The goal of 
the act, Levitan maintains, "was not to ease the burdens of poverty by 
providing cash;" rather its goal was "to offer the poor the opportunity 
to lift themselves out of poverty" (po 318, emphasis added). 
The War on Poverty is also rooted in the New Deal. Emergency Re­
lief, the Works Progress Administration, the National Youth Administra­
tion, and the Civil ian Conservation Corps "were earl ier versions of the 
war or skirmishes against the prevailing poverty of the Depression years'l 
(Clark and Hopkins, 1968, p. 3). 
In the 1930's the federal government had responded to problems of 
poverty. Yet the poor of that time could not be distinguished by racial 
or other characteristics. The programs of the New Deal--especially so­
cial security and the legislation that regulated hours, wages, and work­
26Clark and Hopkins (1968) conclude from their analysis that the 
CAP's were overwhelmingly service-oriented. Their conclusion is sup­
ported by Hallman (1968) who found that thirty-two of the thirty-five 
CAP's he evaluated emphasized services. 
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ing conditions--affected the vast majority of Americans. The poverty of 
tHe 1960's was different: it was highly concentrated in groups that were 
characterized by unequal opportunity. The War on Poverty, directed at 
these groups, especially at the large number of black Americans, differed 
then from earlier efforts (Levine, 1970, p. 33). 
The Housing Act of 1937 had involved the federal government direct­
ly in the city. This role was expanded by the Housing Acts of 1949 and 
1954. The federal government became concerned with slum clearance and 
urban renewal--assuming a responsibility for renewing the cities (Abrams, 
1965, pp. 78-79). 
With the Economic Opportunity Act, the federal government became 
further involved with the city and its problems. Although the "war" was 
on poverty, both rural and urban, the cities were the primary battle­
fields. 27 
According to Piven and Cloward (1971), the War on Poverty and oth­
er Great Society programs involved ~ unique administrative arrangement-­
a "direct relationship between the national government and the ghettoes, 
a relationship in which both state and local governments were undercut" 
(p.26l). The language of the legislation might refer to the "inner 
city," "slums," or the "urban core," but these were only euphemisms for 
the ghetto (p. 260). In their view, as the New Deal circumvented the 
states, dealing directly with the cities, the Great Society--in offering 
27Piven and Cloward (1971) cite the "urban bias" of the Great So­
ciety's programs. To support this assertion they quote Levitan: "For 
the nation as a whole, CAP grants over the first four years averaged 
roughly $97 per poor person. The comparable figure in the ten cities 
that received the largest grants was almost three times the national av­
erage" (pp. 258-59). 
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federal funds to the ghetto--was circumventing city government (p. 263). 
Donovan (1967) also acknowledges the existence of a new pattern of 
federal-local relationships, suggesting that "one of the most interesting 
aspects of the new legislation is its heavy rel iance on local initiative. 11 
He states that the requirement of "maximum feasible participation" of the 
local residents and the poor may well be "the most significant social 
welfare innovation since the days of the New Deal ll (p. 60). 
Earlier the Housing Act of 1954 did require that cities showevi­
dence of "citizen participation" in order to receive urban renewal funds. 
But "participation" in urban renewal resulted in city-wide advisory 
boards--not in the inv01vement of the poor or the residents of the area 
slated for clearance. A workbook from the Office of Economic Opportuni­
ty, the agency that administered the CAP's, stated that I~ne of the ma­
jor problems of the poor is that they are not in a position to influence 
the policies, procedures, and objectives of the organizations responsi­
ble for their welfare" (Donovan, 1967, p. 43). Institutions were con­
sidered unresponsive to the needs of the poor, and thus, social agencies, 
schools, hea1th agencies, and city government became targets of reform. 28 
Most previous efforts to deal with poverty had the individual as a 
28The forerunners of the community action programs were the Juven­
ile Delinquency and Youth Offenses Control Act of 1961 and the Grey Area 
Projects sponsored by the Ford Foundation. These were attempts to at­
tack the causes of poverty through community action. 
See Marris and Rein (1967) for a discussion of the origins of com­
munity action as an approach to social problems and also for a discus­
sion of the evolution of community action under the Economic Opportunity 
Act. 
Moynihan (1969) a1so discusses the President's Commission on Ju­
venile Del inquency (Chapter 3) and the Mobilization for Youth, a Ford 
Foundation project in New York City (Chapters 3 and 6). 
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target of change. 29 Most of the poverty programs of the 1960's--even 
most of the community action programs--ultimately did too. Yet CAP's 
involved the poor in varying degrees in planning and in administering 
programs. Some of the CAP's, recognizing the need for institutional 
change, were committed to the strategy of giving power to the poor and 
of stimulating their confrontation with lithe establishment." The at­
tempt to involve the poor does represent an important break with tradi­
tional social welfare activities (Clark and Hopkins, 1968, p. 7). 
From Model Cities to Revenue Sharing30 
The programs of the War on Poverty were intended in various ways 
to extend opportunity to the poor. However, the physical environment of 
their neighborhoods and cities had not received much attention. The Mod­
el Cities program grew out of this concern. The task force that designed 
the original Model Cities legislation saw the possibility of incorpora­
ting the social concerns of the War on Poverty with programs dealing with 
the physical environment of the city. 
The purpose of the Model Cities program was two-fold: first, to 
provide "assista'nce to enable cities ... to plan, develop, and carry 
out programs to rebuild or revitalize large slum and blighted areas," 
and secondly, lito expand and improve public programs and services avail­
able to the people who live in such areas" (Frieden and Kaplan, 1975, 
p. 53). 
29This point will be developed in Chapter I I I, Section II. 
30This discussion of Model Cities and Revenue Sharing is based 
primarily on Frieden and Kaplan's analysis (1975). 
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An underlying purpose was "to reform the federal grant-in-aid sys­
tem by making it more responsive to local priorities, more flexible, and 
more subject to control by local elected officials" (Frieden and Kaplan, 
1975, p. 232). The concentration of funds in poverty areas of selected 
cities and the improved coordination of federal aid were key concepts. 
The Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Act of 1966--the Model 
Cities legislation--included phrases such as "coordination of federal 
assistance,tI IIprompt response to local initiative," and "maximum flexi­
b i1 i ty in prog ramm i ng, II but accord i ng to Fr i eden and Kap Ian, "they were 
clearly devoid of real operational content. . .. In effect, they re­
flected more the expressed hopes and desires of the program's supporters 
than the specific marching orders of Congress or the White House" (p. 67). 
In practice, the Model Cities program became another grant-in-aid 
to the cities, not the unifier of all other federal aid programs to the 
city as some had envisioned. Improvements were made in poverty neigh­
borhoods, but in the face of the need the changes can hardly be consid­
ered significant ones. 
What is the current response of the federal government to the city 
and its problems? Briefly Jet us consider two aspects: income and aid 
to cities. 
1. Income Provision. Attempts of the Nixon Administration to en­
act a family assistance pJan failed. Partial reforms have been made in 
welfare legislation and in social security. Cash and in-kind benefits 
have been expanded: medical care payments, food stamps, student aid, 
child care, and housing subsidies. However, the income received by num­
erous Americans--especially by racial minorities, households headed by 
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women, and the elderly--continues to place them below the poverty lev­
e 1.31 
2. Revenue Sharing: General and Special. Since 1972 cities have 
received federal revenue funds with virtual ly no strings attached. Cit­
ies may also apply for special categorical grants. Manpower is one 
such, and community development, included in the Housing and Community 
Development Act of 1974, is a second. Community development is primar­
ily concerned with the physical aspects of the city: water and sewer 
projects, urban renewal, urban beautification and open space, historic 
preservation, housing rehabilitation, etc. Model Cities is also includ­
ed. 
How does revenue sharing respond to the needs of the urban poor? 
A 1973 study of cities with populations over 50,000 found that the pat­
terns of spending of revenue sharing allocations is similar to that of 
cities' normal budgetary decisions. "Cities reported spending only 1.6 
percent of their new funds for social services for the poor and aged, 
and only 1.1 percent for health services" (Frieden and Kaplan, 1975, 
p. 246). This is a slightly smaller proportion for health and welfare 
needs than in the normal city budget. 
Population, overcrowded housing, and the extent of poverty are 
considered in the allocation of funds for community development. How­
ever, the law does not require that efforts be concentrated to improve 
the living conditions of low- and moderate-income groups. 
31 The number of persons in 1975 officially clas~ified by the fed­
eral government as living in poverty was nearly 26,000,000--a 10.7 per 
cent increase over 1974. 
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Frieden and Kaplan maintain that the performance standards for par­
ticipation in community development decisions reflect a more limited con­
ception of resident participation than that of the Model Cities program. 
They fear that the participation of poor residents will be weakened, and 
that participation may ultimately revert to the I imited form that char­
acterized the early urban renewal program (pp. 252-53).32 
The "politics of neglect," the title of Frieden and Kaplan's book, 
aptly characterizes the responses of the federal government in the 1970's 
to the needs of the urban poor and the crisis facing the city. 
Ill. RESPONSES TO SOCIAL PROBLEMS: AN ANALYSIS 
In the previous section our concern was with responses that have 
been made to social problems. Numerous individuals and groups, as well 
as various levels of government have responded to a variety of problems: 
housing, health, crime and delinquency, child welfare, etc. Our focus, 
however, was necessari ly I imi ted and was primari lyon urban poverty_ We 
have seen that over the years the federal government has assumed a more 
active role in promoting the social we1fare of all citizens, as well as 
in accepting more responsibility for the poor. 
In spite of all these efforts, poverty and its related conditions 
continue to exist. President Johnson expressed the belief that it is 
possible to conquer poverty. Why then does poverty persist? Several 
32An alternate conclusion is drawn by Cole (1975). While admitting 
the need for additional research, he maintains that lithe most objective 
concl usion appears to be that revenue sharing has not and wi II not lead 
to the demise of municipal citizen participation opportunities, although 
the form they will take in the future may be altered" (pp. 73-74). 
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different answers to this question will be summarized and the theoreti­
cal debate on this issue will be briefly discussed. A social systems 
model that explains both the causes of problems and factors shaping re­
sponses to problems will be presented. Finally, the implications this 
has for social planning will be considered. 
Explanations for the Persistence of Poverty 
Numerous explanations have been offered for the persistence of 
poverty. They can be placed in two broad categories: those that assign 
responsibility to the poor themselves and those that consider the social 
structure as generating and maintaining poverty. The first two theories 
that will be summarized blame the poor; the others focus on some aspect 
of the social structure as the dominant factor. 
The Individual As Responsible. There seems little need to clarify 
this view point. Popular throughout history, many still accept it as the 
chief explanation for poverty. According to a 1969 survey of attitudes 
toward poverty and anti-poverty programs, fifty-six per cent of white 
Americans support the view that individual fail ings are primarily respon­
sible for poverty (Reissman, 1973, p. 69).33 
If policy decisions are influenced by public opinion, this bel ief 
is an important factor in explaining lithe pol itics of neglect. 1I 
33 1n a study by Rytina et al. (1970) respondents were asked, IIWhy 
are poor people poor?" Sixty7.two-per cent of the rich expressed the be­
lief that poverty is the result of personal attributes, whi1e only sev­
enteen per cent of poor blacks agreed with this. The study also exam­
ined beliefs about the American opportunity structure. The data tends 
to confirm the hypothesis that lithe support of an ideology is strongest 
among those who profit most from the system which the ideology explains 
and defends, the rich in this case" (p. 715). 
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The Lower Class As Self-perpetuating. liThe culture of poverty" 
(Lewis, 1966), "lower-class cul ture" (Mi ller, 1958), lithe disreputable 
poor" (Matza, 1966) are similar versions of a concept of poverty in 
which a special set of values, norms, and behavioral traits--non-conform­
ing with middle class standards--are ascribed to the poor. 
This notion of poverty was prevalent in the social science I iter­
ature in the 1960·s. Marris and Rein (1967) as well as Moynihan (1969) 
cite the key assumptions of this concept as underlying the original 
planning of the community action programs. 
If social pol icy is based on this concept, as many of the War on 
Poverty programs were, ultimately it must focus on individual deficien­
cies as the cause of poverty. For although the social structure or so­
cietal conditions34 may have originally given rise to lower class cul­
ture, once it comes into existence it is viewed as self-perpetuating. 
"By the time slum children are six or seven they have usually absorbed 
the basic attitudes and values of their subculture. Thereafter they are 
psychologically unready to take full advantage of changing conditions or 
improving opportunities that may develop in their 1ifetime l ' (Lewis, 1966, 
p. 21). 
340scar Lewis (1966) "suspects ll that lithe culture of poverty flour­
ishes and is endemic to the free-enterprise, pre-welfare-state stage of 
capital ism" (p. 24). He is also "incl ined to bel ieve the culture of 
poverty does not exist in socialist countries ll (p. 23). 
Among the factors cited by Lewis as preconditions for the culture 
of poverty are: "a cash economy, with wage labor and production for 
profit and with a persistently high rate of unemployment and underem­
ployment, at low wages, for unski lIed labor" (p. 21). Lewis al so ob­
serves: liThe dominant class asserts a set of values that prizes thrift 
and the accumulation of wealth and property, stresses the possibility of 
upward mobility and explains low economic status as the result of indi­
vidual personal inadequacy and inferiori ty" (p. 21). 
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Thus, according to this perspective, social institutions play no 
major role as ~ present cause of poverty. In fact, if the poor are in­
capable of taking full advantage of opportunities, the ability of social 
institutions to eradicate poverty is questionable. 35 In this view, the 
persistence of class poverty seems inevitable. 
The Political System. In two separate studies--one of five urban 
programs of the 1960's (Piven, 1971) and another of federal efforts to 
solve five contemporary social problems (Jones, 1971)--the writers ar­
rive at similar conclusions: the federal government (the political sys­
tem) is incapable of solving social problems. Why? Because programs 
designed to cope with problems are ultimately shaped by politics. 
Both Piven and Jones posit the existence of a pluralistic politi­
cal system in which government representatives are responsive to compet­
ing interest groups. "'n the process of gaining enough adherents for a 
program to eradicate a social problem," the program must necessarily be­
come so diluted and diverted "that it is either irrelevant to the prob­
lem or incapable of solving it" (Jones, 1971, p. 585). 
The assumption is that to maintain itself, the political system 
35Banfield (1970) blames the lower class for crime, poverty, edu­
cational and racial problems. Programs aimed at solving these problems 
are bound to fail, Banfield asserts, because the lower class is unable 
to respond. Little can be done for these problems, although time and 
economic growth may eventually alleviate them. According to Banfield, 
no urban crisis exists, and he warns that by treating a spurious crisis 
as if it were real, we may unwittingly make it so (p. 22). Efforts to 
"solve problems" of the city are only likely to make them worse. 
In a later work Banfield (1974) reaffirms hi's basic thesis that 
the nature of the lower class makes real change impossible, and he again 
warns against governmental programs designed to solve problems. 
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must appeal to its middle class constituencies. 36 lilt is not feasible 
for government to attempt to change fundamental inequities within the 
economic, social, and pol itical structures" (Jones, p. 586). Therefore, 
social programs will continue to deal with symptoms of problems. And 
problems necessarily persist. 
A Power Elite. 37 The proposition that the poor remain poor because 
the middle class does not support a change in the status quo has just 
been set forth. The assumption is that political power lies in the mid­
dIe class--that public policy is reflective of their interests. 
Elitist theory holds a contrary proposition: public policy is a 
reflection of the interests and values of elites. Who are the elites? 
They are those who occupy key positions in economic, political, or mil i­
tary institutions. They are drawn primarily from the upper socio-econom­
ic classes. There is considerable circulation of elites. They move 
freely between positions in corporations, government, the military and 
in some of the other influential institutions. 
Although el ites disagree on some issues, these are relatively un­
36Walinsky (1964) argues that lithe middle-class majority does not 
want to improve significantly the lot of the poor, or--a further-step-­
that the middle-class actively desires to keep the poor where they are" 
(p. 160). The middle-class, according to Walinsky, wishes to IIkeep the 
poor in their place" in order to preserve their own status. 
3711The power elite" position set forth here is based on C. Wright 
Mills' book (1959). A book edited by Domhoff and Ballard (1968) con­
tains articles reviewing and criticizing Mills as well as Mi1ls· reply. 
An explanation of American politics from an elitist perspective is 
offered by Dye and Zeigler (1971). Chapter I explains the meaning of 
elitist theory, while Chapter 13 sets forth some propositions. 
Mills (1959) and Domhoff (1970) dea1 with a national elite, while 
Hunter (1953) deals with a local elite, developing the thesis that pow· 
er in Atlanta was concentrated in elites. 
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important. They share basic values and are committed to the preservation 
of the existing social system. Masses are influenced--even manipulated-­
by elites, rather than elites being influenced by the masses. 
Since el ites control decision making, it is unl ikely that any sub­
stantial changes will be made that would alter existing relations. Pub­
lic policy reflects the general conservatism of the elites. Inequality 
and power seem destined to persist. 
The Economic System. In C. Wright Mills' (1959) version of the 
power elite, power is lodged in positions in economic, political, and 
military institutions. More specifically, it is wielded by those who 
occupy the key institutional positions. Conceptualizing a tripartite 
power-base, Mills held that the institutions, although related and inter­
dependent, remain separate spheres. 
A radical critique,38 influenced by Marx, faults Mills for not ex­
plicitly stating what forms the basis for the consensus existing among 
the el ites and for not specifying what unites the three separate insti­
tutional hierarchies. 
In this view the three institutions do not share equally in power-­
the economic sphere dominates the other spheres. Real power resides in 
those who control the economic order. Power is class-based, not posi­
tion-based, and resides in the upper class of business owners and corp­
orate managers. 
38The explanation of this perspective is based on three articles 
contained in the Domhoff and Sal lard collection (1968). See Part II: 
"Radical Critics of The Power Elite" and the articles by Lynd, Sweezy, 
and Aptheker. -­
See also Domhoff's discussion of The Power El ite and its critics, 
pp. 251-78. 
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Public pol icy decisions reflect their interests which are primar­
ilyeconomic: the continuance of the economic system with private en­
terprise and the protection of private property. The working class has 
shared in the fruits of economic growth and some concessions have been 
made in order to reduce tension. But decisions ultimately serve to per­
petuate the system in which property and income are distributed unequal­
ly.39 No radical redistribution of wealth or income is likely to occur. 
Thus, the economic system will continue to generate inequality and pov­
erty. 
Factors Causing Poverty and Shaping Responses to Poverty 
Debate over Key Factors. Some of the prevalent theories that are 
offered to explain the existence and persistence of poverty in the Unit­
ed States have been reviewed. Factors that have been considered as 
causes include: the poor person as an individual, lower class culture, 
the political system, the middle class, the power elite, and the econom­
ic system. 
In addition to these competing explanations, an attempt to pin­
39According to this perspective whether economic, political, or 
social unrest becomes revolutionary is largely dependent upon how the 
elite handle the situation. Dye and Ziegler's (1971, Chapter 12) treat­
ment of the Civil Rights Movement is typical of this perspective. They 
conclude that "if elitist democracy in America is to survive the pres­
ent racial crisis, those who rule must use their influence as opinion 
leaders of the white masses to foster attitudes more conducive to social 
change and racial equal ity" (p. 319). If the white el ite is able to 
Ilenact and effectively administer programs that more equitably distrib­
ute rewards and opportunities throughout all segments of society ... , 
it will thereby reduce the tension ... and reduce the revolutionary 
potential of a deprived minority" (p. 319). 
Thus, this perspective admits that change occurs, but it is con­
sidered minimal--only enough to placate the dissatisfied. The system 
remains basically the same--with the elite firmly in control. 
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point key factors is further complicated by a disagreement over the rel­
ative importance of elements in the social structure. An analytical 
distinction can be made between the factual or institutional level of 
social structure 'and the normative or ideological level, that is, val­
ues, beliefs, norms, etc. 
In analyzing causes of and responses to poverty one is faced with 
the question of how much weight to assign to the values of individualism 
and competition, the work ethic, beliefs in opportunity and equality, 
etc. It must also be determined whether to explain causes and policy 
primarily at the institutional level--the political system, economic 
system, and/or social organization. Some hold that we should look pri­
marily to the normative and ideological, for it supports or reinforces 
the factual level, while others maintain the opposite. 
A similar disagreement arises when some theorists distinguish be­
tween infrastructure and superstructure--with the infrastructure con­
ceptualized as giving rise to the superstructure. Marx contended that 
the economic system--the means of production (technology and organiza­
tion) and the relations of production--determines the superstructure. 
Marx included in the superstructure all non-economic institutions, as 
well as the cultural and symbolic systems. Others besides Marx have 
used this concept, but differ on what comprises the infrastructure: is 
it the economic system, community, technology, demographic factors, or 
combinations of these?40 
40A demographic-ecological framework has frequently been used by 
American sociologists to explain the urban way of life. Powell (1968), 
using another framework, argues that the key to the city is the economic 
institutions: first the market, then the corporation. He uses Buffalo, 
New York, from 1810-1910 as a case study to support his thesis. 
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41The theoretical debate over the causes of poverty continues. 
Competing theories about the relative importance of normative and insti­
tutional aspects of the social structure also continue to be offered. 
Supporting evidence is fragmentary, and thus, definitive answers to end 
the debate are unavailable. 
A Social Systems Perspective. Although agreement on the causes of 
poverty is lacking, in order to develop policy and programs to cope with 
poverty and its attendant problems--to develop a social planning model, 
some theoretical perspective must be accepted. In this dissertation a 
"single cause" approach is rejected. Economic and technological factors 
are acknowledged as definitely significant. Yet norms, values, and ide­
ology are so intertwined with technology and institutions that they may 
not only reinforce the existing patterns, but may even determine which 
. 42 
are to survive. 
A framework developed by Donald A. Schon (1971)--one which we will 
adopt--permits a consideration of several factors. The social system is 
conceptual ized as consisting of structure, technology, and theory. 
Structure includes the institutional ized relationships between persons, 
41 This debate is closely related to explanations of social change. 
For a concise summary and critique of sociological theories of social 
change see Cohen (1968, Chapter 7). 
42 1n attempting to explain what determines social class Warner and 
his colleagues (1949) advanced a similar view. They assert: lilt cannot 
be denied that economic and technological factors are impo~tant in the 
determination of class and status orders. We must not lose sight of the 
fact, however, that the social system, with its beliefs, values, and 
rules, which governs human behavior may well determine what kind of tech­
nology and what kind of economic institutions will survive or thrive in 
any given tribe or nation" (p. 21). Cohen (1968, p. 198) too concurs 
with this view. 
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between institutions, in institutions, and in organizations. Theory re­
fers to norms, values, and ideology--what some refer to as the symbolic 
system. Technology refers to those tools and techniques used by members 
of the social system. These three components interact with one another 
and are interdependent. Two key assumptions about these system compo­
nents are: "They have evolved in relation to one another and they are 
built on one another. Hence, one cannot be changed without inducing 
change in the others" (Schon, p. 36). 
This conceptualization of the social system and how problems and 
responses fit into this framework is illustrated by the following dla­
gram. 
Structure 
(Institutions) system) 
THE SOC I A L s Y S T E M 
~ II 
Technology 
Responses Problems 
Figure 1. The social system and social problems. 
Problems are generated and maintained by the social system, with 
technology, theory, and structure interacting as causes. But responses 
to problems are also shaped by the social system. Technology may be 
capable of el iminating poverty, but institutions may fail to respond to 
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that possibility, and individualistic values may conflict with and over­
ride altruistic or humanitarian ones. It is the interaction of these 
components that determines the response that is made to problems. 43 
Lmplications for Social Planning 
The adoption of a systems framework permits us to focus on IIstruc­
ture ll as the cause of problems, and at the same time to consider IItheoryli 
as a key factor in the generation and perpetuation of social problems. 
Several theorists contend that responses to problems have been geared 
more to the maintenance of the social system--the status quo--than they 
have been to the causes of problems. For example, Schattschneider (1960) 
has advanced the thesis that the political system develops tla mobiliza­
tlon of bias"--lIa set of predominant values, beliefs, rituals, and in­
stitutional procedures ('rules of the game 
' 
) that operate systemically 
and consistently to the benefit of certain persons and groups at the ex­
44 pense of others" (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970, p. 43). 
The concept of "bias" and its "mobilizationll was applied by Schatt­
schneider only to the political system, but the mobilization of bias is 
a concept that can be extended to the social system itself. "Theoryll 
43 1n stating that these components "determine" policy, no claim is 
made that this is a deterministic process, that is, that if we can iden­
tify essential variables, a response can be predicted. What we do mean 
is that the social system--theory, technology, and structure--provides a 
framework within which the response is made. The meaning will be clari­
fied in Chapter IV when the nature of the human person and social inter­
action are discussed. 
44For Schnattschneider's (1960) discussion of the mobilization of 
bias see Chapter 2, liThe Scope and Bias of the Pressure System." It 
should be added that he clearly identifies the bias as a "business or 
upper-class·bias. 1I 
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and "structure" interact, or "bias is mobil ized," so that social systems 
are characterized by dynamic conservatism, that is, "their boundaries 
and patterns of internal relationships resist change" (Schon, 1971, p. 
32) . 
This conservatism or bias affects responses that are made to prob­
lems. It must be considered in planning social change. Our proposition 
is that social planning must focus on both "structure" and on "theory" 
if social problems are to be resolved. Both are causally related to so­
cial problems. Thus, they can be used not only to explain the persist­
ence of problems, but can also be considered sources of change--as tar­
gets of intervention. 
We will return to this conceptual ization of social problems in 
Chapter IV when we develop more fully the I ink between social problems 
and social planning. 
IV. THE CITY AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS: PAST AND FUTURE 
This chapter has focused on social problems, especially the prob­
lem of poverty. We have seen<that today's problems of poverty are rooted 
in the nineteenth century_ Associated with industrialization and urbani­
zation, poverty differs from that existing prior to the industrial revo­
lution. 
We also traced some responses--both private and governmentaJ--that 
have been made to the problems of poverty_ Our purpose was to provide an 
understanding of how problems have been confronted historically. This 
nistorical account provides the basis for the analysis that will be un­
dertaken in the next chapter when the relation between problem definition 
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and solution is explored. 
Since efforts at various levels of government and by many persons 
and groups over the years have failed to eliminate problems of poverty, 
we outl ined some explanations for their persistence. A social systems 
perspective has been proposed as a framework for conceptualizing both 
the causes of problems and the factors that shape responses to problems. 
This framework will be used when social planning is conceptualized in 
Chapter IV. 
In summary, three questions have been addressed in this chapter: 
First, what are the historical roots of today1s social problems? Sec­
ondly, how have we coped with these problems? And lastly, why do prob­
lems persist? 
A fourth question seems to follow: Will we continue to respond 
half-heartedly to problems? Or in other words, will problems persist? 
Tnis question, however, will not be considered. Instead we will raise 
another: How might social problems be confronted? We have already be­
gun to answer that question with the contention that social planning 
must focus on changing elements in the social system--specifically, 
structure and theory. 
To enrich and complement the insights that have been gained, the 
next chapter will probe more deeply into the nature of problems. We 
will analyze them from a sociological perspective. Only after social 
problems have been explored can we develop a model of social planning 
that offers the possibility of successfuly confronting these problems. 
CHAPTER I II 
SOCIAL PROBLEMS: A THEORETICAL ASSESSMENT 
This chapter continues the exploration into the nature of social 
problems that was begun in the previous chapter. Operating on the prem­
ise that in order to be effective, social planning must grow out of a 
consideration of its content and be responsive to the nature of that 
content, we must examine social problems further, for they are the con­
tent of social planning. 
While the last chapter considered social problems primarily from 
an historical perspective, our approach now is in a more theoretical 
vein. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first draws upon 
sociological literature for theoretical insights into social problems. 
The second part analyzes social practice--assessing the relation between 
the definition of a problem and its solution. The implications that 
this theoretical approach to social problems has for social planning is 
the concern of the third section. The last part considers in more de­
tail the ramifications on citizen participation. Our investigation into 
the nature of social problems leads to the contention that the partici­
pation of citizens is essential in social planning. This provides a 
theoretical basis for the inclusion of citizens in the social planning 
process. 
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I. SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS 
In turning to the sociological 1iterature that deals with social 
problems we will consider how sociologists define social problems. Then 
we will investigate how sociological theorists treat social problems. 
Two distinct approaches--what we identify as the subjective and the ob­
jective--wil1 be reviewed. Finally, we will criticize these approaches 
for what they neg~ct, that is, social structure. 
. ." . 
Definitions of Social Problems 
'~henever peopl~ begin to say, 'Isn't it awful! Why don't they do 
something about it?,' we have a social problem"(Horton and Leslie, 1970, 
p. 3). Although this is by no means a formal definition of socialprob­
lems, the ingredients for such a definition are present. 
Most definitions of social problems focus on two elements: an ob­
jective element and a subjective or definitional one. A social problem 
is seen as referring to an objective--an actual--condition (the "it" 
that's considered "awful"). But to say "Isnlt it awful!" also implies 
that some social standard or norm is used as a criterion to judge "it," 
the objective condition, as "awful." Thus, definitions of social prob­
lems also contain a subjective dimension that refers both to the judg­
ment that a discrepancy exists--the definition that there is a problem 
("people begin to say ...11), and to the basis of or the norm for the 
judgment (lIitls awful"). Implicit also is a belief that action can be 
taken to change the situation. 
The following are representative of definitions found in sociolog­
i ca Iii t era t u r e : 
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Social problems [are] the substantial, unwanted discrepan­
cies between what is in a society and what a functionally sig­
nificant collectivity within that society seriously (rather 
than in fantasy) desires to be in it (Merton, 1966, p. 799). 
A social problem is a condition which is defined by a consid­
erable number of persons as a deviation from some social norm 
which they cherish (Fuller and Myers, 1941b, p. 320). 
A social problem is a condition affecting a significant num­
ber of people in ways considered undesirable, about which it 
is felt something can be done through collective social action 
(Horton and Leslie, 1970, p. 4). 
All three of these definitions refer to an objective element--a 
condition that exists. All refer in some way to a norm. Although only 
the second definition refers explicitly to the definitional process, the 
others imply that someone must define or judge a condition as a discrep­
ancy, a deviation, or as undesirable. 
Those who look to sociologists for assistance in unders,tanding 50­
cial problems are assured that IIsociologists usually consider a social 
problem to be an alleged situation which is incompatible with the values 
of a significant number of people who agree that action is necessary to 
alter the situation ll (Rubington and Weinberg, 1971, pp. 5-6). 
Our discussion thus far seems to indicate that substantial agree­
ment exists among sociologists as to what constitutes a social problem. 
However, in delving deeper into the sociological literature on social 
problems, instead of finding clarity and basic agreement among theorists, 
one finds substantial cleavage and disagreement. A discussion of four 
articles that appeared in recent issues of Social Problems will illus­
trate this cleavage. 
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Sociological Approaches 
Although Rubington and Weinberg (1971, 1973) have identified and 
analyzed five sociological perspectives on social prob1ems: social pa­
thology, social disorganization, value conf1ict, deviant behavior, and 
labelling; we will classify current theories according to whether their 
emphasis is on: (1) the subjective, evaluative, or definitional dimen­
sion of social problems, or (2) the objective elements of social prob­
lems. Two articles by Kitsuse and Spector (1973, 1975) and two by Manis 
(1974a, 1974b) will be discussed as illustrative of these two approaches. 
The implications that these two approaches have for social planning will 
be examined later. 
Kitsuse and Spector: The Definitional Process. Kitsuse and Spec­
tor (1973) examine two approaches to the study of social prob1ems: the 
functionalist approach and the value-conflict approach. They find that 
the functionalist tradition, as exemplified by Merton, focuses on objec­
tive conditions. A1though Merton (1966) acknowledges that sociologists 
need to consider who is eva1uating a condition as a social problem, he 
does not limit social problems to those identified as such by the people 
being studied. Merton holds that "social problems are not only subjec­
tive states of mind; they are also, and equally, objective states of af­
fa i rs" (p. 788). 
Merton distinguishes between manifes·t social problems--lIthose ob­
jective social conditions identified by problem-definers as at odds with 
the values of the society," and latent social problems--those Ilconditions 
that are also at odds with values of the society but are not generally 
recognized as being so·· (p. 788). 
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In making this distinction, Merton, according to Kitsuse and Spec-
tor, emphasizes the objective over the subjective. They criticize him 
for making the sociologist the ultimate judge of whether a social prob­
lem exists and challenge the basis for such a judgment. 
Waller (1936) and Fuller and Meyers (1941a, 1941b) recognized that 
value-judgments playa key role in explaining the subjective elements of 
social problems and were among the first to consider them a formal cause 
of the condition which is considered undesirable. Kitsuse and Spector 
criticize the value-confl ict position for not following this unique in­
sight, for not moving lito the position that objective conditions are not 
necessary" (p. 413). According to them, the distinctive task of the so­
ciology of social problems is to explain "the'subjective elements' of 
social problems--the process by which some groups successfully define a 
condition as a problem within thei r society" (p. 418). 
It is in the light of this assertion that Kitsuse and Spector
I 
(1975) explore the relationship between labelling theory and the value-
conflict approach to social problems. Both perspectives consider social 
problems lias products of social processes in which members of a group, 
community, or society perceive, interpret, evaluate, and treat behavior, 
persons and conditions as problems" (pp. 584-85). Once again value-
conflict theorists are criticized for concentrating on objective condi­
tions and for abandoning the study of social definitions. 
Labelling theorists focus on the definitional process that labels 
behavior as deviant or a condition as a social problem. Howard Becker's 
work exemplifies the best of this approach, yet he too is concerned 
about the ro I e of obj ec t ive cond it ions. He asks: I'Can peop I e def i ne 
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any condition that does not exist--an illusion--as a social problem?" 
(quoted by Kitsuse and Spector, 1975, p. 589). Becker concludes that 
objective conditions must be included in a conception of social problems 
and that their existence must be verifiable. 
Kitsuse and Spector, however, object to Becker's "balanced view," 
to his sacrificing 'Ithe integrity of the definitional process." They 
charge that "this reduces the definition from a social construction of 
reality, an accomplishment of members of the society, to a mere mechani­
cal reaction to exterior forces" (p. 589). 
In their view a "'social problem' is not a qual ity that inheres in 
social conditions; rather, it is an emergent product of definitional 
processes in which people perceive, define, and assert conditions to be 
social problems" (p. 586). Kitsuse and Spector maintain that sociolo­
gists who study social problems must focus on definitional processes, 
examining how persons perceive and define certain conditions as social 
problems, and how they organize to solve or ameliorate them. The dis­
tinctive subject matter of the sociology of social problems is not ob­
jective conditions nor how these conditions are generated by the social 
structure, but rather the definitional processes and the processes by 
which problems come to be acted upon (pp. 586, 593). 
Manis: Objectiv~ Conditions. Manis (1974a, 1974b), taking a po­
sition contrary to Kitsuse and Spector, maintains that the leading soci­
ological perspectives have essentially similar conceptions of social 
problems. In this assertion he includes Merton with Kitsuse and Spector. 
What unites these apparently disparate perspectives, according to Manis, 
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lis that they define social problems in the light of popular values 
(1974a, p. 307; 1974b, p. 2). Manis criticizes these perspectives for 
failing to focus on those objective conditions that are detrimental to 
the well-being of society. Social conditions "become epiphenomena rath­
er than the central focus of analysis" (1974b, p. 3). 
Sociologists, according to Manis, must face the task of distin­
guishing between spurious and genuine (objective) social problems and 
between trivial and serious ones. Manis agrees that value-criteria are 
essential in the identification and appraisal of social problems. He 
argues, however, that societyls values are not adequate criteria for a 
scientific inquiry into social problems. In place of societal or popu­
lar values, Manis proposes that the knowledge and values of science be 
used to identify social problems and to assess their seriousness. 2 
Manis does not ignore the role that beliefs and values play in the pub­
licls perceptions of social problems nor the importance of explaining 
social behavior. What Manis does emphasize is that the task of a soci­
ology of social problems is to focus on social problems as objective 
conditions. 
I Interestingly, Kitsuse and Spector criticize Merton for focusing 
on objective conditions, while Manis faults Merton for not giving enough 
attention to objective conditions. 
2Manis devotes an article (1974a) to arguing that scientific val­
ues would provide more useful and transcultural criteria for defining 
social problems than lithe voice of the people. 11 In a follow-up article 
(1974b) Manis admits that "specifying and applying the values of science 
will be a difficult task" (p. 7), but he urges that this be done. He 
also outl ines a "scientific· ' approach to determining the seriousness of 
social problems. (By seriousness Manis means the primacy, the magnitude, 
and the severity of social problems. For the further development of 
these concepts refer to his article.) 
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Theory of Socia) Problems: A Criticism 
Two distinct approaches to the study of social problems have been 
presented. While the discussion of the four articles and their diver­
gent views has offered insights into various sociologica1 perspectives, 
an important dimension is missing. No attention was given to the struc­
tural aspects of social problems. For that perspective we wi1 1 consider 
C. Wright Mills' analysis (1943) of what he termed lithe professiona1 id­
eology of social pathologists." 
After reviewing soci010gy texts written during the period 1909­
1941, Mills found that social problems were typically defined "in terms 
of deviation from~" (pp. 531-32). His primary criticism was that 
sociologists of social problems had no structural viewpoint. They tend­
ed lito slip past structure to focus on isolated situations. . There 
is a tendency for problems to be considered as problems of individuals, 
and .•. sequences of situations were not seen as linked into struc­
tures" (p. 534). 
Does Mills' criticism of over thirty years ago apply today? First t 
let us 100k at the definitional approach to social problems in the light 
of this criticism. Kitsuse and Spector are quite explicit about their 
position, admitting that they do not consider the question of "how con­
ditions are generated by the social structure" or "how institutional ar­
rangements produce certain social conditions" to be the proper subject 
matter of the sociology of socia1 problems (1975, pp. 586, 593). Mills' 
criticism, they would argue, is not a val id one. They would also deny 
that they focus on isolated situations or that they consider problems to 
be those of individuals. Kitsuse and Spector would not find this charge 
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relevant, for their focus is on the definitional process and on the per­
sons who are involved in that process. The fact that public definitions 
have no structural linkages or that they focus on individuals, Kitsuse 
and Spector would answer, is not their concern nor the concern of the 
sociology of social problems. 
In a discussion of the seriousness of social problems Manis (1974b) 
indicates that it is important to identify and treat primary social prob­
lems--those that cause, either directly or indirectly, other social prob­
lems, and hence have important consequences on society. This concern 
with causal relations might lead to structural considerations, but Manis 
is not expl icit about this. 
Mills· criticism of sociologists of an earlier time does seem to 
apply to sociologists of social problems today. This failure to concep­
tualize social problems structurally has important implications for so­
cral practice. Mills points out what he saw as the consequences of not 
attending to the structural dimensions of social problems: These theo­
retical perspectives reinforce the approach of social workers and other 
professionals who see problems as a series of "cases. 1I In terms of deal­
ing with problems, this conception of "social" problems does not lend 
itself to collective action (p. 531). Neither does it "make it easy to 
reform the status quoll (p, 537). 
Two theoretical perspectives on social problems--one stressing the 
definitional dimension; the other focusing on the objective elements of 
social problems--have been discussed and criticized for their neglect of 
the structural elements of social problems. No further assessment or 
criticism of these perspectives will be offered, for our purpose is I im­
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ited to gleaning insight into social problems. Later in the chapter we 
will consider the impl i~tions these perspectives may have for social 
planning. 
For further insight into the nature of social problems we turn now 
from sociological theory to social practice. 
II. SOCIAL PRACTICE: DEFINITIONS AND "SOLUTIONS" 
Some of the responses that have been made to social problems were 
considered in the previous chapter, and now will be subject to further 
analysis. We will focus on how a problem is defined and examine the re­
lationship that exists between a definition and a "solution. 1I Problem 
definition will be seen as an essential factor in determining what so­
lution will be offered for the problem. This assessment will give rise 
to the contention that if social problems are to be resolved, they must 
be defined in structural terms. 
The Relation between between Definitions and "Solutions" 
Nineteenth Century. Individualistic explanations of poverty pre­
vailed throughout most of the nineteenth century. ~overty was seen to 
be the problem of an individual. It was believed that if a person 
worked hard and was thrifty, he would succeed. And so the logic went, 
if a person were poor, the fault was personal--he had failed. By the 
opening of the twentieth century another explanation was gaining ac­
ceptance: the economic system itself generated and maintained poverty 
and its attendant problems. 
Table I presents different views of poverty that were prevalent in 
the nineteenth century. The first two have a similar definition of pov­
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erty--it was seen to result from some personal deficiency,3 whether it be 
intemperance, indolence. or lack of thrift. This definition, however, 
prompted two different responses. One group was impe11ed to provide 
charity or relief, with the focus more on the obligation of the giver 
than on the needs of the recipient or on his worthiness or unworthiness. 
The second group, represented by the New York Association for the Im­
provement of the Poor and the Charity Organization Societies focused on 
the poor with the suspicion that they rea11y didn't mind their degrada­
tion. 4 These humanitarians feared that persons might remain In a state 
of pauperism, so in giving re1 ief they sought to avoid fostering depend­
ency. They he1d what was the dominant view throughout the century--that 
"publ ic assistance should be granted, not only sparingly, but grudging­
ly; it should be • dispensed only in ways that would discourage peo­
ple from seeking it" (Bremner, 1956, p. 47). Individual counsel ing and 
attempts to improve the character of the poor were seen as the chief 
means of combatting poverty. 
A third individualistic interpretation of poverty derived from ev­
oluttonary theory. The application of Darwinism to society suggested 
that through competition and the "s truggle for existence" the weak would 
perish while the strong would survive. Competition was a law of nature 
3A distinction was made between the "deserving" poor or the "im­
potent," that is, the aged, the ill, orphans, etc., and those who were 
Ilundeserv i ng . II 
41n a discussion of attitudes toward the poor Kenneth Clark and 
Jeannette Hopkins (1968, pp. 19-20) characterize those in the first 
group as the "Good Samaritan-Lady Bountiful Tradltion" and those in the 
second group as in the "Puritan-Horatio A1ger Tradition." 
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and any interference to protect the "unfit" would slow the evolutionary 
process, impeding society1s improvement. According to William Graham 
Sumner, the leading American exponent of Social Darwinism, the answer 
lay in cultivating economic virtues: "Let every man be sober, industri­
ous, prudent, and wise, and bring up his children to be so likewise, and 
poverty will be abol ished in a few generations
" 
(quoted by Hofstadter, 
1955a, p. 61). 
These individual istic interpretations were more in harmony with 
the conditions of the early nineteenth century than they were with the 
United States of the latter half. Opportunities abounded, land was 
available, labor was scarce, towns were growing rapidly. "There was sub­
stantial truth in the assumption that willingness to work brought mate~ 
rial well-being, while failure impl ied some personal defect in the suf­
ferer" (Bremner, 1956, p. 17). 
However, built into the thriving industrial economy were depres­
sions which recurred with regularity after 1819. Hard work and thrift 
did not guarantee economic security. As more and more workers experi­
enced involuntary unemployment, structural explanations for poverty 
gradually gained adherents. 
Before mid-century many reformers began to consider environment as 
an important factor in urban problems. If housing and the neighborhood 
environment could be improved, they believed, many urban problems would 
be solved. Settlement residents embraced this fourth explanation of pov­
erty and sought not only to assist individuals, but worked to transform 
the neighborhood--hoping to eventually create a new urban envIronment. 
By the late 1890 l s many of the visitors of the Charity Organization 
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Societies, settlement residents, and other reformers were formulating a 
broader view of poverty, defining it in terms of insecurity and insuffi­
ciency (Bremner, 1956, pp. 124-25). The individual was now viewed as a 
victim of economic forces over which he had little or no control. Un­
employment and low wages were considered as the primary causes of pover­
ty. Reformers proposed legislation to establ ish minimum wages and maxi­
mum hours, to protect the worker against unemployment, accidents, ill­
ness, old age, and to prohibit child labor. 5 
Although critical of the economic system, the majority of these re­
formers had faith in the abil ity of legislation to correct abuses of the 
system. More radical critics, however, maintained that inequality and 
injustice were inherent in the capitalist system itself, and therefore 
demanded more fundamental changes. Marxists, of course, advocated the 
overthrow of capitalism, but they had little influence in the United 
States at this time. A religious critique of capitalism was also ad­
6
vanced. Capitalism was indicted as anti-Christian--for its exaltation 
of selfishness, competition, and profit; for placing more value on goods 
than on persons; for stunting the moral growth of persons and for cor­
rupting their spirit. Others criticized the economic system, but of­
5For a discussion of the role of social workers in these reform 
efforts see Part I I I of Robert H. Bremner's From the Depths (1956). 
6Walter Rauschenbusch was the most well-known of those who 
preached the "Social Gospel. 11 As a replacement for the capi tal ist sys­
tem, he proposed communism--not Marxist, but resembl ing that of the ear­
ly Christian community. 
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fered no solutions. 7 
Although a broad range of definitions and solutions were offered 
in the nineteenth century, the focus was primarily on the individual. 
That view prevailed until the depression of the 1930's changed the fo­
cus--poverty was seen as associated with the economic system and was de­
fined in terms of insufficiency and insecurity. Solutions, such as un­
employment insurance, social security, and eventually a minimum wage, 
were adopted that were to cover--not remedy--the deficiencies of the 
economic system. 
After the Great Depression--through the 1940's and 1950's--poverty 
was largely forgotten by mainstream Americans. Finally in the 1960's 
poverty was again brought into our consciousness. We will examine pov­
erty programs of that period and the assumptions that underl ie them. 
Although definitions of poverty in the 1960's may appear more sophisti­
cated and programs are "new" and diverse, we shall see that a great deal 
of similarity exists between the definitions and solutions that predom­
inated in both the nineteenth century and the 1960's. 
Programs of the 1960's. The conception of lithe poverty cyc1e" un­
derlies the poverty programs of the 1960's. In this view poverty exists 
for a number of reasons: 
Inadequate education, low or non-existent income, I imited job 
opportunities, dilapidated and overcrowded housing, poor physi­
cal and mental health, an inclination towards del inquency and 
crime--these and many other characteristics of poverty both 
7Thorstein Veblen was one such critic. His perceptive critique of 
the pecuniary economy which subordinated production to profit can be 
found in his The Theory of the Leisure Class (1962). Veblen, however, 
proposed no alternate system. 
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cause and are caused by each other, interacting in a manner 

which renders it virtually impossible for the disadvantaged 

child, adult or family to break out of the "cyc1e of poverty" 

(quoted by Marris and Rein, 1967, p. 38). 

This conceptualization of the "cyc1e of poverty" is illustrated by 
the diagram of Rist (1972, p. 44): 
Poverty - - - - - - - - - leads to - - - - - cu1tura1 and environmenta1 
obstac1es to motivation 
1eads to leads to 
I 
1imi ted income poor health, and inadequate 
opportunities - - - - - - leads to - - - - - education and low mobility 
limiting earning potential 
Figure 2. The cycle of poverty. 
The causes of poverty are seen as circular and interrelated. Pov­
erty is self-perpetuating. Attacking the problem of poverty demands a 
comprehensive approach, but as Marris and Rein point out, it also per­
mits a flexible strategy. "Intervention at any point may be effective" 
(Marris and Rein, 1967, p. 39). 
Looking at actual programs sponsored under the Economic Opportunity 
Act, three different definitions of poverty can be identified. Table I I 
relates these definitions to the "solutions" that were offered by the War 
on Poverty programs. Explanations for poverty ranged from the poor per­
son to institutions to the powerlessness of the poor. However, an exami­
nation of the Community Action Programs (CAP's) reveals what the focus 
of the "War on Poverty" was. 
In an analysis of thirty-five CApi s Hallman (1968) found that one-
half assumed that the cause of poverty lay in the nature 6f the poor them­
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TABLE II 

WAR ON POVERTY: DEFINITIONS AND SOLUTIONS 

DEFINITIONS SOLUTIONS 
~----------------
Provide opportunity for: 
i nd i v i dua 1 : 
· Educational programs, such as 
· Faulty socialization 
I. Poverty lay within the 
Head Start, Fol low Through, 
Upward Bound, Neighborhood 
or Youth Corps (aimed at dropouts) 
• 	Participation:Individual deficiencies 
• 	to learn leadership 
• 	for personal development 
• Job 	 training programs, such as 
JOBS, Job Corps, Neighborhood 
Youth Corps 
Participation to motivate and 
overcome alienation 
Apathy 
Inducements to institutions to 
(Bureaucratic conservatism) 
I I. Institutions not responsive 
coordinate, to innovate 
Participation of poor in planning 
• Schools and administeri,ng programs Employment services 
I Provide opportunities and respon­• Welfare agencies 
Health agencies 
• Housing 
• 	City government/agencies 
• 	Etc. 
I I I. Powerlessness of the poor 
sive services: 
Special educational programs 
Job training programs 
Neighborhood health centers 
Family planning programs 
Legal services 
Participation seen as: 
· Community organization for 
self-help 
· Community action to confront 
institutions 
Community action seen as enabling 
the poor to reverse their condi­
tion by gaining power 
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selves. The other half too placed responsibil ity on the individual, but 
in addition maintained that society and its institutions had also failed. 
Howev~r, service programs predominated in near1y all CAP's with the ser­
vices aimed at individuals rather than families or groups (p. 287). In 
only three communities did the strategy of giving power to the people 
predominate; confrontation and conflict were deliberately chosen as 
strategies to produce institutional change (p. 289). 
Although modern programs dealing with poverty may be more diverse 
and sophisticated, the dominant definition of poverty in the 1960 l s dif­
fered little from the one that predominated in the nineteenth century: 
the individual is held responsible for his condition. And thus, the 
dominant strategy has been directed toward changing the individual rath­
er than reforming or changing the system. 
The Importance of Definitions 
From the foregoing discussion it should be obvious that a strategy 
that is devised to cope with a problem is closely related to how the 
problem is defined. 
If poverty is defined in terms of individual deficiencies, the 
strategy of manpower training may be appropriate to that definition. But 
although a strategy is appropriate to the definition of the problem, it 
may be totally ineffective in attacking the prob1em. 
If IIfull employment" is defined so as to permit a five per cent 
unemployment rate, then unemployment is built into the economic system, 
that is, it is structural. Although the strategy of training individu­
als may benefit some, it cannot effectively solve the problem of those 
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8five per cent whose unemployment is structurally generated.
Figure 3 illustrates the consequences of not adequately defining 
a problem. 
When the causes of poor housing, unemployment, low income, etc. 
are rooted in the structure of economic and social relations, problems 
cannot be remedied by trying to motivate or educate individual persons. 
A definition that fails to deal with the causes of a problem leads to a 
strategy that is ineffective in coping with the problem--and it may even 
exacerbate or add new dimensions to the original problem. 
An example of a strategy that not only is ineffective in treating 
a problem, but has also created a new one is publ ic housing policy. 
Housing policies have not been directed at practices, e.g., taxation 
pol icies, federal home loan policies, credit policies of lending insti­
tutions, real estate practices, that contribute to the IIhousing problem." 
As a consequence, substandard housing still exists and the housing stock 
continues to deteriorate. Moreover, the housing problem now has a new 
dimension. 
This new dimension--the consequence of publ ic housing policy--has 
been aptly described by the National Commission on Urban Problems: "In 
most cities of the country, high-rise publ ic housing units clearly indi­
8The Work Incentive Program (WIN) provides a good example of this 
kind of strategy. WIN was devised to provide job training for the poor 
in order to reduce overall welfare costs. Hill (1974) maintains that 
the program was based on four assumptions about the structure of the la­
bor market which can be seriously questioned. Yet the Department of La­
bor failed to refer to the structure of the labor market. Consequently 
responsibil ity for program fai,lure has been assigned to administrative 
problems and the deficiencies of the trainees--not to the structure of 
or conditions in the Jabor market. 
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PROBLEM 1 
l 
, 
COMPETING DEFINITIONS 

I Structura I I [ Individual I 

I 

DEFINITION: 

Individual as cause 

l 1 

Program aimed 
System unchanged at i nd i vi dua I 

1 

Problem continues Prog ram fa i lure 
New problem 
NEW DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM 
Figure 3. Consequences of defining a prob1em in terms of the in­
dividua1 when the cause is structural. 
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cate what they are--large congregations of the poor. They stand out in 
many communities like so many sore thumbs" (1969, p. 123). Thus, a pol­
icy proposed as "a solution" for the shortage of low-cost, decent hous­
ing units did add low-cost units to the market. But their highly stand­
ardized design, their high density, their design as "island," reinforces 
lithe charity stigmal! attached to subsidized housing. "Each project pro­
claims, visually, that it serves the 'lowest income grouplll (Wurster, 
1966, p. 247). Publ ic housing has added a new dimension to the "housing 
problem. 1I 
Our review of how problems of poverty have been handled leads to 
the conclusion that not only have efforts been limited, but they have 
been misdirected. The predominant definition of poverty has focused on 
the individual as the cause. Correspondingly programs have been geared 
to the individual. Efforts have been misdirected in that they ultimate­
ly end with the treatment of symptoms--not causes. 
It is a basic contention of this dissertation that urban problems 
will never be solved unless they are conceptualized structurally. This 
does not imply, of course, that this conceptualization will automatical­
ly lead to implementation, and thus "solution." However, definition is 
a key determinant of the kind of program that can be offered as a "sol u­
tion. 11 If problems are to be resolved, social planning must address it­
self to the causes of social problems--that means defining problems in 
structural terms and choosing "solutions ll that deal with structural re­
I a t ions. 
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II I. SOCIAL PROBLEMS AND SOCIAL PLANNING 
The analysis of definitions and solutions that has just been com­
pleted has emphasized the importance of dealing with problems structur­
ally. Earlier in the chapter it was noted that the sociological I itera­
ture fails to define social problems in structural terms. Sociological 
theorists do not conceptualize social problems structurally. In this 
section social problems will be defined in structural terms. Then the 
impl ications for social planning that can be drawn from our theoretical 
investigation into the nature of social problems will be considered. 
Soc i a I Prob I ems and "Soc i a 1" Causes: A Def j nit ion 
'Ilf you take the words 'social problems' and try to isolate them, 
it is obvious that these two words should represent 'social I in contrast 
to something else" (Horowitz, 1968, p. 87). What we have seen, however, 
in reviewing current definitions, is that any condition that is incom­
patible with the values of a considerable number of persons is a social 
problem. Manis would use the values of science as a standard, whi1e 
Kitsuse and Spector recognize any condition identified as a social prob­
lem as one--by definition. 
Using these conceptions of social problems, one has difficulty in 
specifying what is ~ a social problem. The meaning that is being pro­
posed for social problems does distinguish between problems and social 
problems. A problem is said to exist when there is a discrepancy between 
actual conditions and a social standard or norm. However, ~ prob1em ~ 
social only when its causes I ie outside of individuals--when the sources 
or origins can be found in existing structural or institutional arrange­
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ments. Social planning then is concerned with social problems which are 
related to and generated by social, economic, and political institutions. 
Individual behavior itself, though important, is not the prime consider-
at ion. 
Merton (1966, p. 783) claims that "no satisfactory case has been 
made for confining the scope of social problems" to only those that are 
social in origin. We are suggesting that two reasons justify our doing 
so. First, this approach avoids reductionism, that is, reducing the 
problem to a single cause or to one of individuals. The contention is 
that social problems should be considered as social facts which need to 
be explained by other social facts. 9 The second reason is that this ap­
proach to social problems has important connections with social planning. 
For unless problems are conceptual ized structurally, strategies will not 
be adopted that deal with causes. And we have argued, if problems are 
to be resolved, they must be dealt with structurally. Reserving the 
term social problem only for those problems whose source is social 
(structural) has important impl ications for efforts aimed at alleviating 
problems. These reasons seem a sufficient justification for confining 
social problems to those whose origin is social. 
Impl ications for Social Planning 
It is not the task of the social planner to reconcile the conflict­
ing theoretical views of social problems nor to work toward the develop­
ment of a "full-fledged theory of social problems." That task remains 
90urkheim in his classic study, Suicide, argued that suicide, seem­
ingly a very personal matter, was a "social fact.1I He offered explana­
tions for suicide in terms of other social facts. 
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the domain of the sociologist. While it would be helpful to the planner 
if adequate theory existed, the current theoretical debate does offer 
the p1anner important insights that shou1d be incorporated into planning 
theory and practice. We will now consider what the social planner can 
gain by taking into account both the objective and subjective dimensions 
of social problems. 
Objective Dimensions of Problems. While social theorists may de­
bate whether objective conditions are essential elements of a social 
problem, the p1anner is necessarily concerned with objective conditions 
and with methods of changing them. Planners typically have approached 
problems as objective conditions, as technical issues. Analysis and 
proposals aimed to al Jeviate or eliminate problems have also been con­
sidered technical matters (Rein, 1969, pp. 238-40). Socia1 p1anners 
seem well aware of the complexity and interrelatedness of social prob­
lems and the need for better information and data systems, tools of 
· h 10ana lYSIS, t eory, etc. 
The analysis of problem solving efforts of the nineteenth century 
and of the 1960's explored the relation between problem definition and 
the strategy adopted. Our contention is that social problems need to be 
defined in structural terms and alternatives must be devised to deaJ 
with these structural aspects. The development of more sophisticated 
theory, methods of analysis, and planning tools must be directed toward 
the structural dimension of problems, for if this technology supports 
programs that are primarily aimed at individuals, social problems will 
10For further discussion refer to Rittel and Webber (1973), 
Perloff (1965), and Manis (1974b). 
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continue to exist. Structural relations must be considered an important 
element in the objective make-up of social problems and as a target of 
the planner's intervention. 
Subjective Dimensions of Problems. Planners ordinarily have fo­
cused on objective conditions and have been concerned with basing their 
plans on a thorough, objective appraisal of the existing conditions and 
with improving the rationality of the process. When an objective anal­
ysis has little influence on what is done with the problem, the planner 
may decry the vested interests, the confl icting objectives, and the pol­
itics that are involved. Yet the fact that groups offer competing def­
initions of problems should not be viewed as obstructing the planning 
process--impeding its rationality and the planner's expertise. 
The review of theoretical approaches to social problems suggests 
that we not only consider social problems as pertaining to objective 
conditions, but also take into account their subjective or definitional 
aspects. Blumer (1971) bel ieves that there is Iia clear need to study 
the process by which a society comes to see, to define, and to handle 
their social problems" (p. 301). While Blumer charges that sociologists 
who study social problems "notoriously" ignore this process, it is also 
true that planners as well have paid scant attention to the definitional 
process. 
When social problems are viewed as the product of a process of 
collective definition, others besides planners are seen to have a role 
in identifying, defining, and handl ing social problems. Problems--defi­
nitions and solutions--are recognized as not just the domain of the ex­
pert~ Problems are not merely objective conditions that can be solved 
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by an objective analysis and the design of effective means. 
Attending to the subjective dimension of problems means that the 
planner must recognize the role that others play in the process of col­
lective definition. The interaction between citizens and between citi­
zens and planner is considered essential in determining the fate of the 
problem. When the planner acknowledges this dimension of social prob­
lems, he will realize the need to study the process of collective defi­
nition and to understand it. Then he must determine what role he can 
play--with others--to bring about better methods of dealing with social 
problems. 
The planning literature currently refers to this interaction be­
tween citizens and between planner and citizens as "citizen participa­
tion" in the planning process. It is our contention that viewing social 
problems as the product of a process of collective definition provides 
us with a different and fruitful perspective on citizen input in the 
planning process. In the next section we will focus on citizen partici­
pation--considering in more detail the impl ications that our examination 
of social problems has on it. 
IV. THE DEFINITIONAL PROCESS AND CITIZEN PARTICIPATION 
An extensive examination of citizen participation will not be un­
dertaken in this dissertation. However, some brief comments will be 
made about the literature that exists on the subject and about some ex­
periences with citizen participation in federal programs. Because some 
contend that citizen participation presents a dilemma for the planner, 
that view will be discussed. In considering whether citizen participa­
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tion is a planning dilemma, we wi1l show that if the subjective or def­
initional aspect of social prob1ems is taken into account, citizen par­
ticipation not only is not a dilemma, but is essential in coping with 
social problems. Focusing on the nature of social problems forces us 
to reconsider citizen participation--providing us with a theoretical 
basis for its inclusion in the planning model presented in this disser­
tation. 
The Literature of Citizen Participation 
A rather extensive 1iterature dealing with citizen participation 
does exist. That I iterature provides us with theoretical and normative 
perspectives as well as empirical studies of citizen participation. It 
is not the domain of anyone of the social sciences, but has drawn con­
tributions from sociologists, political scientists, psychologists, law­
yers, planners, and co~unity organizers. Evidence from the literature, 
however, "is contradictory, inconclusive, particularistic, and overly 
qualified by the dictates of time, place, and circumstance" (Spiegel and 
Hi ttenthal, 1968, pp. 3-4). 
Because of insufficient evidence, generalizations about the value 
of citizen participation are difficult to draw--that is, ones that will 
not be challenged. "Anyone can draw just about whatever meanings his 
predilections desire," Spiegel and Mittenthal assert, for the approach to 
citizen participation is suffused "with normative judgments, value-laden 
preconceptions, lack of objective criteria and standards of measurement, 
and a host of differentiated perspectives" (p. 4). 
Although accurate generalizations about citizen participation are 
difficult to formulate and no unifying theory exists, the planner needs 
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to be famil iar with the literature and must also be aware of its limi­
tations. It does not serve our purpose here to review the literature 
or to directly assess or evaluate lithe many faces of citizen participa­
t ion. ,,11 It is pertinent, however, that we examine whether citizen par­
ticipation is an obstacle in planning to solve problems. Some contend 
that the demand for participatory democracy interferes with the profes­
sional expertise that is needed to cope with complex problems. Thus, 
we will face the issue of whether citizen participation is a dilemma 
confronting planners. 
Citizen Participation: A Planning Dilemma? 
In answering this question we will briefly review citizen partici­
pation in federal programs, assess that experience, and then consider 
two articles in which citizen participation is treated as creating a 
planning dilemma. 
Experiences with Citizen Participation. A review of the experi­
ences of citizen participation in urban renewal activities, community 
action programs, and in Model Cities provides evidence that controversy 
and struggle have characterized the relations between professionals, of­
ficials, and citizens in some cities. 
From his ana1ysis of citizen involvement in three federal programs, 
Mogulof (1969) contends that involvement of citizens has moved from the 
concept of coalition to that of adversary. He concludes: 
The movement from the public-private coalitions of the De­

linquency Program, to the expansion of the coalition in the 

CAP to inc1ude neighborhood leaders, and now to ttadversary" 

l1 This is the tit1e of SpiegeJ and Mittenthal 's article (1968). 
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re1ationships between government and the black neighborhood 
in the Model Cities Program, appears to be a central theme of 
the history of these programs (1969, p. 231, emphasis added). 
In some cities more harmonious relations have existed between cit­
. d I· . and he city. government. C· 12 hIzens an panning agencies t ooptatlon as 
been a prevalent method used by planning agencies to gain support for 
planning endeavors (Burke, 1968, p. 291). Dahl (1961) labels citizen 
participation in the urban redevelopment process in New Haven a IIdemo­
cratic ritual. 1I According to Dahl, "citizen participation gave legiti­
macy and acceptability to the decisions of the leaders, created a corps 
of loyal auxiliaries who helped to engender public support for the pro­
gram and to forestall disputes" (p. 133). 
A study of citizen participation procedures led Arnstein (1969) to 
distinguish eight levels of citizen participation. Most citizen partic­
ipation activities were classified as either "non-participation" or as 
"tokenism. 1I Whether citizen participation has been characterized by 
more or less harmonious or conflictual relations, Arnstein concludes 
that citizens, when they have "participated," have ordinarily been ex­
cluded from real power. 
Mogulof and Arnstein both worked for the Model Cities Administra­
tion, both examined citizen participation in federal programs, and their 
articles appeared in the July, 1969, Journa1 2i the American Institute of 
Planners. Yet the two view citizen participation quite differently. As 
has been indicated, Mogulof saw citizen involvement moving toward an ad­
12Cooptation is defined as lithe process of absorbing new elements 
into the leadership or policy-determining structure of an organization 
as a means of averting threats to its stability and existencell (Selz­
nick, 1949, p. 13). 
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versary relationship. From the perspective of change Mogulof foresaw 
that livery probably ... neighborhood councils or congresses [will] 
emerge as quasi-governmental units for their areas in the Model Cities 
Program with jurisdiction gradually spreading to non-Model Cities ex­
penditures" (p. 321). 
Arnstein maintained that most CAP's were characterized by "the emp­
ty ritual of participation" with no redistribution of power occuring to 
the poor. She foresaw the likelihood of this being repeated in most of 
the Model Cities programs (pp. 216-17). 
Mogulof was optimistic about the 1ikel ihood that federal programs 
would enable the poor to exercise more control over resource allocating 
mechanisms, while Arnstein was generally pessimistic about the possibil­
ities for change. 
Analyzing Model Cities programs six years after Mogulof and Arn­
stein, Frieden and Kaplan (1975) offer the following assessment of cit­
izen participation: 
The Model Cities Program •.• was intended to create agree­
ment and partnership between residents and city government. 
Even though the participating residents did not always share 
this view, the nature of the program itself pushed them increas­
ingly toward a cooperative stance with local government after 
the initial ground rules had been establ ished. Organizing the 
poor was never a major purpose of the program as HUD adminis­
tered it (p. 83). 
Assessing current federal requirements for participation Frieden 
and Kaplan maintain that the "performance criteria on the role of pover­
ty area residents in community development decisions and operations are 
weak and diffuse ll (p. 252). Although the Department of Housing and Ur­
ban Development has set administrative rules for citizen participation, 
Frieden and Kaplan suggest that lithe performance standards can be met by 
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superficial citizen involvement" (p. 253). Their analysis and projec­
tions tend to support Arnstein's contention that citizen participation 
as exemplified in federal programs ultimately maintains the status quo. 
It appears that after years of experience with citizen participa­
tion it can be viewed from two divergent perspectives: that of citizens, 
especially the poor--as a means of gaining citizen power; or the per­
spective of the planning agency/city government--as a means of social 
control. 
Planners ordinarily do not consider citizens '~ means to achieve 
better planning goals nor are they seen as partners in assisting an or­
ganization in achieving its goals; rather they are viewed as potential 
elements of obstruction or frustration .••" (Burke, 1968, p. 291). 
The citizen is seen primari ly as advisory or as a target of "education­
al" efforts. The aim is to use citizen participation in order to lend 
legitimacy to official decisions. 
HUD's current rules for citizen participation lend themselves to 
the social control perspective, for as Frieden and Kaplan (1975) have 
suggested, these requirements can be met by superficial citizen involve­
ment. However, it is doubtful whether citizens will be satisfied with 
minimal involvement. The tension between citizen participation as a 
method of gaining citizen power and as a means of social control still 
exists. 
liThe Dilemma" Examined. We wil I now explore the basis for this 
tension, or what some have referred to as "a planning dilemma," and try 
to determine whether this dilemma can be resolved. In doing so, we will 
draw upon articles by Burke (1968) and Rein (1969). 
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Burke (1968) contends that the participation of citizens in com­
munity planning presents a basic dilemma. The basis for the dilemma, 
according to Burke, is the demand for both ~ticipatory democracy and 
professional expertise in decision making. He seeks to resolve the di­
lemma by identifying five strategies of citizen participation., enunciat­
fng their assumptions and the conditions necessary for the effectiveness 
of each strategy. 
The resolution of the dilemma is effected, Burke suggests, by 
choosing a strategy of citizen participation that fits the role and re­
sources of a particular organization. He bel ieves that organizations 
themselves can resolve the dilemma. 
Planning agencies must be more precise about what they mean 
by citizen participation, how they intend to implement it, what 
agency resources will be used to organize and involve citizens, 
and what voice citizens will have in planning decisions (Burke, 
1968, p. 294). 
While Burke has provided an insightful analysis of various forms 
and functions of citizen participation, his reliance on the planning 
agency does not provide a satisfactory resolution for what he defines as 
a basic conflict between citizen participation and professional expert­
ise. Since his solution is to adapt citizen participation to each organ­
izational environment, cooptation or an educational/therapeutic strategy 
may we 11 be the one the agency dec ides IIf its. II Burke IS proposa 1 for the 
resolution of the dilemma is too heavily weighted on the side of the 
planning agency, and thus oriented toward the status quo and social con-
t ro I . 
Rein (1969) approaches lithe dilemma" from another direction--he 
explores the problem of the legitimation of social innovation. He asks, 
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IIHow is the need for innovative intervention justified and support for 
it secured?" (p. 233). 
Four different sources of authority are identified by Rein as le­
gitimating the intervention of city planners. He cal Is these the au­
thorities of expertise, bureaucratic position, consumer preferences, and 
professional values. After reviewing each of these as a source of le­
gitimation, Rein examines three strategies planners draw upon and how 
each contributes to the legitimation of reform. 
The strategy of elite consensus acknowledges the reality of insti­
tutional ized power. Legitimation for change and reform depends upon the 
endorsement of those representing establ ished institutions and powerful 
interests. But the pursuit of this strategy is 1ikely to conflict with 
the purpose of reform and will ultimately impede innovation. 
Rational analysis is another way of legitimating planned change. 
As we have already indicated, this has tended to be the approach that 
planners have favored. The fundamental dilemma of rational planning, ac­
cording to Rein, is the conflicting requirements of rationality and fea­
sibility (p. 239). A rational solution is not necessarily politically 
relevant, thus the strategy of rational analysis, or professional ex­
pertise, may confl ict with the other strategies of legitimation. 
The third strategy discussed by Rein is that of citizen participa­
tion. After reviewing the difficulties of this strategy, he concludes 
that confrontation "with established institutions not only is likely to 
create confl ict, but also may fail to generate any constructive accommo­
dation that can lead to real reform" (p. 242). 
Each strategy then has an inherent dilemma that stands in the way 
of social change. Can these dilemmas be resolved? Rein concludes that 
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they cannot, for they are "inherent in the nature of American social 
life" (p. 242). Pursuing all three strategies simultaneously ultimate­
ly leads to confl ict. The best that can be done, according to Rein, is 
to pursue a11 the strategies in the same and in different organizations, 
stressing one and then another (p. 242). 
Rein warns: lilt is futile to search for paradigms and prescrip­
tions that wi11 clear the whole problem out of the way and ultimately 
demonstrate that the strategies are indeed consistent and mutual1y rein­
forcing, not fundamentally in confl ict" (p. 242). 
Contrary to Rein's admonition of futility, we contend that it is 
both necessary and possible to formulate a new conceptualization of the 
planning process in which planner and citizen play complementary roles. 
It is actually misleading, as Seaver (1966) points out, to speak of "a 
dilemma of citizen participation. 1I13 A dilemma exists when one is faced 
with a choice between unsatisfactory or unpleasant alternatives. But 
there can be no choice between citizen participation and the planner's 
expertise. It is not possible, nor is it desirable to exclude either. 
What then can be done to resolve the difficulties? 
The Definitional Process: Planner and Citizen Together 
Aleshire (1970) argues that the relationship between planning and 
citizen participation must be improved. He presents two possib1e ap­
proaches: in lithe planning model,'1 citizen participation is made a part 
of the planning process; and in "the citizen participation mode1," plan­
13Seaver (1966) rejects the notion that citizen participation is a 
dilemma facing planners, and redefines the prob1em as being one of deter­
mining the degree citizens should participate in the pJanning process. 
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ning becomes part of that process. Aleshire's basic point is that cit­
izen participation and planning have a complementary relationship and 
that it is essential to harness lithe power of citizen participation to 
the potential of planningll (p. 393). 
Although Aleshire's suggestions for improving planning and partic­
ipation are appropriate, little is gained by distinguishing between cit­
izen participation and planning. It is n~re useful to consider the cit­
izen and planner ~ having complementary roles ~~ process, whether 
it is called a planning process, a decision making process, or a problem 
solving process. Thus, the necessary task is not to join planning and 
citizen participation--which is Aleshire's argument. Rather the task 
facing us is to unite planner and citizen in one process, capital izing 
on the unique contributions of both. 
This view is not one that is widely accepted, for in the planning 
literature, problem solving is ordinarily regarded as the domain of the 
expert, requiring scientific analysis and a high degree of objectivity. 
(ndeed, planning when conceived as a comprehensive, rational, efficient 
process seems jeopardized by the involvement of nonprofessionals in the 
process. (And hence, the planning dilemma.) 
However, we are proposing a reconceptualization of social planning-­
one that flows from the nature of social problems. The review of theo­
retical approaches to social problems enables us to con~ider social prob­
lems not just as objective conditions, but also to take into account the 
subjective aspects of social problems. If we accept this analysis of 
social problems, then social planning must deal with both the objective 
and subjective aspects of social problems. And that entails a role for 
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both "expert"_-to deal with the analysis of objective conditions and 
evaluation of alternatives, and for citizen--acknowledging his role in 
the definitional process. While it might be easier and more efficient 
if the planner had control over definitions and solutions, the planner 
does not exercise that prerogative, thus he needs to attend to the defi­
nitional process in which others participate. 
Very little is known about that process, however, five stages 
have been identified by Blumer (1971): 
I. The emergence of a social problem. "A social problem does 
not exist for a society unless it is recognized by that society to ex­
ist" (pp. 301-02). This recognition of social problems is a highly se­
lective process--one that needs study so we can understand how it works. 
2. The legitimation of the problem. "After gaining initial rec­
ognition, a social problem must acquire social endoresement if it is to 
be taken seriously and move forward in its career" (p. 303). Again I it­
tIe is known about the factors that are involved. 
3. The mobilization of action with regard to the problem. In 
this stage those who wish change corne in conflict with those who oppose 
it. As a consequence, some problems survive, others fade away. "How 
the problem comes to be defined, how it is bent in response to awakened 
sentiment, how it is depicted to protect vested interests, and how it 
reflects the play of strategic position and power--all are appropriate 
questions that suggest the importance of the process of mobil ization 
for action" (p. 304). 
4. The formation of an official plan of action. The official 
plan ~Ijs almost always a product of bargaining, in which diverse views 
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and interests are accommodated. What emerges may be a far cry 
from how the problem was viewed in the earl ier stage of its career'l 
(p. 304). 
5. The transformation of the official plan in its empirical im­
plementation. J'lnvariably to some degree, frequently to a large degree, 
the plan as put into practice is modified, twisted and reshaped, and 
takes on unforeseen accretions" (p.304). Blumer adds, "I scarcely 
know of any facet of the general area of social problems that is more 
important, less understood, and less studied than that of the unfore­
seen and unintended restructuring of the area of a social problem that 
arises from the implementation of an official plan of treatment" (p. 305). 
Blumer's model of the definitional process reflects present real­
ity. If planners acknowledge the importance of collective definitions 
with regard to social problems, they will study this process in order 
to understand it. Recognizing that each stage of the collective pro­
cess is a crucial one in determining the fate of the problem, they will 
seek to incorporate the stages identified by Blumer into the planning 
process. 
Citizens, politicians, and bureaucrats are involved in the process 
of collective definition. Citizens cannot be relegated to only the 
stage of goal formulation, or politicians to the formal decision stage, 
or administrators to the implementation stage. Studying the process of 
collective definition should make this clear to the planner. 
Participation of citizens in the planning process can be seen in 
a different light, for with this perspective on social problems the 
planner will not consider different interests, definitions, goals, val­
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ues, etc. as obstacles to be overcome. They will rather be viewed as 
natural conditions of a plural istic, heterogeneous society. The plan­
ner's task is to find ways of incorporating citizens and groups into 
the social planning process in order to facilitate the exchange between 
planners and citizens and between citizens themselves, and also to cap­
ital ize on the unique contribution of each in helping to define and re­
solve social problems. 
Focusing on the definitional aspect of social problems leads us to 
the conclusion that the participation of citizens--rather than posing a 
dilemma--is essential to the planning process. 
v. CONCLUSION 
At the beginning of the chapter it was stated that a social plan­
ning model must be responsive to the nature of its content. Since so­
cial problems are the content of social planning, we examined the na­
ture of social problems by looking at both sociological theory and so­
cial practice, i.e., analyzing how problems have been dealt with his­
torically. 
Solutions have been related to definitions, and it has been ar­
gued that social problems must be defined in structural terms--withso­
cial planning addressing itself to structural causes. From sociologi­
cal theory we have seen that the process of collective definition plays 
an important role in determining the fate of a social problem. From 
this perspective, citizen participation is no longer regarded as a di­
lemma, nor is one concerned about the degree citizens should partici­
pate--the participation of all that have interests in the problem and 
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in a11 stages of the planning process becomes an important concern. 
The next chapter wi11 e1aborate the theoretica1 framework that un­
der1ies our conceptua1ization of socia1 planning and shou1d both c1ari­
fy and support the contention that no inherent conflict exists between 
citizen and p1anner joining together to dea1 with socia1 prob1ems. 
CHAPTER IV 
TOWARD A THEORY AND MODEL OF SOCIAL PLANNING ­
Some theoretical concepts and a model of social planning will be 
presented in this chapter and the next. We will focus first on theory, 
intending to accomplish two objectives. One is to relate what has been 
learned from our examination of social problems to social planning. 
The second is to place social planning--theoretical concepts and the 
model--in a broader theoretical framework. Before endeavoring to do 
either we wi11 set forth some underlying theoretical assumptions and 
wi1l also give some brief attention to the present state of planning 
theory. 
I. THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS 
While a consideration of theoretical assumptions may appear to be 
a digression, it is necessary for these are basic premises underpinning 
the concepts of social planning that will be developed in these two 
chapters. These premises deal with the nature of society, man, and so­
cial interaction. Because they are drawn from sociological theory, 
they may be unfamiliar to many planners. Although drawing heavily on 
those theorists known as symbolic interactionists,l there is no inten­
lRefer to Herbert G. Blumer's essays which are found in his book, 
Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method (1969); George H. Mead 
(1934); Arnold M. Rose (1962); and articles in a reader edited by Jerome 
G. Manis and Bernard N. Meltzer (1967). 
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tion to represent any specific theorist or group of theorists. Our ap­
proach is eclectic--and although there will be come overlap in the dis­
cussion, there is consistency in our assumptions about social real ity, 
man, and social interaction. 
The Nature of Social Real ity 
Berger and Luckmann (1966) provide an insightful analysis of the 
social construction of real ity. Developing three major propositions 
about the nature of social real ity, they present society as a human 
product, as objective reality, and as subjective reality. Each propo­
sition will be discussed briefly, and is accepted as a basis for the 
social planning theory and model presented in this dissertation. 
1. Society is a human product (pp. 47-128). Men acting together 
produce the human environment. Languages, customs, institutions with 
their roles and norms, etc. are man made. Any given social order, in 
both its origins and its continued existence, is a product of human ac­
tJvity. 
2. Society is an objective reality (pp. 58-61). Once in exist­
ence institutions are experienced as objectively real, as existing over 
and beyond the individual. Institutions come to be perceived by indi­
viduals as external and coercive facts. 2 
Berger and Luckmann also discuss the question of reification (pp. 
88-92). Reification occurs when man no longer realizes that social re­
2Emile Durkheim recognized that "social things are actual ized only 
through men; they are a product of human activity" (1964, p. 17). Vet 
Durkheim came to focus on the objective real ity of social facts, neglect­
ing man, the producer. Durkheim stressed man's experience of social 
facts as existing outside of him and as exerting coercion over him (p. "3). 
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ality is the product of human activity--in fact man, the producer of 
the social world, is considered its product. The authors point out: 
lilt is important to keep in mind that the objectivity of the institu­
tional world, however massive it may appear to the individual, is a hu­
manly produced, constructed objectivity" (p. 60). 
3. Man is a social product (pp. 128-83). Each individual is born 
into a particular society with the society predefining "that fundamental 
symbolic apparatus with which we grasp the world, order our experiences 
and interpret our own existence" (Berger, 1963, p. 117). Thus, the in­
dividual experiences and internal izes the social world as an objective 
real ity, making society subjective real ity for him. This occurs through 
the process of social ization which is defined by Berger and Luckmann as 
lithe comprehensive and consistent induction of an individual into the 
objective world of a society or a sector of it" (p. 130). 
Yet the symmetry between objective and subjective real ity is nev­
er complete, that is, socialization is never completed. Although every 
society develops procedures of reality-maintenance to safeguard itself-­
it still remains possible for a person's subjective reality to be trans­
formed. 
The Nature of the Human Person 
The three propositions that have been discussed above deal with 
the nature of social real ity. Man, as an integral part of that reality, 
entered into that discussion. Now, however, we will focus specifically 
on the nature of man--considering how the social sciences have typically 
viewed man, and then will set forth the view of man that the theoretical 
concepts and model of social p1anning presented in this dissertation is 
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based on. 
The model of man espoused by mainstream contemporary sociologists 
has been an "oversocialized conception" (Wrong, 1961). According to 
this view the individual internal izes social norms and then behaves in 
accordance with them. Society imposes external constraints on the in­
dividual by sanctioning behavior, but constraint also "become internal, 
psychological, and self-imposed as well" (Wrong, p. 186). 
Not only has sociology set forth a deterministic view of man, but 
other social sciences have also done so. In a critique of the behavior­
al sciences Bolton (1967) points out that behavior in that perspective 
is conceptualized as "a mechanical response to or expression of some 
other activating force--that is, a reaction to stimuli, to organic ten­
sions, to internal ized norms, to social sanctions, to dysfunctional 
cha nge, etc. II (p. 1 03) . 
Berger and Luckmann (1966) offer an alternative perspective. They 
stress the dialectical relationship that exists between the individual 
and social reality: the individual produces the social world and in turn 
that social world shapes the individual. 3 This dialectic of individual 
3B. F. Skinner (1971) also admits the existence of a dialectical 
relationship. He acknowledges that manls environment is "almost wholly 
of his own making,1I but also that man is shaped by this environment. 
But Skinner's fundamental thesis is that man is controlled--not just 
shaped--by his environment. Individual behaviOr is changed, i.e., con­
trolled, by changing the physical or social environment. Skinner be­
1ieves that he has avoided portraying man as "victim" or "passive ob­
server," since the environment--although controlling man--is largely of 
his own making. According to Skinner man controls himself by manipulat­
ing the world he lives in--he is both the controller and the controlled. 
But if man is controlled (by the environment) to be controller (of him­
self and the environment), it seems to follow that his behavior is mere­
ly a reaction to environmental forces. Skinnerian man ultimately is 
both "passive" and "victim." See especially Chapter 9, "What Is Man?". 
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and society is the perspective accepted in this dissertation--with the 
added assumption that the human person has the capacity to selectively 
and creatively relate himself to his world. 4 I'The individual is in the 
fullest sense an actor (not a mere field or receptacle) who creatively 
determines his environment by selecting and reconstructing the materi­
als of experience in terms of his own sensitivities and makeup--his 
unique personal perspective" (Matson, 1966, pp. 171-73). 
Social Interaction 
A conception of human interaction in harmony with the view of hu­
man nature outlined above is that provided by theorists known as sym­
bolic interactionists. Herbert Blumer, a leading exponent of this view, 
explains: 
The term "symbol ic interact ion" refers, of course, to the 
pecul iar and distinctive character of interaction as it takes 
place between human beings. The pecul iarity consists in the 
fact that human beings interpret or "define" each other's ac­
tions instead of merely reacting to each other's action. Their 
IJresponse" is not made directly to the actions of one another 
but instead is based on the meaning which they attach to such 
actions. Thus, human interaction is mediated by the use of 
symbols, by interpretation, or by ascertaining the meaning of 
4Hampden-Turner (1970) and Matson (1966) both hold a similar per­
spective. Hampden-Turner rejects a strict determinism, recognizing that 
"man is free yet bound by his human condition" (p. 25). In his view man 
has capacities for synthesizing, symbolizing, and exploring. For this 
discussion refer to Chapter 2, liThe Existential Perspective." 
In his treatment of the history of ideas Matson (1966) explores 
the impact of classical mechanics on man's image and finds that th~ lega­
cy is a "radically broken self-image." He criticizes the contemporary 
paradigm of a "natural science" of man and society--behaviorism, and 
traces the countermovement which is laying the groundwork for an alter­
native science of human behavior. According to Matsbn several tradi­
tions are converging on a view which emphasizes man's freedom of choice. 
Man is more than what his behavior reveals--there is an inner dimension 
to that behavior. Matson argues for this broader view of the '~hole 
man, II man II in d ; v ; sib1 e . II 
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one another's actions. This mediation is equivalent to insert­
ing a process of interpretation between stimulus and response 
in the case of human behavior (1962, p. 180). 
Interaction is seen as an interpretative process. In a given sit­
uation man interprets things or actions, imputes meaning, and then acts 
on the basis of that meaning. Although action is situated in a social 
context, it is constructed or built up rather than determined or re­
leased. 
In Chapter I I a systems perspective was adopted as a framework for 
conceptualizing the causes of social problems and the factors that shape 
the responses to these problems. How does social interaction fit in a 
. ?5systems perspective. System components, such as structure, theory, and 
technology, provide a framework for action, but they do not determine 
action. People do not act toward structure, theory, or technology. 
These system components will enter into action only to the extent to 
which they shape situations in which people act and to the extent to 
which they supply fixed sets of symbols which people use in interpret­
. h . . 6Ing t e situation. 
An important assumption is that man acts on the basis of the mean­
ing he assigns to objects or actions. It is important to note that in 
5The response that follows is a simplification of a very complex 
problem in sociological theory, but one that suits our purposes here. 
Social interactionist theory does not deny social structure--action is 
situated in a framework that includes structural and cultural features. 
However, many interactionists have focused on micro-processes stressing 
the interpretative process and have largely ignored the contextual base 
of interaction. Brittan (1973, Chapter 10) calls for a "transituation­
al" sociology that would avoid both relativism and socio-cultural de­
terminism. Other theorists see the problem as relating micro-theory to 
macro-theory. 
6These two sentences are a paraphrase from Blumer (1962, p. 190). 
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this perspective man responds not to a meaning that is intrinsic to an 
object7--rather it is man that confers meaning. It is through interac­
tion that meanings arise and are sustained. However, since meaning is 
socially constructed by individuals in particular societies or sectors 
. .. I· . 8o f society, It IS re atlve to some perspective. 
Individuals may bring noncongruent and competing definitions to 
an interaction situation. Therefore, in the process of interaction 
meanings will not only be sustained, but they may also be negotiated-­
being modified or transformed in the process. 
In short, bas ic features of symbol ic interact ion are: "that indi­
vidual action is a construction and not a release, being built up by 
the individual through noting and interpreting features of the situa­
tions in which he acts; [andJ that group or collective action consists 
of the aligning of individual actions, brought about by the individuals 
7The term object encompasses Iinot only physical things, or human 
or social structures, but also relations between such structures, in­
teractions among them, processes that occur within and between them, in­
terface phenomena, and most importantly, human activity guided by inten­
tion ll (Ozbekhan, 1969, p. 53). 
8The sociology of knowledge is the field that studies the rela­
tionship between thought and society. Marx and Mannheim are major con­
tributors to its development. Marx1s thesis that thought and systems of 
thought are dependent upon economic and class factors is well known. 
Mannheim expanded this notion--asserting that thought is related to so­
cial status, roles, and positions, such as generations. 
A more recent theorist, George Herbert Mead, has developed the the­
sis that "mind arises through communication by a conversation of gestures 
in a social process or context of experiencell (1934, p. 50). It seems 
livery difficult to deny his claim that if determinants of thought other 
than society itself exist, they can structure mind only through the in­
termediary of the social relations in which it is necessarily enmeshed" 
Ceoser, 1968, p. 432). 
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interpreting or taking into account each other's actions" (Blumer, 1962, 
p. 184). These presuppositions underlie the concept of planning pre­
sented in this dissertation. 
I I. PLANNING THEORY 
In addition to the usual difficulties that face those who are at­
tempting to construct theory, planning theorists are handicapped by 
confusion about the very meaning of the term "planning theory" (Bolan, 
1974). There are few writings that focus on planning theory, and thus 
1ittle light is shed on the confusion. However, two recent articles-­
one by Friedmann and Hudson (1974) and the other by Bolan (1974)--do 
afford insight into the current state of planning theory, and merit 
some consideration. 
Friedmann and Hudson (1974) provide an historical review of the 
literature of planning theory, and distinguish four intellectual tradi­
tions: (1) the tradition of philosophical synthesis whose theorists go 
beyond the boundaries of a single discipline in an attempt to achieve an 
integrated view of planning as a social process; (2) those with a ra­
tionalistic focus whose concern is with how decisions can be made more 
rationally; (3) the tradition of organizational development which focus­
es on ways to achieve changes in organizational structure and behavior 
and casts the planner in the role of change agent; and (4) the tradition 
of empiricism which is concerned with studies of national and urban plan­
ning processes. 
A major part of Friedmann and Hudson's article is devoted to re­
viewing each of these traditions. Although they do find coherence with­
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in the various traditions, they admit that no unified planning theory 
exists--there is no coherent body of theoretical propositions (1974, 
p. 13). Friedmann and Hudson suggest the tradition of philosophical 
synthesis as one that may possibly provide a framework for the integra­
tion of planning theory, yet they express doubt that this convergence 
will occur in the near future. They maintain: 
We still lack a body of experience that would demonstrate 
the usefulness of a unified approach to guided social change 
and indeed, there is not even the promise that such an approach 
and the theory underlying it might soon be shaped in the mold 
of social practice (p. 13). 
While the approach of Friedmann and Hudson (1974) is largely an 
historical one, Bolan (1974) examines the current state of planning the­
ory. His rather elegant map of planning theory "terrain" contains 
twelve cells (p. 17), representing "twelve distinct areas which togeth­
er map the total reach of a theory of planning" (p. 16). His framework 
includes four levels of social relations: a substantive level (where 
interaction occurs with other humans and the environment), a cultural 
level, an institutional level, and a psychological level. 
Bolan's major goal was to critically examine the current state of 
planning theory, yet some planners may be overwhelmed by all that Bolan 
has included as the terrain of planning theory. According to him, "a 
broad sweep of many intellectual strains" and "a host of accumulated 
knowledge of the physical and social world" (p. 20) has found its way in­
to planning theory. The recent planning thought that Bolan has consid­
ered requires a new perspective on planning. 9 
9Bolan's framework obl iterates the distinction between procedural 
theories and substantive theories of planning made by Hightower (1969)-­
a distinction many planners may feel more comfortable with. 
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Bolan clearly sets forth that perspective by specifically describ­
ing what he means by planning theory: 
My orientation is toward the general body of knowledge deal­
ing with planned social change. r am interested in understand­
ing that confluence of human purposes and interests, and that 
array of activities employing social, economic, and physical re­
sources which alter human affairs, relationships, institutions, 
and artifacts in accordance with some mutually agreed to, de­
sired, and purposeful goal (pp. 13-14). 
Our concern--as Bolan1s--is with planned social change, which we 
have referred to as resolving social problems. We do not claim to pre­
sent a unified or fully developed theory of socia~ planning. However, 
we do intend to discuss some concepts that seem promising for social 
planning theory. We will first consider what implications the nature 
of social problems has for social planning. Then social planning will 
be discussed in relationship to the social construction of reality. 
I I. SOCIAL PROBLEMS AS THE OBJECT OF SOCIAL PLANNING 
A premise basic to this dissertation is that social planning the­
ory and practice must grow out of a consideration of its content or ob­
ject--and that is social problems. An exploration of the nature of so­
cial problems from both an historical and a sociological perspective has 
yielded two different ways of conceptualizing social problems as Figures 
4 and 5 indicate. However, these are not conflicting views, but may be 
seen as complementary. Both permit the formulation of two propositions. 
One is that if social problems are to be dealt with effectively, 
social planning ~ treat the structural causes of these problems. It 
is evident that this proposition is in line with the social systems 
framework (Figure 4) t but it also flows from the perspective derived 
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125 
from our consideration of sociological theory and social problems (Fig­
ure 5). Conceptualizing social problems as having two dimensions per­
mits us to focus on objective conditions, such as causes, seriousness, 
and scope. In attending to objective conditions, in assessing the re­
lationship between problem definition and solution, it has been contend­
ed that it is necessary to consider the structural factors that cause 
or perpetuate these conditions. For too long problems have been dealt 
with as being those of the individual. 
The second proposition is that if social problems are to be dealt 
with effectively, social planning ~ address itself to the values, be­
liefs, definitions, etc. that obstruct social change. A consideration 
of the subjective dimensions of social problems has given rise to the 
assertion that planners must be concerned with how persons define so­
cial problems and that the definition process must be brought into the 
planning process. According to this perspective unless persons collec­
tively consider a condition as a social problem and define it in struc­
tural terms, it is not possible to cope effectively with the problem. 
The social systems perspective also supports this proposition. "Theo­
ry," that is, norms, values, ideology, etc., may serve to legitimate 
existing social structures. If this is the case, beliefs and values be­
come important factors in shaping efforts to deal with social problems. 
Social planners must acknowledge this--making "theory" the target of 
change. 
The investigation into the nature of social problems (in Chapters 
II and [[I) has supported these two propositions, and has also yielded 
two perspectives on social problems: considering their dimensions and 
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their systemic causes. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate these two different 
ways of conceptualizing social problems. Although these two perspec­
tives do not present us with a unified or general theory of social prob­
lems, they are complementary rather than contradictory views of social 
problems. Their value for us lies in their giving us two ways of think­
ing about social problems and two ways of conceptualizing social plan­
ning (Figures 4 and 5). 
In relation to social planning, these two perspectives on social 
problems do converge--permitting us to conceptualize social planning as 
planning that treats the structural causes of social problems and ad­
dresses the values, beliefs, definitions, etc. that obstruct social 
change. Our analysis of social problems has provi~ed the basis for a 
reconceptual ization of social planning. 
IV. SOCIAL PLANNING AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 
Planning theory belongs in the context of a general theory of so­
cial reality. Of the traditions identified by Friedmann and Hudson 
(1974) only the tradition of philosophical synthesis attempts explicit­
ly to do this. Since planning theory (and practice) grows out of one's 
view of man and society, it is appropriate for planning theorists to 
situate planning theory in a broader theoretical framework. 
At the beginning of this chapter our assumptions about the nature 
of social real tty, man, and social' interaction were set forth. It is 
suggested that these theoretical c~ncepts can contribute to planning 
theory and that ,they have important appl ications for planning practice. 
These concepts are used to place planning in a larger theoretical frame­
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work. P1anning is considered as a process in which rea1 ity is socially 
constructed. This conceptual ization is i1lustrated by Figure 6. 
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Fi gu re 6. Social planning and the construction of reality. 
The construction of real ity is considered as occurring in seven 
phases--with planning beginning in the third phase. To facilitate dis­
cuss ion the b10cks in Figure 6 have been numbered. 
1. The social world is produced by man in interaction. These 
institutionalized arrangements give rise to social problems--with both 
the arrangements and the problems they generate being experienced as ob­
jective rea1 ity. An examp1e may serve to c1arify. Unemp10yment is in­
tegral to the institutional ized economic arrangements that man himself 
has created, that is, it is structurally generated and maintained. Con­
temporary economic institutions, including unemp1oyment, can on1y be 
fully understood when one considers the historica1 process by which they 
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were produced--and produced by man. Unemployment is an objective fact. 
It is experienced as objective reality--a problem or reality confronting 
some persons as an external and coercive fact, a reality over which they 
exercise little or no contr01. 
2. Each society has specific ways of defining and perceiving the 
socially constructed world. Each individual born into that society un­
dergoes a process by which that world becomes subjectively his world. 
''What is real 'outside 
' 
corresponds to what is real ·within'" (Berger 
and Luckmann, 1966, p. 133). 
The experience of individuals and society leads to the accumula­
tion of knowledge--making it possible for knowledge to be transmitted 
10from generation to generation. This social stock of knowledge is 
available to individuals within the society, and although individuals 
differ in their knowledge, they share in at least part of this knowledge. 
Berger and Luckmann write of the social distribution of knowledge, re­
ferring to the fact that knowledge of social real ity is not shared 
equally by individuals. 
An example of the social distribution of knowledge that is perti­
nent to the planning process is the knowledge possessed by the planner 
and by the non-planner. Friedmann (1973) develops this distinction, 
10pertinent to Berger and Luckmann's (1966) discussion of the so­
cial stock of knowledge are concepts such as recipe knowledge, degrees 
of familiarity,. typificatory schemes, and relevance structures. Devel­
opment of these concepts is not necessary here, but the reader who is 
interested in how participation in the available social stock of know­
ledge affects interaction should refer to pp. 41-46. 
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11
calling one personal knowledge and the other processed knowledge. 
[Personal knowledge isJ based on the direct experience of 
the knower with the facts at hand. Personal knowledge is nei­
ther formally codified nor subject to a process of systematic 
verification. Rich in detailed observation, it is incapable 
of being generalized beyond the specific case from which it has 
been drawn (pp. 245-46). 
~rocessed knowledge i~ another term for scientific-tech­
nical knowledge and [i~ expressed in statements that can be 
formally communicated, critically examined, and revised on the 
basis of both new observations and the critique received (p. 
246) . 
Individuals then differ in their knowledge of social reality--in 
their definitions and perceptions. This means that conditions may be 
defined as social problems by some and not by others, or individuals may 
agree that a social problem exists, but define it differently. 
3. It is possible for persons to share their views of reality and 
for one person to apprehend another's subjective processes. One's sub­
jectivity can be made objectively available to others and can be sub­
jectively meaningful to them. This does not necessarily mean'that a 
person fully understands another or that there is necessarily congruence 
· b' • 12between t helr su Jectlve processes. 
The planning process can be viewed as an opportunity for the par­
ticipants--planners and citizens--to share their subjectivity, to en­
110ur use of Friedmannls distinction does not deny that planners 
have "personal" knowledge about some aspects of social reality, nor that 
non-planners may have processed knowledge. This distinction is used in 
an ideal-typical sense to indicate that with regard to a specific plan­
ning task persons differ in the kinds of knowledge brought to the task. 
Each type of knowledge is incomplete in itself--needing the other to 
complement it. 
12See Berger and Luckmann (1966, pp. 129-30) for a discussion of 
intersubjectivity. 
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gage in a process of interaction through which their definitions of so­
cial reality--of social problems--not only can be shared and understood, 
but are actually subject to negotiation and modification. 
4. If we accept the concept of the social distribution of knowl­
edge, it fOllows that no one person possesses a complete view of real­
ity. If it is true that persons share limited views of social real ity-­
of social problems, the purpose of participation in the planning process 
is not just to share definitions, or to ensure that one's definition 
predominates, or to educate citizens, or to legitimate decisions. Rath­
er it is to make different definitions and counter-definitions accessi­
ble to the participants in the planning process, and to make the parti­
cipants subject to the possible modification of their own definitions 
of rea I i ty. 
If the personal knowledge of the non-planner and the processed 
knowledge of the planner can be joined, new understandings and defini­
tions can emerge. Friedmann (1973) refers to this process as mutual 
learning. But not only do planner and non-planner have different kinds 
of knowledge, but individuals, especially those occupying different 
socio-economic positions, also possess knowledge differently. The con­
cept of mutual learning can be extended to include the joining of the 
unique personal knowledge of various individuals. In a broader sense 
then, mutual learning refers to the process in which participants share 
their knowledge, their understandings, in the joint exploration of so­
cial problems, their definitions, and their possible solutions. 13 
13This definition of mutual learning is a modification of Fried­
mann's (1973, p. 245). 
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If citizens and planners join together in the planning process, 
engage in the process of mutua1 learning, each person's view of social 
reality--of social problems--will change. One's subjective real ity is 
thereby subject to modification. 
5. What is sought in the p1anning process is, a collective defini­
tion of the social problem. This requires that participants jointly de­
fine a condition as a social problem--and define it in structural terms. 
6. Once meanings have been shared and negotiated, common under­
standings and a definition constructed, planners must assist partici­
pants in designing lines of action--plans--that will deal with the caus­
es of social problems. Just as a social problem isa social construc­
tion of reality, a product of a process of collective definition, so too 
the "plan" that emerges from the process is socially constructed. It is 
a collective social creation--and not merely the planner's "product." 
7. Once the collective action, the plan, is agreed to and imple­
mented, social arrangements--the object of the plan--are changed. Man 
is again constructing social reality and social problems--objectively 
and subjectively. The definitions and the plan that emerge from the 
process cannot in any sense be considered as final, for any definition 
of real ity or plan is precarious. Definitions are always subject to re­
definition in the course of everyday interaction. 
Our consideration of the definitiona1 or subjective dimension of 
social problems in the last chapter led to the assertion that planners 
need to study the definitional process and make it a part of the planning 
process. This perspective on social problems challenges planners to re­
consider the role citizens are to play in the planning process--that is, 
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if social problems are to be resolved. 
Conceptualizing social planning as the construction of reality 
further develops these concepts. The interaction that takes place be­
tween citizens and between planners and citizens is seen as crucial in 
constructing a collective definition of the problem and a collective ac­
tion to deal with it. Our discussion of social planning as the construc­
tion of social real ity has developed more fully a theoretical basis for 
the participation of citizens in the planning process. 
This conceptual ization also has consequences for the role of the 
planner. For if persons, individually and collectively, are prepared 
to act on the basis of the meanings of the objects that comprise their 
world, planners need to attend to the process by which meanings emerge. 
They have a role to play in facilitating the process in which partici­
pants note, interpret, and assess the situations facing them. This role 
will be discussed in more detail in our presentation of the planning 
model. 
v. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter social planning has been conceptual ized in rela­
tion to social problems. It has been considered as a process that con­
fronts the systemic causes of social problems (Figure 4) as well as the 
objective and subjective dimensions of socia1 problems (Figure 5). These 
two perspectives on social problems have given rise to a new conceptu­
al ization of social planning. It has been our contention that if social 
problems are to be dealt with effectively, social planning must (1) 
treat the structural causes of these problems, and (2) address itself to 
133 
the values, beliefs, definitions, etc. that obstruct social change. 
Social planning has also been placed in a broad theoretical frame­
work, being conceptual ized in the context of the social construction of 
reality. Within this basic theoretical framework a model of social 
planning wil I be constructed. This model and the planner's role in it 
are the focus of the next chapter. 
CHAPTER V 
TOWARD A THEORY AND MODEL OF SOCIAL PLANNING--I I 
This dissertation is grounded in the bel ief that we can improve 
our capacities to treat our problems, and this chapter specifically is 
addressed to this issue. A model of social planning that grows out of 
a consideration of the nature of social problems and that has problem 
resolution as a focal concern is presented. 
This presentation treats three components of the model: (I) char­
acteristics of the planning process; (2) phases of the process; and (3) 
roles for planner, citizen, and decision maker. Five characteristics 
of the planning process will be discussed, and it will be argued that 
these premises or characteristics are essential if social planning is to 
deal effectively with spcial problems. A diagram illustrating the phas­
es of the process and planning roles in each of the phases will be set 
forth. The role of the planner will be considered in more detail than 
that of the others. 
Because assumptions about the planning environment and the nature 
of knowledge influence how persons approach planning, these assumptions 
will be explicated before e1ements of the planning mode1 are presented. 
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I. ADDITIONAL ASSUMPTIONS: ENVIRONMENT AND KNOWLEDGE 
The Environment of Planning 
Contemporary society is characterized by rapid change (Schon, 
1971, p. 23; Friedmann, 1973, p. 106). Changes in professions and oc­
cupations, regions, organizations, institutions, intellectual disci­
pI ines, values, and even in personal identity have caused Schon (1971) 
to announce the "loss of the stable state." He contends: "Currents of 
change roll through every domain of society, shaking the stable state. 
No establ ished instit..,ution l.!:!. ~ society ~ perceives itself ~ ade­
quate to the challenges that face.!..t' (p. 17). 
Emery and Trist (1965) have focused on the environmental contexts 
in which organizations exist. They find that the environment is chang­
ing rapidly under the impact of technological change. Differentiating 
four types of environmental contexts, they identify one as a "turbulent" 
one. liThe turbulence results fron the complexity and multiple charac­
ter of the causal interconnections" (p. 31). The environment is "So 
complex, so richly joined, that it is difficult to see how indidivual 
organizations can, by their own efforts, successfully adapt to them" 
(Emergy, 1967, p. 223). The actions of individuals and organizations 
have unplanned and sometimes negative consequences on others. 
Planning, therefore, is challenged by "turbulence"--by a rapidly 
changing, interrelated, increasingly complex environment. 
136 
1Knowledge 
The diversity, complexity, and rapidity of change that character­
ize the social environment are closely related to the following assump­
tions about the knowledge that is brought to bear on the planning task. 
1. The difficulty of identifying and measuring key variables 
limits 	our ability to explain relationships, and therefore our ability 
d • . 1·· d 2t o pre Ict consequences IS Imlte. 
2. Knowledge is scarce and therefore costly. 
3. The data available to planners are often incomplete and in a 
form that is not useful. 
4. On the other hand, sometimes there is not a lack of informa­
tion, but lIan information overload, too many signals, more than can be 
accounted for; and there is as yet no theory in terms of which new in­
formation can be sought or new experiments undertaken ll (Schon, 1971, 
p. 13). 
5. Knowledge is socially distributed. Therefore no one person 
knows "what's best," nor is one particular perspective I'the best.1I 
Scientific knowledge, as well as knowledge from anyone discipline, has 
1For an extended discussion of the contemporary IIcrisis of know­
ing," see Friedmann (1973, pp. 98-112). Dror (1968, pp. 225-32) also 
examines what he terms "barriers" that face the development of pol icy 
knowledge in the social sciences. 
2This assumption will be treated again in the next chapter when 
Dunnls (1971) concept of lIevolutionary experimentation ll and Iidevelop­
mental hypotheses" is discussed. It is central to his concept of plan­
ning. 
I' 
137 
its biases and needs to be complemented by other perspectives. 3 
In summary, a good deal of uncertainty--and even ignorance--char­
acterize our knowledge of social real ity. 
I I. TOWARD A SOCIAL PLANNING MODEL: PROCESS CHARACTERISTICS 
The elements of the social planning model that will be developed 
are based on the theoretical concepts and assumptions that have been 
discussed in the preceding pages. The model is built on (1) what has 
been presented as the nature of social problems, (2) the theoretical 
concepts deal ing with the nature of social reality, man, and social in­
teraction; and (3) 'the assumptions that were just discussed regarding 
the planning environment and the nature of our knowledge. 
Five characteristics are proposed as essential to the social plan­
ning process, and hence, are integral to the model. The contention, 
based on the assumptions that have been made, is: if social problems 
are to be resolved, planning must be a (1) "task-oriented," (2) "exper­
imental," (3) "cybernetic," (4) dialogic, and (5) collaborative process. 
These characteristics or premises are interdependent and overlapping; 
however, they will be discussed separately. 
A "Task-oriented" Process 
If social problems are to be dealt with effective1y, the planning 
3Bish (1975, pp. 258-59) details two similar assumptions. One is 
"relative increasing ignorance." The expansion of knowledge means that 
each person knows relatively less. The second is that the scientific 
bias leads to the neglect of "time and place specific information." 
These two assumptions are offered by Bish as counter to assumptions of 
perfect and complete knowledge. 
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process must be "task-oriented." This term has been selected in pref­
erence to "goal-oriented" which has often been associated with design­
ing effective means to attain goals. A task-orientation includes this, 
but in addition requires that every step of the planning process be ~-
rected toward resolving the problem. This means defining the problem 
in structural terms, and after the problem has been defined, translat­
ing goals into measurable criteria so that programs can be evaluated in 
terms of how much progress has been made towards resolution of the prob­
lem. If the plan that is finally selected represents a compromise be­
tween competing interests, it is unlikely that it will be relevant in 
deal ing with the problem. The plan must be oriented toward "the task," 
not to competing interests. 
Attention especially needs to be paid to implementation, for we 
know that in the process of implementation problems are often restruc­
tured and redefined (Blumer, 1971, p. 305). The question arises wheth­
er it is possible for organizations that are responsible for imp1emen­
tation to focus on problem resolution--to be task-oriented. 4 Michel IS 
famous study of reformist movements in Germany led him to conclude that 
it is inevitable for organizations in the course of time to reI inquish 
original goals and become more concerned with their own survival--with 
organizational maintenance (Blau, 1956, pp. 94-95). Selznickls (1949) 
4Wildavsky (1972) refers to a task-oriented organization as a 
"self-evaluating organization." lilt would continuously monitor its 
own activities so as to determine whether it was meeting its goa1s or 
even whether these goals should c~ntinue to prevail" (po 509). Al­
though Wildavsky is not certain that self-evaluating organizations can 
exist, he considers how the ideal organization would function and dis­
cusses some of the obstacles to its realization. He sees the development 
of trust as an essential requirement for the self-evaluating organization. 
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study of the Tennessee Valley Authority also revealed that the TVA grad­
ually altered the objectives of its programs, becoming more conservative 
in the course of its development. Blau (1956), however, contends that 
organizational or bureaucratic structures of themselves do not necessari­
ly generate a conservative trend. 
Thus, it must be recognized that organizations and participants 
in the planning process may experience difficulty in focusing on the 
task of problem resolution--especial ly over an extended period of time. 
However, commitment to that task is essential if problems are to be re­
solved. 
An "Experimental" Process 
A commitment to problem resolution, i.e., a "task-orientation," 
requires an "experimental ll approach. Experimental--as used here--re­
fers to the provisional or tentative nature of ~ the phases of ~­
~. It is not being used in the sense of a scientific approach--one 
requiring the specification and control of variables. 
An experimental approach is essential, for the social planner is 
handicapped by the lack of two kinds of knowledge: first, "there is in­
sufficient information of a 'base-l ine' character about the extent of a 
problem--the kinds of people affected by it and its indirect consequen­
ces or associated phenomena," and second, we have only "a meager under­
standing of the complexity of relationships among social forces" 
(Riecken and Boruch, 1974, p. 2) . 
.Presently many planning efforts do not reflect the state of our 
knowledge. "Specific reforms are advocated as though they were certain 
to be successful" (Campbell, 1972, p. 188). In a critique of urban 
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problem solving Brewer (1973, p. 234) states that there is a tendency 
for technical professionals lito hold out hope that a specific project, 
a particular computer model, or a given demonstration project 
will provide the much-desired answer." 
Besides those who advocate specific plans/programs as lithe ans­
wer," there are administrators and staff who also fail to view programs 
as "experimental.11 Campbell (1972) makes a pertinent distinction be­
tween the trapped administrator--the one who is committed to ~ specific 
program--and the experimental administrator who is committed to prob­
lem resolution rather than to a specific reform. The former cannot af­
ford to permit the program to undergo serious evaluation, whereas the 
latter is willing to use evaluative information to retain, modify, or 
abandon a particular program--he is committed to the task of problem 
solving. 
If one acknowledges the complexity of social problems and the lim-
I 
itations on our knowledge, it fol lows that a plan that has been evalu­
ated in the 1ight of goals and finally selected for implementation will 
not necessarily lead to goal achievement or problem resolution. Even 
though consequences may have carefully be projected and.analyzed, the 
results are uncertain. Thus, an approach more in harmony with the na­
ture of our knowledge and the nature of social problems would be an ex­
perimental one. In this approach to social planning, a program/plan is 
hypothesized as leading to goal attainment, and all those with a stake 
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5in the planning process need to acknowledge the possibility of failure. 
The commitment is to problem resolution--not to a specific plan or pro­
gram. 
Experimental refers not only to plans and programs, but requires 
that every phase of the planning process be considered provisional or 
tentative. Does this mean that goals too are subject to revision or 
even abandonment? The answer is partially contingent on how we define 
goals. 6 We will consider a goal as referring to an ideal or a value. 
It is abstract--to be pursued, not attained. Objectives, on the other 
hand, are more specific and are possible to achieve. 
Ordinarily goals do not change; objectives do. The following ex­
ample wi 11 illustrate. IIA decent home for every American fami ly" was 
declared a national goal by Congress in the Housing Act of 1949. A 
specif:c objective of that act called for a total of 810,000 publ ic 
housing units to be constructed in the next six years. That objective 
was revised downward in 1954. By 1972 there were 310,000 fewer publ ic 
5Michael (1973) and Wildavsky (1972) discuss the importance of 
organizations acknowledging the possibility of failure. Michael de­
votes a chapter (pp. 131-43) to the topic, "embracing error!' His the­
sis is that in order to engage in long-range social planning we must 
acknowledge uncertainty, expect error, seek to discover it, and then 
use it as a basis for learning. To encourage this behavior organiza­
tions must reward error-embracing. 
Because Wildavsky postulates that knowledge is contingent, that 
improvement is a1ways possible, that organizations must learn from ex­
perience, evaluation becomes critical. Yet because evaluation depends 
upon accurate information, Wildavsky too contends that organizations 
must reward "bad news." 
6young (1966) points out that the term goal is used in many ways, 
and also that terms, such as objectives, aims, policies, purposes, and 
alternatives are often used more or less interchangeably for goals-­
without distinguishing their meanings. Our discussion of goals and ob­
jectives is based on the distinction Young makes between goals and ob­
jectives. 
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housing units than the 1968 Housing Act had specified as an objective to 
be reached by 1973, and far short of what had been called for in 1949. 
Specific housing objectives have changed and will continue to change, 
while the goal of Ita decent home" is, and more than likely will remain, 
a stated national goal. 
Young (1966) points out that a hierarchy of goals exists (some are 
less important) and that some of the goals may actually be incompatible. 
Thus, even abstract goals need to be reexamined, and perhaps be given a 
different priority.7 
It is important, therefore, for goals to be analyzed in the light 
of other goals. And in order to resolve social problems, programs must 
be evaluated to determine whether they are reaching their objectives, 
and objectives must be examined to see if their fulfil lment leads in the 
direction of goal attainment. Since our knowledge is incomplete and un­
certain in many respects, efforts to resolve social problems require a 
planning approach that acknowledges this, and then tests knowledge by 
action. In other words, social planning requires an experimental ap­
proach to problem solving. 
7Young (1966) discusses conflict over publ ic goals, and proposes 
a procedure the planner can use to handle mUltiple goals. Included in 
that process is the examination of the relationship between the goals, 
the relative evaluation of goals or sets of goals, and finally, the es­
tablishment of goals which are prioritized. 
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8A "Cybernetic" Process
When it is acknowledged that our efforts at problem resolution are 
subject to error, provision must be made to monitor and evaluate these 
efforts, and then redirect them when necessary. We will borrow the 
term "cybernetic" and adapt it to the planning process which involves 
human beings and a turbulent environment rather than machines. 9 
Planning, as a cybernetic process, imp1ies an openness to the en­
. and' an . f· t h provi·des d orvlronment requires In ormation system10 at ata f 
monitoring and evaluating programs. Even more significantly, it re­
quires that the planning system have the capacity to respond to feed­
back information--using the knowledge that is gained to improve perform­
8Bauer (1969) and Jantsch (1969) both conceive of p1anning as a 
cybernetic process. In Bauer's view the detection of the consequences 
of the plan and its subsequent adjustment become essential to p1anning, 
and thus he is concerned with feedback and information systems. 
Jantsch develops the notion of adaptive or "cybernetic" institu­
tions. He argues that it is necessary for institutions to continuously 
re1ate "planning objectives and potentials to the changing environ­
ment, and to provide suitable information systems" (p. 473). Planning, 
according to Jantsch, is a IIflexible process of continuous search and 
modification" (p. 477). 
911Cybernetics is the study of steering, of the ways groups of ma­
chines, or persons, or combinations of machines and persons, are guided 
to work jointly to realize goa1s set by the cybernetic over1ayer. Cy­
bernetics is most highly developed in mechanical and electrical systems, 
where it consists of (1) one or more centers which issue instructions to 
the units which do the work, and (2) communication I ines which carry the 
instructions from the center(s) to the \AIOrking units, and return 'feed­
back' information and responses from the subject units. While many cy­
bernetic models omit power, we see it as a third main factor. If the 
steering units cannot back up their signals with rewards or sanctions, 
they will be frequent1y disregarded" (Etzioni, 1970, p. 223). 
lOAn information system, according to Bauer (1969, p. 66), has 
four functions: (1) detection, (l) evaluation, (3) diagnosis, and (4) 
prescription for action or guidance. 
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The important point is to use feedback information in a system­ance. 
atic way, or in other words, to learn from experience, thereby improv­
ing problem solving efforts. Accordingly, the plan may require some 
modification, major adjustments, or may need to be abandoned and a new 
plan adopted. Or the problem itself may need to be redefined. All ef­
forts are judged by their effectiveness in confronting the structural 
11 
causes of the problem and need to be continually directed to that end. 
A Dialogic Process 
Planning has been conceptualized both as a process in which real­
ity is socially constructed and as a process of mutual learning (Chap­
12 
ter IV). However, mutual learning can only take place through dialog. 
And it is in a face-to-face situation that persons can most fully share 
13their subjectivity, i.e., what social real ity is to them. 
Therefore, it is important to consider the threefold features 
11 John Platt, a humanistic scientist (1974, pp. 124-25), argues 
that a "cybernetic 1NOrking-through" of the problems facing us is essen­
tial. His view is similar to what has been expressed as a task-oriented, 
experimental, cybernetic process. He explains: liThe cybernetic view 
of man and society is that we move ahead by a steering process, indi­
vidually and collectively. We must continually look ahead to see which 
direction we are going in and how it needs to be changed, and what we 
must do to change it. No direction is permanent. No prophecy is sure. 
No recommendation is absolutely certain. So we must proceed by contin­
ually evaluating, choosing and acting, with lookouts (or 'prophets') and 
with feedback-monitoring as we work through current problems and con­
tinually adjust our human course in the light of new dangers or new pos­
sibilities, experimenting but being ready to correct the course when we 
see we have begun to go wrong." 
125ee Friedmann's (1973, pp. 177-83) discussion of dialog. 
13Berger and Luckmann (1966, pp. 28-34) discuss the importance of 
face-to-face interaction for experiencing the other as "rea1." 
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that are essential to dialog,14 and thus, to the model of social plan­
ning that is being proposed: 
I. The ability and willingness of each participant to state the 
other's view of real ity to the other's satisfaction (the abil ity to take 
the role of the other and to express one1s interpretation). 
2. The abil ity and wi llingness of each participant to state the 
conditions under which the other's view of reality is valid or has merit 
(recognition that the other's subjective reality has some validity). 
3. The ability and willingness of each participant to assume that 
in many respects the other is I ike himself; that is to say, that a com­
mon ground exists where they share common values and perspectives, and 
each is aware of this common ground, and perhaps, of the circumstances 
which have led the other to the position he holds (empathy). 
The collaborative model is premised on the willingness and ability 
of persons to engage in the process of mutual learning through dialog. 
A Collaborative Process 
It is common today to refer to planning as a process. Many ac­
knowledge that this represents a change in the focus of planning, for 
previously the primary concern of urban planners was the preparation of 
! product-"'a "mas ter plan." Their task was ordinarily considered com­
pleted when the plan was produced"'-and hopefully adopted. "Planning is 
now viewed as ~ continuing process of moving towards provisional goals 
rather than the delineation of an ideal end-state to be achieved at 
14These features of dialog are a modification of those set forth 
by Anatole Rappaport and are discussed by Dunn (1971, p. 230). 
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some future data" (Robinson, 1972, p. 21, emphasis added). In current 
theory and practice it is recognized that the planner is engaged in a 
dynamic, developmental activity. 
In earlier views of planning the planner was viewed primarily as 
an expert--standing outside or beyond the political process. He was a 
technician: value-free, providing an objective, impartial analysis. 
Current theories of the planning process set the planner in the midst of 
the political process (Bolan, 1969; Rondinelli, 1969). 
A few theorists have given process another meaning, that is, they 
conceptualize planning as a process of social interaction. Friedmann 
(1973) advocates "transactive planning," in which planner and client 
groups join together in a process of mutual learning. He has outlined 
a style of planning in which interpersonal relations between planner and 
client are central. Although Friedmann does not use the term "social 
interaction," he does conceptual ize transactive planning as a "sequence 
of interpersonal relations" (p. 170) and as a "web of interpersonal 
transactions" (p. 200). 
Perlmann and Gurin (1972) have developed a social problem solving 
model which requires that the practitioner perform both analytical and 
interactional tasks. According to this model the practitioner performs 
the technical tasks that planners have traditionally seen as belonging 
to their professional competencies. In addition the practitioner is in­
volved in a process of interaction with others. To deal effectively 
with problems, he must also be concerned with building working relation­
ships with his client. 
In his conceptua1 ization of planning Bolan (1971) draws on knowl­
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edge from group dynamics, role theory, and organization studies. He 
presents planning as a social process with the planner enmeshed in a so­
cial interaction network. According to this framework, planning involves 
not just a role for the planner, but three interrelated roles: a plan­
15
ning role, a cl ient role, and a community decision network. In Bolan's 
scheme the planner is involved in interaction at two levels: with the 
cl ient group and with the larger community. Planning is also placed in 
a political context with his model realistically capturing the re1ation­
ships that shape urban planning decisions. Negotiation and bargaining 
are integral to that process. 
By conceptual izing planning as a social process and situating the 
planner in that process, Friedmann (1973), Perlmann and Gurin (1972), 
and Bolan (1971) have made important contributions to planning theory. 
The planner is no mere technician whose role is to objectively develop 
and propose an efficient, effective plan. Neither is he just involved 
in an on-going developmental process; the planner is now viewed as act­
~~ relation to others. 
Planning has been conceptual ized in this dissertation as a process 
of social interaction. We are now asserting that if planning is to re­
solve social problems, interaction must be characterized by col1abora­
tion. By collaboration is meant that participants ~ the planning ~-
cess join ~~ common effort to solve social problems. 
This notion of collaboration has two imp1 ications. The first is 
15Besides conceptualizing these three roles, Bolan (1971) sets 
forth a framework encompassing factors that influence the interaction 
between planner and c1 ient (po 388) and one that includes those factors 
that influence client and community interaction (po 391). 
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that participants enter into the process in order'to work toward the 
resolution of a social problem. If the planning process is character­
ized primarily by competition, and if the outcome is largely shaped by 
bargaining, experience seems to support the conclusion that the pol icy/ 
plan will not be directed toward problem resolution (Piven, 1971; Jones, 
1971; Ross and Staines, 1972). 
Planning as a collaborative process has a second implication: 
participants--citizen and planner--are viewed as collaborators or part­
ners in the process. Planning is not the exclusive domain of the plan­
nero If knowledge of social reality is socially distributed (as we 
maintained earl ier), more than one perspective is needed on the problem 
and its "solution." 
Most planners would agree that input from others is needed. And 
most do seek to involve others in goal formulation and make efforts to 
assess values and preferences. 16 But col laborationhere means more 
than this: citizens, planners, and decision makers--although each has 
a different role in the planning process--come to the planning task as 
equals. Each brings his special knowledge, i.e., either personal or 
processed, to bear on the planning task. Table I I I, which is borrowed 
from Friedmann (1973, p. 187), clnrifies these distinct contributions. 
Planning as collaboration means that each participant brings a 
specific contribution to the process. Each contributes to the task and 
each has something to learn from the other participants. Planning to 
resolve social problems requires joint efforts to do so. This concept 
16For an excellent disc:.Jssion of the planner's task of assessing 
walues and preferences refer to Kahn (1969, Chapter IV). 
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TABLE III 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO PLANNING 
Planners 	 Citizens 
· 	 concepts • intimate knowledge of context 
· 	 theory · realistic alternatives 
· 	analysis · norms 
· 	 processed knowledge · priorities 
· 	 new perspectives · feasibility judgments 
• 	systematic search · operational details 

procedures 

of planning as a collaborative process is so essential to dealing with 
social problems that we will identify the concept and model of social 
planning proposed in this dissertation as collaborative social planning. 
In sum, we have assumed that planning is situated in a turbulent 
environment and that our knowledge of that environment is incomplete 
and uncertain. Five characteristics have been identified as necessary 
requirements of the social planning process. That process, it has been 
argued, must be a task-oriented, experimental, cybernetic, dialogic, 
and collaborative process. These process characteristics are integral 
to our social planning model. 
II 	I. THE SOCIAL PLANNING PROCESS: PHASES AND ROLES 
Phases of the planning process and roles in that process are as­
pects of the social planning model that will now be considered. 
Phases 
Friedmann (1969) describes the classical decision model of the 
planning process as involving four distinct steps: "(I) preparation of 
alternative plans ~ planners; (2) adoption of one of these plans ~ 
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deciders; (3) implementation of the chosen plan ~ administrators; and 
(4) recycling information concerning the results of implementation to 
planners who use this information to revise the current plan" (p. 312, 
emphasis added). 
In place of this classical model Friedmann proposes an action­
planning model that "fuses action and planning into a single operation 
so that the conceptual distinctions of planning-decision-implementation­
recycling are washed out" (1969, p. 312). Friedmann maintains that 
this model is closer to empirical real ity--that it is difficult to iso­
late the four steps in the classical model. 
Because of its relegating planners, decision makers, and adminis­
trators to a particular phase of the planning process, the classical de­
cision model described above by Friedmann is rejected. However, we 
will also reject Friedmann's suggestion to abandon entirely the concep­
tual distinctions of planning--decision making--implementation--recy­
cling. Although he is correct in maintaining that it is often diffi­
cult in reality to isolate these steps, conceptual izing the planning 
process as a series of phases or stages is useful. 
Examples of various conceptual izations of planning phases are 
set forth in Table IV. They represent the thinking of persons from 
varied backgrounds: Schein (1969), a process consultant who deals 
with group problem solving; social workers, Perlman and Gurin (1972), 
who consider social problem solving from the perspective of social plan­
ning and community organization; Kahn (1969), a social worker, whose 
concern is social planning; Riecken and Boruch (1974), social scien­
tists who are interested in experimentation; and of Robinson (1971), an 
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urban planner. Although a great deal of similarity is apparent, when 
one explores their views of planning or problem solving, differences 
a 1 so appear. 
However, our purpose is not to compare these conceptualizations 
of planning phases, but to point out that when the planning process is 
conceptualized in phases, those selected are of necessity going to re­
semble other formulations. The collaborative model conceptualizes the 
planning process as having four phases or stages: (1) problem defini­
tion and goal formulation; (2) formulation and evaluation of alterna­
tives and the pol icy decision; (3) plan development and implementation; 
and (4) monitoring, evaluation, and recycling. These should be recog­
nized as analytical distinctions--not as clearly defined stages. The 
process could easily have been conceptualized as having five or six 
steps instead of four as do the formulations of Schein (1969), Robinson 
(1971), and Perlman and Gurin (1972). 
Two other points are to be noted about the phases of the planning 
process. First, both the pol icy decision and implementation are included 
as part of the planning process. Some planning models omit one or both-­
with planning viewed as preliminary to a decision and/or sometimes plan­
ners are given an evaluation role after the plan/program has been imple­
mented. Both Kahn (1969) and Robinson (1971) omit the policy/plan de­
cision and implementation from their models (although both include eval­
uation and feedback as part of the planning process). In the collabora­
tive model, as in the models of Schein, Riecken and Boruch, and Perlman 
and Gurin, the roles of decision makers and program administrators-­
although differing from that of the planner--are integral to the process 
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of coping with social problems. In the collaborative model then, deci­
sion making and implementation are considered integral to the planning 
process. 
Second, the process is considered a cycl ic or continuous one. The 
stages do not necessarily proceed one through four in a rigid sequence. 
The process is characterized by flexibility--it is a cybernetic process. 
Therefore, it may be necessary to return to an earlier phase of the cycle 
(as illustrated by arrow "c" in Figure 7). 
This view of planning as a flexible process is a rather common one 
today. For example, Kahn (1969, pp. 60-62, 132) discusses the "spiral" 
or "intersecting circle" nature of the planning process. Although plan­
ning steps are specified in a logical sequence, planning often requires 
returning to an earl ier stage to refine or revise an outcome. Or, as 
Kahn notes, two phases are sometimes intermingled. 
In addition to considering planning as a flexible or a "spiral" 
process, in the collaborative model the process is not ended until the 
problem is resolved. This in reality demands "continuous" planning. 
Roles 
The collaborative model includes roles for citizens, planners, 
and decision makers as has been mentioned several times. Figure 7 
illustrates the basic relationships that characterize each planning 
phase in the modeJ. 
IICitizen" is used in a generic or tlresidual" sense--it refers to 
any participant who is not a planner. Citizens (IIX") will include per­
sons from the target population, academic persons, those involved in op­
erational programs, persons representing the decision makers, and other 
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Figure 7. Planning as a collaborative process: Roles for citi­
zens, planning team, and decision makers. 
interested persons. Each citizen ("X") and planner ("VII) has a unique 
contribution to bring to the planning task. The arrow (1Ia") from citi­
zen to planner indicates that dialog characterizes the process. Through 
the process of mutual learning the knowledge of each undergoes a change. 
The outcome ("0") results from planner and citizen joining together in 
a collaborative effort. The broken lines under "X" and "V" indicate 
that planner and citizen have contributed to the task: the outcome (110 '1 ) 
is a col1ective one, differing from what either citizen ("X") or plan­
ner ("V") originally brought to the process. 
Although the decision maker is represented (or may be directly in­
volved) in contributing to the outcome ("0"), this model reserves a spe­
cific role to him (them). That role (IIZ") is to formalize the collec­
tive outcome, or for some reason, to make another decision. For example, 
a collective outcome may not have been reached. Then the task of the de-
cis ion maker is to weigh the different views and make a decision. 
The collaborative model then has a role for citizen, planner, and 
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decision maker in every phase of planning. 
Roles and Phases Illustrated 
The roles of citizens, planners, and decision makers in each phase 
of planning are illustrated in Figure 8. Three points should be noted. 
First, as already indicated, the phases in the collaborative plan­
ning process do not differ significantly from those conceptualized in 
many other models. 
Second, the greatest value of the diagram lies in its clearly in­
dicating a role for the citizen in each phase of planning and relating 
that role to the planner1s. Other planning models do not set forth as 
explicitly this kind of a role for the citizen. 
Third, although the collaborative and dialogic nature of the plan­
ning process is somewhat illustrated by the diagram, it fails to portray 
what have been proposed as other important features of the planning pro­
cess; that is, its experimental, task-oriented, and cybernetic charac­
teristics (although to some extent the cybernetic nature is indicated by 
the arrows). Because this diagram fails to adequately convey these five 
characteristics of the collaborative planning model, it cannot be con­
sidered a diagram of the model, rather it is a diagram of roles and 
phases of the model. 
IV. THE ROLE OF THE PLANNER IN THE COLLABORATIVE PLANNING MODEL 
A1though the co 11 aborat i ve mode I inc 1udes three ro 1es, we wi 11 
focus on the role of the planner. By planner, we are actually referring 
to a team of "planners," because planning for structural change and plan­
ning .in col1.aboration with'citizens requires that the planner possess 
----------------
-----------------------
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technical planning skills, famil iarity with social science knowledge, 
the abil ity to critically assess its relevance to concrete problems, 
knowledge about the management of complex organizations and interrela­
tionships, interpersonal skills that can facilitate the process of mu­
tual learning through dialog, and a commitment to collaborative planning 
for social change. It is evident that no one person can embody these 
necessary skills and knowledge; therefore, an Interdiscipl inary team is 
necessary to fulfill the tasks that are r~quired by collaborative social 
planning. 
Before developing the role of the planner in the collaborative so­
cial planning model, some of the basic roles that h~ve been performed 
by social scientists/planners will be considered. These roles will then 
be related to that demanded by collaborative social planning. 
A Review of Planning Roles 
Three kinds of professional roles have been identified by Vollmer 
(1970) as ones currently performed by appl led social scientists. In the 
role of analyst the professional brings his analytic and theoretical 
skills to bear on problem analysis and the design of a plan for problem 
resolution. In the role of adyocate the professional "seems to identi­
fy completely with his client's interests, point of view, and total sit­
uation as he brings his professional talents to bear on the s01ution of 
client problems" (p. 33). Professionals have also become involved in a 
third role--that of mediator when there are conflicting points of view. 
For this role "one must be able to identify with the interests, aspira­
tions, and points of view" of others (p. 33) in working toward a reso-
Iut ion. 
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How do these three roles relate to that played by the planner in 
the collaborative model? The role identified by Vollmer as analyst is 
one that is required for deal ing with social problems. Theoretical, 
analytical, and technical skills are essential. 
We will reject the role of advocate as a planning role, for that 
role demands an adversary relationship, whereas collaborative planning 
is premised on joint effort. The concept of "advocacy planning" is a 
familiar one to planners (Davidoff, 1965; Peattie, 1968; Kaplan, 1969), 
and most often has been promoted by those whose concern is for power­
less, low-income groups. The advocate planner (as Davidoff conceived 
the role), representing certain interest groups, would present alterna­
tives that differed from the public planning agency's plan. It was 
postulated that the competition that resulted would yield superior 
plans. 
A variant of this' concept is described in a recent article by 
staff members of Cleveland's City Planning Commission (Krumholz ~!l., 
1975). The authors relate how that public agency is applying the con­
cepts of advocacy and activism--in the interests of the city's poor and 
powerless--to the problems of Cleveland. 17 From their experience of 
using professional talents as advocates for the poor, they call for a 
redefinition of the planner's role along these lines. 
17Krumholz et ale (1975) note that these problems "have ·Iess to 
do with land uses-,-zoning, or issues of urban design--the traditional 
domain of city planners--and more to do with personal and municipal pov­
erty, unemployment, neighborhood deterioration and abandonment, crime, 
inadequate mobility, and so on tl (po 298). The article gives a broad 
overview of The Cleveland Pol icy Planning Report, its goals, and exam­
ples of how the planners have applied the concepts of advocacy, activ­
ism, and p01icy planning. The article described a significant change 
that has occurred in planning thought and practice. 
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Although we agree with the equity goal that is the basis for their 
policy recommendations and also agree with their analysis of problems 
and proposed solutions, their model is rejected for three reasons. 
First, this model casts the planner in the role of one who knows 
"what is best" for the city. In their own words they view planners as 
lithe guardians of our cities' futures" (p. 304). Although the planners 
are on the side of the poor and the powerless, theirs is an el itist 
perspective. 
The second objection is closely related: nowhere do the authors 
describe their commitment to the participation of citizens, or the poor 
in particular to whom they give priority attention. From the theoreti­
cal perspective of this dissertation--unless attention is given to the 
process of collective definition, efforts to impose definitions and so­
lutions will not be successful in the long run. 
/
Third, it appears that the greatest strength of the advocacy mod­
el is ultimately its greatest 1imitation. Advocacy is premised on a 
plural istic pol itical process where many interests are in competition. 
The advocate planner chooses sides, devoting his professional talents 
and moral commitment to the poor, seeking to influence decisions so 
that they will reflect these interests. Using the pol itical system, 
however, has built-in 1imitations. For in advocating the interests of 
the poor, one comes in opposition to the most powerful. Although some 
gains may be made for the poor, decisions made within the pluralistic 
political process will ultimately reflect the interests of the most pow­
erful . 
Vollmer (1970) suggests that when there are divergent or conflict­
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ing views the planner can assume the role of mediator. Because media­
tion often involves compromise, it too will be rejected as a role for 
the planner in the collaborative model. However, the planner does need 
the skills a mediator possesses--namely, the ability to identify with 
the other--with his interests and perspective. 
A role closer to that needed for collaborative planning is that of 
a process consultant. Process consultation has been defined as tla set 
of activities on the part of the consultant which help [si~ the client 
to perceive, understand, and act upon process events which occur in the 
client's environment" (Schein, 1969, p. 9). Although the literature on 
process consultation deals with organizations and their development, 
the key assumption of process consultation is similar to what we have 
concluded after examining the nature of social problems, that is, lithe 
client must learn to see the problem for himself, to share in the diag­
nosis, and to be actively involved in generating a remedyl' (Schein, 1969, 
p. 7). The planner needs to establ ish a working relationship with par­
ticipants in the planning process, facilitate mutual learning through 
dialog, so that social problems can be collectively defined and acted 
upon. 
A Collaborative Role: An Elaboration 
It has been maintained that in collaborative social planning the 
role of analyst is required. In this role the planner brings "processed 
knowledge" to the task, and a role similar to that of process consultant 
is also needed so that participants may be facil itated in sharing their 
"personal knowledge" and in mutual learning as together they engage in 
the task of social planning. For purposes of discussion we will consid­
...... , 
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er that planners in each phase of planning have tasks in three areas: 
(1) technical ones, uti 1izing speci31 planning ski 115 and social science 
knowledge, (2) interactional tasks relating to citizen participants, 
i.e., promoting mutual learning through dialog, and (3) interactional 
ones relating to the decision makers. These three task areas are the 
framework that will be used as we consider the planner's role. 
The tasks that are outl ined as technical ones differ I ittle from 
those identified by ethers as belonging to the planner. They are tasks 
that have been traditionally seen as the planner's. However, our em­
phasis on the collaborative nature of the planner's role does consti­
tute an approach that differs from most planning models. Although oth­
er models may describe the planner in interaction with others, assign­
ing the planner the role of facilitating mutual learning through dialog 
is unique to the collaborative model. 18 
The three tasks in each of the four stages of planning are sum­
marized in Table V and will be discussed in more detail. 
I. Problem Definition and Goal Formulation. Problem definition 
and goal formulation are closely related, but they are distinct. To il­
lustrate this relationship we will consider the housing goal of Ita de­
cent home for every American family" and definitions of the housing 
problem. Although persons may hold the same goal, they may define the 
problem differently. The housing problem may be defined as a shortage 
of low-rent housing, or research may lead to another definition as it 
18Friedmann (1973) does consider planning as mutual learning. 
However, he does not elaborate the planner's role in facil itating mu­
tual learning, nor does he conceptualize planning in phases as we have 
proposed. 
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did in Cleveland. Research by Clevelandls City Planning Commission re­
vealed--not a shortage, but that a surplus of low-cost marginal qual ity 
housing existed in that city, therefore a more detailed analysis of the 
problem was necessary (Krumholz ~ !L., 1975). A housing surplus, va­
cancy rates, migration data, abandonment, deteriorating housing units, 
and low-income famil ies call for different pol icy solutions from those 
which would be the case if the problem were defined as a housing short­
age. 
The importance of problem definition and its relation to policy 
has been discussed in some detail. Planners in this first phase of 
planning need to be cognizant that the definition process determines 
the fate of the problem; understand that social positions give rise to 
different values, bel iefs, interests, and thus, different definitions; 
and that individuals and groups normally work for the acceptance of 
their definition. It is evident that resources and power are unequally 
distributed. Presently the policy process works to the advantage of 
those who are already favored. 19 
Although no one phase of planning merits being designated the 
most important, this first phase is crucial. It is essential to bring 
interested persons, including administrators and program staff persons, 
19 1n their article, liThe Pol itics of Ana1yzing Social Prob1ems," 
Ross and Staines (1972) discuss three meLhods of handling the conflict 
that arises between competing definitions of publicly recognized social 
problems. According to the authors t~e outcome of the conflict tends 
to preserve present privileges. They maintain that "the approach to 
social problem definition that stresses political process leads to the 
conclusion that the nature of the outcomes is related over the long run 
to constellations of power, influence, and authority which process and 
filter the problems a society sets itself" (p. 38). 
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into this phase. Facil itating the group to arrive at a collective def­
inition is a challenging task for the planner. 
(a) Technical Task: Problem and Research Ana~~. The planner 
has three general technical tasks. First, the existing situation must 
be examined and the "objectivel' elements of the problem establ ished. 
Data about the seriousness and magnitude of the problem as well as oth­
er relevant social and demographic information must be collected. Trends 
need to be identified and projections made. Second, the social struc­
tures that contribute to perpetuating the problem must be identified. 
These structures may be societal, regional, state, local, and neighbor­
hood. 20 Those who gain and who lose by the existence of the present ar­
rangements need to be identified. Third, theoretical explanations of 
the problem that are found in social science I iterature need to be con­
sidered and their relevance assessed. 
(b) Promoting Mutual Learning through Dialog~ This task refers 
to the exchange between planner and citizen. The planner1s role is to 
facil itate this exchange and help the group achieve its task. This 
task of the planner in each phase of planning will be discussed in 
three parts: (I) eliciting input from others, (2) sharing by planner, 
(3) facil itating the group's task. 
It is .important for persons and groups to share their definition 
of the problem. The planner needs to facil itate the expression of def­
initions, grievances, preferences, priorities, and other relevant in­
formation. Underlying assumptions should be made expl icit, and values 
20Though these structures may be beyond the direct control of the 
planning system, their role in maintaing the problem must be considered. 
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and norms that are threatened or seem threatened must be clarified. Ar­
eas of agreement and disagreement should be identified. The planner al­
so needs to inject the relevant findings of his research analysis, and 
in a manner that is comprehensible to those involved. The group should 
be enabled to establish and place priorities on broad goals, and then 
translate them into specific and measurable objectives. The problem 
should be clearly defined--and in structural terms. 
(c) Goal Articulation to Decision Makers. The decision maker 
(who may be a single person, such as mayor, commissioner, agency head, 
etc.; or a group--council, commission, etc.) may have participated-­
either personally or by representative--in the dialog between citizen 
and planner. Although the goal of that process of dialog is a collec­
tive definition (and eventually action), the responsibility for the de­
cision itself belongs to the decision maker. 
In this stage of planning 21 planners should present the decision 
makers with the prioritized goals, and the specific objectives that 
have been agreed to. If no consensus was reached, the planners need to 
identify for the decision makers the various perspectives, who holds 
them, and why. They should make recommendations22 and support them 
21 Th' .IS not . I y a d'Iscrete step . . In t hI'panning process,IS necessarl e 
for the goals may be presented simultaneously with the recommended plan. 
22Collaborative social planning is presented as a normative model. 
However, the difficulties involved in reaching a collective definition 
and action are recognized. Therefore, when the group does not arrive at 
a collective decision, it becomes necessary for the planner to present 
his recommendations to the decision maker. Although this may cast him 
oosomeone's IIside," the planner should avoid assuming the role of ad­
vocate for any special group. This would seriously jeopardize the col­
laboration that is needed in future planning endeavors. 
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with data--clarifying their assumptions and value-position. 
The decision makers may choose to approve the action recommended 
by the planners and citizens, or having objections or reservations may 
send the recommendations back for further consideration. If there was 
no consensus on goals and objectives, then the dicision makers have the 
responsibility for selecting the goals and objectives. 
II. Formulation and Evaluati~!, of Alternatives and Pol icy Deci­
cis ion. The process of formulating pol icy to deal with a problem has 
inherent difficulties. Some are of a technical nature: difficulties 
of projecting consequences, of developing measures to compare alterna­
tives, of choosing between alternatives that offer different combina­
tions of benefits, of dealing with uncertainty, etc. 
Bes i des these "techn i ca I" p 1 ann i ng probl ems, thi s stage a 1 so of­
fers special challenges to the collaborative process. Presently in the 
process of formulating an official plan of action interest groups mobi­
lize to influence the decision. "The official plan is always a product 
of bargaining, in which diverse views and interests are accommodated l1 
(Blume r, 1 971, p. 304). 
The plan that emerges from compromise, and as a response to power, 
may be only weakly related to the goals that were originally formulated. 
In the process the problem may be redefined. 
Realizing the tendency of groups to engage in strategies to pro­
mote their interests, and being aware that bargaining can divert efforts 
away from effective problem solving, the planner must develop methods to 
foster a collaborative approach to developing a policy/plan. 
(a) Technical Task: Identification and Evaluation of Alternatives. 
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In the attempt to identify alternatives to deal with the problem, past 
efforts should be examined--with the planner analyzing circumstances in­
volved and then assessing reasons for the success or failure of the pol­
icy. Policies that will deal with the structural causes of the problem 
are the concern. They must be identified and evaluated. In projecting 
and comparing consequences, the planner needs to hypothesize the chan­
ces of goal achievement, compare the costs and benefits of each alter­
native--noting especially their differential impact on groups, the pos­
sible effects beyond the system under consideration, and how the pol icy 
may affect other goals. 
Resources, such as money, personnel, and facilities, must be iden­
tified. Constraints too must be considered: resources, values, be­
liefs, and institutions that are beyond the scope of the planning system. 
(b) Promoting Mutual Learning through Dialog. Planners need to 
elicit from others what, their preferred alternative is and what they 
see as other possibil ities. Consequences, including costs and benefits, 
should be probed. Values, beliefs, and assumptions underlying differ­
ent alternatives should be explicated. Planners too need to share their 
analysis, projections, and assumptions. The participants should under­
stand how each alternative relates to goal achievement and understand 
how costs and benefits impact differently on certain groups. The group 
should be facil itated to arrive at a pol icy/plan recommendation. This 
means that bargaining that might divert from the problem must be avoid­
ed. The task is to select an alternative that promises to deal with 
the structural aspects of the problem. All should be aware of the com­
plexity and uncertainty involved, the possibility of error, and of the 
~eed for flexibility. 
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(c) ~endation of Pol icy/Plan to Decision Makers. The planner 
should communicate the policy/plan to the decision makers with the per­
tinent analysis. If consensus was not reached on the policy/plan, the 
planners should present their recommendations justifying them in terms 
of goa1 achievement, making it clear what the costs and benefits seem 
to be. They should also present reasons for the disagreement between 
the participants. 
It may be necessary for the planner to identify those who support 
and who oppose their recommendations. They should identify the resour­
ces and the possible strategy of their opponents. Then they should se­
lect an appropriate strategy, carefully weighing the I ikely benefits as 
well as the disadvantages. 
I II. Plan Development and Implementation. tllnvariably to some 
degree, frequently to a large degree the plan as put into practice is 
modified, twisted and reshaped, and takes on unforeseen accretions" 
(Blumer, 1971, p. 304). According to Blumer, lithe unforeseen and unin­
tended restructuring of the area of a social problem that arises from 
the implementation of an official plan of treatment" (p. 305) is not 
well understood and is in need of much study. 
One way to begin to deal with this problem is to overcome the di­
chotomies between planning and implementation. In this model planners 
have a role in developing implementation procedures and in monitoring 
and eva1uating programs. It has been recognized too that administrators 
and program staff must be drawn in some way into the planning process 
from the very beginning. If administration and staff do not have a 
"role in problem definition and in planning the program, it is easy to 
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understand how they may redefine the problem and substitute a different 
policy in the process of implementation. 
(a) Technical Task: Design of Implementation Procedures. In de­
veloping programs to achieve specific goals and objectives the expected 
impact of the program on costs and benefits must be projected. The 
normal detai1s of programming, such as determining needed staff, facil­
ities, budgeting, etc. must be attended to and placed in a time frame. 
We have postulated that effectiveness in confronting the causes 
of social problems demands that the planning process be characterized 
by a task-oriented, experimental approach. Devising means of monitor­
ing and evaluation becomes an important task. This requires the design 
of information gathering and processing mechanisms. A plan of evalua­
tion--including measures--must be developed. A means of adjusting im­
plementation procedures to feedback must also be provided. 
(b) Promoting Mutual Learning through Dialog. Efforts to reform 
the organization and del Ivery of social services usually are direct~d 
at four kinds of problems: fragmentation, inaccessibility, discontinu­
ity, and unaccountabi 1 ity (Gi lbert, 1973, p. 1). Gi lbert points out 
that these problems are related to a broad range of issues. 
Problems of fragmentation concern organization characteris­
tics and relationships, especially coordination, location, spe­
cialization, and dupl ication of services •... Problems of 
inaccessibility concern obstacles to a person's entering the 
network of local social services. . . . Problems of discon­
tinuity concern a person's movement through the network of 
services and the gaps that appear as an agency tries to match 
resources to needs ...• Problems of unaccountability con­
cern relationships between persons served and the decision­
makers in service organizations ••. (Gilbert, 1972, p. 1). 
After discussing methods of dealing with these problems, Gilbert 
concludes that uncertainty surrounds the selection of the "right method. 1I 
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While further investigation of basic issues is needed, Gilbert argues 
that present policy choices must not foreclose other possible options. 
Gilbert's analysis pertains specifically to the delivery of so­
cial services and problems that are largely organizational. Although 
our concern is with attacking the structural causes of problems, these 
practical administrative problems must be dealt with as well as the 
prime one of developing a plan/program that will work toward problem 
resolution. 
Uncertainty surrounds both developing a plan/program to attack so­
cial problems and the concrete problems of program administration. Cit­
izens, administrators, and organizational staff have their own perspec­
tives on problems of implementation and insights on how methods might 
be improved. The exchange between them must be fostered, and in facili­
tating agreement on an operational program, the planner must promote an 
awareness and understanding of the concerns expressed. Specific roles 
in implementation, monitoring, and evaluation must be agreed to. The 
plan must be considered a "hypothesis," as a possible means of attain­
ing the objectives. The importance of feedback, learning from experi­
ence, and flexibil ity needs to be stressed. 
(c) Communication with Decision Makers. The implementation plan 
is presented to the decision makers. If consensus on the plan was not 
reached, the planners present their recommendations with supporting 
analysis. They need to identify for the decision makers who disagrees 
and the areas of disagreement. Planners may need to develop a strategy 
to overcome resistance--whether it be from citizen groups, administra­
tors, etc.--always mindful of what may be long term consequences of 
the i r ac t ion. 
171 
IV. Monitoring, Evaluation, and '.'Recycling." An experimental, 
cybernetic approach and a corrmitment to problem resolution (a "task­
orientation ll ) have been proposed as important characteristics for an ef­
fective social planning process. The ~~ action--its implementa­
tion--has been proposed as the test of effectiveness. It is therefore 
essential that we be able to assess plan effectiveness. Yet evalua­
tions of social programs have been inadequate, and it is widely agreed 
that evaluation has not affected decision making in a significant way 
(Wholey !!!L., 1971, p. 46). 
John W. Evans (1969) admits that we lack adequate evaluation meth­
odology, yet he cites other factors as more important in accounting for 
the dearth of good evaluations. The most significant obstacle, Evans 
maintains, is that persons in key positions, such as decision makers 
and program directors, lack backgrounds in either the physical or social 
sciences and therefore do not understand the importance of objective em­
pirical evaluation. Another important factor, according to Evans, is 
that the role of program evaluator is seen to be in conflict with the 
role of program administrator. Program administrators seem to be pro­
gram advocates. 
If evaluation is going to provide us insight into the effective­
ness of social programs and then be used as a basis for decision making 
and replanning, the planner must find ways of overcoming these obstacles. 
(a) Technical Task: Information Gathering and Processing. This 
task is a twofold one. First, the planner must obtain needed informa­
tion from all sources. This will include measures, such as social in­
dicators, and information from persons involved, such as the target pop­
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ulation and administrators. Second, the information must be processed. 
In analyzing feedback data the planner must be alert for unanticipated 
consequences--both positive and negative. Plan effectiveness must be 
evaluated. The "objective" elements of the problem need to be consid­
ered. Has the magnitude and severity of the problem been affected? 
What improvements have been made with regard to the initial problem sit­
uation? Who has been affected? In what ways (values, resources, atti­
tudes, etc)? In evaluating effectiveness the planner is relating ef­
fects to objectives and goals. Program efficiency also needs to be as­
sessed. This requires relating costs to benefits. Have benefits justi­
fied the costs? Have resources been used efficiently? Is there a bet­
ter way to utilize resources? 
(b) Promoting Mutual Learning through Dialog. In sharing their 
perceptions of the effects of the plan, citizens should be asked to con­
sider how responsive the plan was to their needs and to identify the 
costs, benefits, and difficulties they experienced. Planners and admin­
istrators too need to share their assessment of plan effectiveness and 
efficiency. 
In facilitating the task of evaluation and recommendations, the 
planner should promote an understanding of the perceptions and concerns 
of al J involved. It is essential to determine how effective the plan/ 
program has been in reducing the problem--in reaching the goals and ob­
jectives. In grappl ing with the issue of how to more effectively and 
efficiently deal with the problem, the decision regarding "recycling" 
must be made--where to "replanlt--to look at goals and objectives again, 
to consider other policy/plan alternatives, or to focus on p1an deveJop­
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ment and problems of implementation. In the process of formulating rec­
ommendations, the planner needs to foster commitment to problem resolu­
tion among participants. 
(c) Comunicating with Decision Makers. Planners then present the 
evaluation and recommendations to the decision makers. If agreement was 
not reached, planners need to identify for the decision makers the areas 
of disagl-eement and who disagrees. Planners should support their rec­
ommendations with adequate data and clear analysis. Decision makers 
must be encouraged to use the evaluation as a basis for their decisions. 
Planners may need to mobilize support for their recommendations. 
v. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined three components of the collaborativ~ 
planning model which are based on theoretical concepts and assumptions 
presented earl ier. First, the planning process has been discussed as a 
task-oriented, experimental, cybernetic, dialogic, and collaborative 
process. It has been contended that these must characterize the plan­
ning process if social problems are to be resolved. Second, the plan­
ning process was conceptualized in four phases with citizen, planner, 
and decision maker having roles in each phase of the process. 
Third, the role of the planner has been elaborated--with his 
tasks fal ling in two main areas: technical and interactional ones. 
Recognizing that social problems have objective dimensions and are 
structurally generated and maintained, we have contended that the plan­
ner has an important role to play in bringing his technical skills (or 
processed knowledge) to bear on social problems. But also cognizant of 
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the subjective or definitional dimension of problems--that the citizen 
has a role to play, bringing his unqiue knowledge to the planning task, 
the planner has been given the role of facilitating the process of mu­
tual learning so that social problems may be resolved. Although other 
planning models may assign interactional tasks to the planner, the col­
laborative planning model is the only one which specifies the planner's 
role in these terms. 
This presentation of the planning model: the characteristics and 
phases of the process; a role for citizen, planner, and decision maker 
in each phase; and the elaboration of the planner's role has completed 
our goal of 1 inking social planning to social problems. Now we under­
take an assessment of what has been done. 
CHAPTER VI 
COLLABORATIVE SOCIAL PLANNING: AN ASSESSMENT AND POSSIBILITIES 
In this final chapter the theory and model of collaborative social 
planning will be assessed. In this evaluation we will briefly consider 
how others have approached the task of improving the policy/planning 
process. Specifically we will examine why the collaborative model is 
proposed as an improvement over other planning models. Some of the 
challenges facing collaborative social planning will also be considered. 
Finally, the thesis will be advanced that dissatisfaction with present 
planning theory and models is giving rise to a new planning paradigm. 
Writings of several theorists have converged on a new conceptual ization 
of planning: planning as learning. This dissertation is considered as 
an effort toward the formulation of this emerging paradigm. 
I. IMPROVING THE POLICY/PLANNING PROCESS' 
The contention that contemporary planning does not adequately ad­
dress the problems of cities underlies this dissertation. Because plan­
ning practice is not re1evant to the pressing problems of the city and 
because present planning models seem to offer little promise of dealing 
more adequately with these problems, a collaborative model has been de­
veloped and presented as one more suited to these problems. 
1Dror (1968, p. 8) uses the term metapo I icy to refer to "po I icy 
a bou t making po I i c i e s • II 
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Collaborative social planning will be assessed at two levels of 
analysis. First, the approach that has been used to build the collabo­
rative model will be compared with ways in which others have approached 
the subject of improving the policymaking/planning process. Second, 
the collaborative model will be compared with several other planning 
models. This evaluation wil I support the contention that the collabo­
rative model promises to be more effective in dealing with urban prob­
lems than these other models. Since the collaborative model is a norma­
tive one, we will also briefly consider the place of normative theory 
in planning. 
Some Contemporary Approaches 
We will examine some of the ways in which persons concerned with 
reform seek to improve planning/policymaking. Three different approach­
es--identified as the policy sciences, political realities, and scien­
tific management approaches--will be discussed. Our concern is somewhat 
philosophical, that is, we are interested in how they set about to im­
prove planning/pol icymaking--in their intellectual approach. 
Pol icy Sciences. Dror (1968, p. 73) contends that a main task 
facing us is lito engage in an empiric study of pol icymaking, and to in­
tegrate the findings of such a study with insights and abstract thought 
to form a comprehensive, systematic, and reliable theory of publ ic pol­
icymaking. " He assigns this responsibility to what he considers an 
emerging discipline, policy science. 
One of Dror's main objectives in his book, Public Policymaking Re­
Examined (1968), is to contribute to the improvement of public policy­
making. His procedure was to first analyze and eva1uate the actual 
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state of public policymaking. From this analysis he concluded that 
there are substantial gaps between what policymaking is in actuality and 
what it might be (pp. 120-25). Next he critically analyzed the main 
normative policymaking models (Chapter 12). Dror then designed his mod­
el (which he calls the "optimal model ") by building on the strengths of 
other models and seeking to avoid their weaknesses. 
Political Real ities. An empiric study of policymaking/planning 
also underlies the political realities approach. Bolan (1967, 1969) 
and Rondinelli (1971, 1973) have both attempted to develop conceptual 
frameworks that reflect existent reality--hence, our labelling their 
approach "a political realities" one. In their frameworks both include 
what they consider the important variables that shape policy or the 
policy process, and both hypothesize relationships between the variables. 
Although Bolan's (1971) conceptual ization of planning as a pro­
cess of social interaction has been referred to earlier, his approach 
to the study of planning/policymaking will be considered. Bolan's 
framework (1969) includes four sets of independent variables (process 
roles, decision field characteristics, planning and action strategies, 
and issue attributes) that are hypothesized as influencing the character 
and qual ity of decision outcomes. The model and hypotheses were tested 
by data gathered from four case studies (Bolan and Nuttal, 1975). 
Rondinel Ii (1971) has proposed a framework that also includes four 
sets of independent variables: ecological and spatial, organizational 
and institutional, perceptual, and policy interaction proc~ss variables. 
These variables are identified as the important ones influencing the 
structure and process of policymaking. Rondinelli also has proposed 
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several hypotheses concerning the interaction among these variables. 
Although both identify different sets of variables--Bolan's focus 
is on decision outcomes, while Rondinell i's is on the structure and pro­
cess of policymaking--a working assumption shared by both Bolan and 
Rondinelli is that a better understanding of the relationships that af­
fect the policymaking/planning process wil I enable the planner to be 
more effective in dealing with urban problems. Both theorists explicit­
ly state that their intent is to contribute to the improvement of pol i-
cymaking/planning. Bolan's (1967, p. 233) desire is to "aid planners . 
. • to come to grips with the complex and crucial process of managing 
urban change." Rondinelli (1971, p. 32) wants to further the understand­
ing of the variables that shape pol icy decisions so that the planner may 
more effectively initiate, facilitate, and guide social change. 
In identifying and working with dependent and independent varia­
bles Bolan and Rondinell i have taken an approach to planning/pol icymak­
ing that is distinctively different from the traditional approach to 
urban planning. 
Scientific Management. A third approach to improving decision 
making reI ies on "the powerful tools of technology.II2 A special issue 
of the Journal of the American Institute of Planners (May, 1965) was 
devoted to exploring these tools and their relationship to planning. 
The editor of that issue, Britton Harris (1965, p. 90), ventured to 
write: 
2While this section only mentions sytems analysis and its tools, 
methods of cost/benefit analysis and program budget systems are also 
included as techniques of "scientific management. 11 
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Experience so far accumulated and amply displayed in this is­
sue ... tends to suggest that the problems of metropolitan 
growth and development are ... problems which are best han­
dled through extensive computations on high-speed computers. 
Two years later Eldredge (1967, p. 616) observed: 
There seems I ittle question that the massive novelle vogue 
in planning is the use of hard data managed through computer 
information storage systems, or data banks, and put to work by 
various types of mathematical simulation models in computer 
language for predi'ctive purposes and for aid in decision-making. 
In the sixties computer technology appeared to many to be an im­
portant addition to the planner's repertoire of tools--a tool which 
could contribute to making planning more "scientific. 11 Thus, models de­
veloped for the Pittsburgh and San Francisco Community Renewal Programs 
seemed to be promi'sing aids--and perhaps, even "breakthroughs"--in urban 
decision making (Stegner, 1965; Loewenstein and Herrmann, 1967). But 
from the perspective of the seventies it is evident that these models 
have contributed little to coping with problems in either city (Brewer, 
1973) • 
Brewer (1973), a systems scientist, describes and analyzes the 
sophisticated problem solving techniques used in the San Francisco and 
Pittsburgh Community Renewal Programs. He contends that the models 
were based on both inadequate theory and data, that there were no stated 
criteria by which to appraise the models, and that they were formulated 
by "ou tsiders" with little or no input from residents. Brewer3 is high­
ly critical of urban problem solving methods that rely heavily on tech­
3Besides offering the reader valuable insights into the limita­
tions of computer models, Brewer (1973) discusses four appraisal func­
tions he considers necessary in problem solving. They are theoretical, 
technical, ethical, and pra'gmatic functions. The last chapter includes 
some specific recommendations for improving problem solying. 
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nica1 professiona1s, conc1uding that--at 1east in these two cases--they 
provided little useful information for the decision makers. 
Hoos (1973) a1so criticizes the reliance on technicians, decrying 
lithe mys t i que of techn i que. II I n a short and focused c r it i que of sys tems 
techniques Hoos describes what she considers the basic weaknesses of 
the systems approach4 and contends that a "review of 10 years' litera­
ture and experience with systems analytic techniques in the public sec­
tor discloses iteration and reiteration of platitudes and promises, but 
little improvement in either the state-of-the-art of systems analysis 
or of government" (p. 158). 
Yet despite its weaknesses and the failure of systems analysis to 
improve problem solving Hoos finds that lithe trend in the journals and 
meetings of diverse professional societies is unmistakably toward 'sci­
en t i f i c managemen t 0 f pub1i c a f fa irs III ( p . 1 58) . 5 
Collaborative Social Planning: Approach and Theory 
Rationale for Our Approach. The three approaches discussed above-·­
policy sciences, pol itical realities, and scientific management--are 
contemporary attempts to improve the policymaking/planning process. In 
4Hoos (1973) discusses the basic weaknesses as: (1) the fiction 
of completeness, (2) the lack of rigor in the conception of such key 
concepts as models, (3) the myths surrounding objectives and objectiv­
ity, and (4) the fallibility of facts. 
50ne enthusiast is Robinson (1972, pp. 95-102) who endorses the 
use of mathematical techniques and the computer for explanation and 
prediction purposes as well as for the design of alternative plans. 
Although admitting that many of the models have not been operational, 
he believes that simulation modeling will make the planner more effec­
tive (p. 100). Thus, in his recent reader in urban planning and deci­
sion making, Robinson's (1972) overriding concern is with improving 
planning methodology--largely relying on technological means. 
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attempting to develop a model for the social planning process we might 
have pursued one of these recognized approaches. Yet we did not--choos­
ing instead to link social planning to social problems. Therefore, it 
is necessary to consider why this approach has been taken. 
Some criticism of computer models and systems analysis has already 
been offered. This was done because so many seem to rely heavily or. 
technology as a means of improving planning. Technical expertise or 
scientific management has a role in problem solving, but improving tech­
niques--in itself--will not resolve urban problems. 
The political realities approach too has a place in the study of 
planning/pol icymaking, for it can help us understand factors that shape 
the process and the outcome. But if one is interested in attacking 
problems at their source, this approach is seen to be rooted in present 
political realities, and thus, is too oriented toward the status quo. 
The policy sciences also approach policy empirically with the in­
tention of improving policymaking. Dror (1968) expl icitly admits that 
the approach is normative in nature. The policy sciences approach has 
positive features, and through it a greater understanding of the policy 
process has been gained. However, the policy sciences approach seems 
to offer little hope of improving the process so that substantive 
changes can occur. 
Although these remarks do not comprise a thorough analysis of 
these approaches, they do indicate why stil I another approach was selec­
ted. Our rationale: if we want to resolve social problems, planning 
theory and practice must be geared toward them. Thus, to improve plan­
ning we should examine the nature of social problems and then build 
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planning theory and a model from this analysis. We will now consider 
what has been gained from this approach. 
Theoretical Contributions. While not setting forth a fully de­
veloped theory of planning or social planning, this dissertation has 
made three contributions in that direction. 
First, as has been stated, the approach is unique in that the na­
ture of social problems was explored and then related to planning. A 
reconceptualization of social planning--one in harmony with the nature 
of social problems--was formulated. Social planning has been defined 
as planning that treats both the structural causes of social problems 
and the values, beliefs, definitions, etc. that obstruct social change. 
Second, not only was social planning related to the nature of so­
cial problems, but it was placed in a broader theoretical context. 
Conceptualizing the planning process as part of the social construction 
of reality provides a framework that can be used even if one rejects 
the notion of planning as a collaborative process. Few theoreticians 
have cons i dered p I ann i ng in the fl 4 amework of broad theory--and more the­
orizing needs to be done along these lines. 
Third, although citizen participation is not the focus of this 
dissertation, the participation of citizens has been recognized as inte­
gral to the planning process. Our approach does provide a theoretical 
basis for the participation of citizens in the planning process. 
From our consideration of the subjective dimension of social 
problems (Chapter I I I), it was contended that planners need to attend to 
the process by which social problems emerge, are defined, and are han­
dled. Social problems are more than objective conditions, and planners 
183 
must recognize the role that citizens play in the process of collective 
definition and incorporate that process into the planning process. In 
other words, it is a reality that others play an important part in how 
problems are defined and dealt with. Thus, planners must bring others 
into the process of planning to resolve problems. 
When planning was placed in the broader theoretical framework and 
was conceptual ized as the construction of real i ty (Chapter IV), we held 
that each person's perception of real ity differs. Because of this, 
each person brings a unique perspective to bear on social problems. If 
these persons are brought into interaction in the planning process, if 
their views of reality can be shared, if the personal knowledge of the 
citizen and the processed knowledge of the planner can be joined, if 
persons engage in the process of mutual learning, we have contended that 
social problems are more I ikely to be resolved. 
It is recognized that presently there is no adequate theory under­
lying citizen participation6 (Spiegel and Mittenthal, 1968, p. 4). It 
is also contended that IIthere is a definite need for a working theory of 
participation that can both persuade public officials to utilize partic­
6Godschalk (1972) is a planner who has made recent contributions 
in this direction. Drawing upon exchange theory, he has formulated 
planning and participation as a process of exchange: of exchange be­
tween citizens, government officials, and planners. This exchange, as 
Godschalk conceptualizes it, has three forms: collaboration, competi­
tion, and conflict. Godschalk's preference and focus is a collabora­
tive planning paradigm which he sees as one which opens the planning 
process, decentralizes planning authority, and maximizes citizen partic­
ipation. Because Godschalk's theoretical framework is exchange theory, 
his focus is on what participants ~~ from the process. Because 
planning in this dissertation has been placed in a different theoretical 
framework--that of the social construction of reality, our focus is on 
what participants E!!!.. b(ing to the process. 
Refe r to B rooks I 1975Jrev jew of Godscha 1 k '5 \\() rk and a I so God­
schalk's (1976) rejoinder. 
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ipatory approaches and inform them about the conditions and processes 
necessary to achieve authentic participation. Such a theory can be very 
helpful in winning public officials commitment to participatory prac­
' 
tices" (Godschalk, 1976, p. 206). 
Although needing to be more fully developed, the perspective of­
fered in this dissertation is a promising one for a theory of participa­
tion. With research into collective definitional processes, it is pos­
sible that it can be developed into a "working theory" as well. 
Collaborative Social Planning: The Model Evaluated 
We are now ready to consider why the collaborative model is pro­
posed as one that is more responsive to urban problems than other plan­
ning models. Those models which seek to reflect real ity can be empiri­
cally tested. For example, Bolan (1975) tested his conceptual model 
(first presented in 1969) with data gathered from four case studies. 
The findings led to a modification of the model (Bolan and Nuttal, 1975, 
Chapter 6). However, when one develops a model that does not claim to 
be a reflection of existent real ity, it cannot be tested as Bolan's was. 
The collaborative model would best be tested if it were to be imple­
mented. Since at this time this is not the case, the model can only be 
evaluated theoretically. 
We wi11 proceed with our assessment in terms of two criteria. 
First, since it has been maintained that a planning model must be in 
harmony with the nature of its subject matter, several planning models 
will be evaluated on the basis of whether they take into account the 
objective and subjective dimensions of social problems--making them the 
object of p1anning. And second, it has been asserted that to effec­
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tively deal with social problems, planning must be task-oriented, ex­
perimental, cybernetic, dialogic, and collaborative. Different planning 
models will be evaluated in terms of these characteristics. 
Seven planning models have been selected for evaluation along with 
the collaborative model. Three of the models--the optimal, political 
real ities, and systems--flow from the three approaches we have just con­
sidered. Three others--the rational, incremental, and advocacy models-­
are ones that urban planners are familiar with and are ones that have 
been mentioned earlier. A seventh model--Alfred Kahn's (1969)--is also 
considered since it is specifically a "social planning" model. These 
seven models are broadly representative of current planning models. 
Table VI evaluates the seven models and the collaborative model 
on the basis of the first criterion. 
TABLE VI 
MODELS EVALUATED: 

DIMENSIONS OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS 

AS TARGETS OF PLANNING 

SOCIAL PROBLEMS 
Obj ect i ve St ructura ~Subj ect i ve 
PLANNING MODELS ----f-DlmenSion Components Dimension 
~ . I 
Rat iona I + 

Incremental + 

Optimal (Oror) + 

Political Realities I + 

Systems + + 

Advocacy + +- +­
Kahn's S. P. Model + +- +-

Co 11 aborat i ve + + + 

---
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All the models are concerned with objective conditions, therefore 
the table separately considers whether structural components are a focal 
concern of the model. Structural conditions enter into only some of the 
models. The advocacy model may sometimes focus on structural change, 
but most often services or amenities have been the prime concern of ad­
vocacy planning. By its nature systems models include structural com­
ponents. 
Kahn (1969, p. 144) takes a systems approach to the formulation of 
pol icy and expresses the need for planners to have the freedom to con­
sider fundamental innovation as an alternative. However, when address­
ing the role of planning in institutional changes, Kahn states that the 
planner "is not likely to be in a position to effect them formally" 
(p. 168). He does agree that structural issues may be the focus of 
planning efforts (p. 339), but because he takes lithe situation, certain 
system boundaries, laws or pol icies" as "givens," Kahn's concern is 
with planning in the social "sectors" (p. 167), not systemic change. 
According to Kahn, the social planner ordinarily does not consider in­
s t i tut iona I change, and "there is I itt I e precedent .for an approach to 
them/I ( p. 1 67) . 
Conceptualizing social problems in structural terms and dealing 
with them accordingly is the principal goal of collaborative social 
planning. Thus, social structure is a prime target of intervention. 
The first five models pay little attention to the SUbjective di­
mension of problems, although, of course, someone's subjective defini­
tion must prevail. The advocacy model does consider subjective dimen­
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sions, yet its concern is limited to the cl ient's definition7--rejecting 
other definitions. Kahn recognizes the importance of task definition 
and views it as the outcome of an integration of the "assessment of the 
relevant aspects of social reality and the preferences of the relevant 
community" (p. 61). Kahn devotes a chapter (1969, Chapter IV) of his 
book on social planning to values and preferences and the task that the 
planner has in assessing them. The importance of subjective dimensions 
is acknowl edged by Kahn, but he cons i ders them as "g i vens" to be ~­
sessed, not as the object of change. 8 
Although Kahn's model is cognizant of the importance of the defi­
nitional process--and much more expl icitly than most planning models, 
~ the collaborative model takes the subjective dimension of social 
prob I ems ~ the target of soc i a I pI ann i ng. 
The evaluation of the planning models on the basis of the second 
criterion is presented in Table VI I. The models will be discussed in 
terms of each of five characteristics, that is, whether they are task­
71t might be argued that it is actually the planner's perception 
of the client's definition that prevails. Although Gilbert and Eaton 
(1970) do not deal directly with advocacy planning, they do confront the 
issue of "who speaks for the poor?" They point out that a survey of 
poverty neighborhoods in Pittsburgh revealed a discrepancy between pro­
fessional assessments of neighborhood conditions and those of the resi­
dents. A further discrepancy was found between activists in the neigh­
borhood and the majority tif residents. 
The collaborative social planning model would make this discrep­
ancy the basis for dialog and mutual learning. 
81n the two sentences that conclude his chapter dealing with val­
ues and preferences Kahn states: "Plans need not be seen as always 
bound by values; they may also be inspired by them. The planner is, by 
his very assignment, both technician and agent of change" (p. 129). 
Although we agree with this claim, Kahn does not develop the p1anner's 
role as "agent of change." 
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oriented, experimental, cybernetic, dialogic, and collaborative. These 
characteristics must be understood as they were described in Chapter V. 
(1) "Task-oriented.
" 
Although the concept, task-oriented, was 
described in terms of dealing with problems in structural terms, the 
table evaluates the models in terms of both goal-orientation and whether 
that goal is structu~al change. The rational, optimal, advocacy, and 
collaborative models are goal-oriented--no doubt, because they are nor­
mative models. The incremental and political real ities models, because 
they reflect the pluralistic political system, are often diverted from 
the goal of problem solving. The goal of most of these models ordinar­
ily is not a structural one. Although systems,models include structural 
components, they are given a mixed rating when evaluated for goal-orien­
tation. Because of I imitations of data or of the model itself, the 
problem may become redefined so that the model can handle. it. Conse­
quently, rather than coming to grips with the original or meaningful 
goals, the model may pursue another (Brewer, 1973). 
Kahn grasps the significance of the planning phase that deals with 
the formulation or definition of the planning task, and he emphasizes 
the consequences of definition and redefinition on the emerging plan. 
His treatment of the planner's role in the definition of the planning 
task is probably the most comprehensive available. Kahn rates high in 
our evaluation of planning theorists who view planning as goal-oriented. 
Yet because our concern is with planning that is directed toward resolv­
ing social problems, we have specified that a "task-orientation" re­
quires dealing with structural aspects of problems. Kahn's model of so­
cial planning is not task-oriented in this sense. 
190 
Of all these models, only the collaborative model has this concept 
of the planning task. 
(2) "Experimental." The rational, pol itical real ities, and advo­
cacy models do not consider plans as tentative or flexible. The other 
models do to some extent. Some systems models--lIopenli ones--theoreti­
cally do allow for flexibil ity. The incremental model's basic orienta­
tion to policy making is that it is typically a process of successive 
steps, with the assumption that there is always the possibil ity of doing 
better the next time (Lindblom, 1968, pp. 24-25). 
Kahn does not discuss complexity, uncertainty, a turbulent environ­
ment--nor does he stress the importance of the "experimental" nature of 
"plans." However, in his brief treatment of evaluation, Kahn recognizes 
that sometimes there is a need for a period of trial and error and for 
systematic research and study of implemented programs (1969, p. 326). 
Thus, the incremental, optimal, and Kahn's model to some extent 
conceptual ize planning as "experimental." 
(3) "Cybernetic. 11 Although the incremental model claims that feed­
back is essential (Lindblom, 1968, pp. 24-25), the "requirement of polit­
ical feasibil ity limits its use. Systems models require information 
systems that can lead to adjustment, yet when given a role in problem 
solving, as they were in the San Francisco and Pittsburgh renewal pro­
grams, no efforts were made to utilize feedback information (Brewer, 
1973). The political real ities and advocacy models do not consider 
feedback as essential. Some rational models do include feedback as part 
of the process, but in reality, its use is minimal. Feedback is central 
to Kahn's model: it is built in to each phase of planning, and accord­
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ing to Kahn, can make planning "efficient, responsive, andeffective ll 
p. 327). Dror has similar views and his optimal model also conceiv~s 
the policy/planning process as a cybernetic process. 
(4) Dialogic and (5) Col laborative. All seven models have nega­
tive ratings on these two characteristics. Consequently, it is on the 
basis of these two characteristics that the collaborative model differs 
markedly from these other models. In general, this evaluation reflects 
the place each model gives to the participatlon of citizens. The ra­
tional, optimal, and systems models rely primarily on "experts," not 
citizens for input. Attention is paid principally to the objective di­
mension of problems. The incremental and political realities models, 
because they place planning in a political context, do recognize that 
citizens have a role, but they are not concerned with bringing all. 
those affected by problem~ into the process. 
Advocacy does value citizen participation and seeks to insure that 
the interests of the less powerful are represented. Yet the advocacy 
model enters into the competitive nature of the pol itical process, and 
does not seek to foster collaboration and dialog. 
While some planners stress "rationality" and their own technical 
expertise--and consequently attempt to minimize citizen involvement, 
Kahn shows that "values are ever present and permeate each phase of em­
pirical analysis and all aspects of a planning discussion" (p. 114). In 
Kahn's model the assessment of values and preferences is an essential 
part of the planner's task. 
Kahn also sees the planner as technician providing maximum infor­
mation--facts and projections--to others, and assisting them to make 
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choices. He also states that "layman and technician must collaborate" 
(p. 120). Although Kahn's notion of collaboration is similar in some 
ways to what we have proposed, there is a basic difference. We have un­
derpinned the notion of collaboration with concepts from the sociology 
of knowledge--holding that both citizen and planner have contributions 
to bring to the planning process. In this view the planner has more to 
do than "appraising real ity" and assessing values and preferences: he 
has a role to play in facil itating an exchange between participants so 
that mutual learning can occur. 
Kahn also calls for a diversity of planning efforts which he holds 
would increase the possibil ity of making more intelligent choices (pp. 
124-26). He would encourage and build interest group participation into 
the planning process. Accordingly, planners should become advocates 
"of the interest of government ..• or of various groups with which 
they might work" (p. 124). Clearly this approach espoused by Kahn is 
not in harmony with what we have called "dialog" and "collaboration." 
Thus, while Kahn is to be commended for his excellent treatment of 
values and preferences, for stressing that the role of the planner is 
more than that of technician, and for developing components of "a total 
approach" to dealing with values and preferences (pp. 118-26), in his 
model the planning process is not "dialogic" or IIcollaborative" in the 
same sense as the collaborative model. 
Since none of these seven models attempts to promote col laboration 
and dialog in the planning process, it is our contention that their ef­
fectiveness in confronting social problems is limited. 
In summary, the collabol-ative model is the only model that meets 
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the two criteria. It alone takes both subjective and objective dimen­
sions of problems into account--deal ing with them as objects of planning, 
and it alone is characterized by all five features assumed to be neces­
sary for dealing effectively with social problems. 
Beyond meeting the two criteria above, two other features are cen­
tral to the model. One is that it has a role for citizens, planners, 
and decision makers. And second, the role of the planner involves both 
technical and interactional tasks. These two factors are considered 
essential in deal ing with social problems and are definite strengths of 
the mode I . 
For these reasons the collaborative model is proposed as one that 
would be more effective in confronting the problems of our cities than 
these other models. And our approach--building a planning model that 
is responsive to the nature of social problems--is offered as one that 
can contribute to the improvement of planning/pol icymaking. 
Normative Theories and Models 
Because the collaborative model is normative in nature, a more 
basic question should be addressed: Do normative models have a place in 
planning theory? To answer this we will consider the views of three 
theorists--each of whom represents diverse approaches to planning. 
In discussing whether anything can be gained from constructing 
normative models of planning, Banfield (1959, p. 368) defended his ra­
tional model by stating: 
If the interest is normative--if it is in describing howor­
ganizations would have to act in order to be in some sense more 
effective or efficient--it is hard to see how reference to such 
a model can be avoided, or, indeed, why its lack of realism 
should be considered a defect. 
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Dror (1968, p. 130), in defending normative models, has distin­
guished between the purpose of non-normative models and that of norma­
tive models: 
A non-normative behavioral model is good enough for analyzing 
pol icymaking, but to make improvements in pol icymaking, one needs 
a model which is suitable not only for scientific analysis of 
actual behavior, but also for evaluating that behavior, and for 
deriving suggestions for improving that behavior. 
According to a third theorist, Faludi (1973, p. 5), the most press­
ing problem for planning theory is lito provide a basis for improvements 
to planning procedures and planning agencies, or what has been called 
meta-planning." He goes on to state: 
Clearly for a long time to come such meta-planning will have 
to rely on a theory of planning devoid of adequate empirical 
backing. Besides, assuming even all the requisite research ef­
fort being spent, the significance of a positive theory may sim­
ply be that of elucidating what the obstacles in the way of 
achieving alternative ideals are, not which ideal to choose •. 
The world-as-it-is does simply not provide a final clue to 
how we should wish to see it! (pp. 5-6). 
This brief consideration of the views of three theorists supports 
the contention that meta-planning or normative theory has not only a 
legitimate place, but an essential one in planning theory. If we are 
interested in solving social problems, we must focus on how to improve 
planning--and that means constructing normative models. And that may 
a I so mean a "1 ack of rea 1 i sm" (Banfi e I d, 1959, p. 368), or may requ ire 
relying "on a theory of planning devoid of adequate empirica1 backing tl 
(Faludi, 1973, p. 5). 
I I. CHALLENGES FACING COLLABORATIVE PLANNING 
In assessing the theory and model of collaborative socia1 planning 
only the strengths have been examined. There is no intention to either 
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deny the weaknesses or ignore the obstacles that stand in the way of im­
plementing collaborative planning. However, instead of discussing ei­
ther limitations of the model or obstacles, we shall consider some areas 
where change is needed9--that is, if planning is to be collaborative, if 
social problems are to be resolved. These changes will include ones 
dealing with individuals, with planning structure, and changes in the 
planner's knowledge and skills. 
Individual Changes 
The collaborative model is premised on the willingness and ability 
of persons to enter into dialog with each other. Is it realistic to 
expect those with conflicting interests to join together to define so­
cial problems and agree to collective action to deal with them? Will 
people give the time and energy that is demanded? Are persons from di­
verse backgrounds--from different socio-economic classes or racial 
groups--able to participate in dialog even if they are willing to de­
vote their efforts to collaborative planning? 
Two planning theorists, Friedmann (1973) and Michael (1973), have 
written in detail about changes that are necessary for persons to engage 
in a process of mutual learning. Their ideas will be briefly summarized. 
Friedmann (1973) admits that the transformation of society re­
quires the transformation of man. In his book, Retracking America 
9Dror (1968, pp. 217-18) lists sixteen areas in which he believes 
policymaking must be improved. He also devotes six chapters (16-21) to 
changes he considers nece~sary. As Dror sees it changes are needed in 
knowledge, in personnel, in structure and process patterns, in input and 
stipulated output, and in the environment. Dror deals with these chang­
es in a normative fashion, but they are grounded in an analysis of cur­
rent policymaking and are informed by his explicitly stated assumptions. 
His book is well worth study. 
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(1973, Chapter 9), he discusses the issue of lire-educating man." Fried­
mann finds that both cognitive and interpersonal skills need develop­
mente He states that a "heightened capacity for effective learning" is 
necessary. This requires the strengthening of four abil ities: (1) the 
ability to question existing reality, (2) the ability to draw general 
lessons from concrete experience, (3) the ability to test these lessons 
in practice, and (4) the abil ity to sincerely examine the results (pp. 
232-37). While Friedmann recognizes our deficiencies with regard to 
interpersonal skills, he contends that we can increase our capacity for 
dialog. 
Although these cognitive and interpersonal skills can be developed 
in small working groups of adults, Friedmann believes that the most ef­
fective learning occurs in childhood, and, therefore, our formal educa­
tional system must aim to develop these skills in students. 
Michael devotes his entire book, On Learning to Plan--and Planning 
to Learn (1973), to the social psychological resistances of individuals 
and groups in organizations to what he terms "long-range social plan­
ning" or "future-responsive societal learning." Six chapters (pp. 101­
98) examine the personal and interpersonal "burdens of changing." His 
discussion, which covers nearly one hundred pages, can be summarized by 
the following 1ist of requirements that Michael finds necessary for in­
dividuals. 
1. 	 Live with and acknowledge great uncertainty. 
2. 	 Embrace error. 
3. 	 Seek and accept the ethical responsibility and the conflict­
laden interpersonal circumstances that attend goal-setting. 
4. 	 Evaluate the present in the light of anticipated futures, 
and commit themselves to actions in the present intended 
to meet such long-range anticipations. 
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5. 	 Live with role stress and forego the satisfactions of sta­
ble on-the-job, social group relationships. 
6. 	 Be open to changes in commitments and direction (p. 281). 
In summary, collaborative planning requires that individuals de­
velop certain cognitive and interpersonal skills. It also has social 
psychological demands as well. These have only been highlighted--for a 
fuller discussion Friedmann (1973) and Michael (1973) can be referred to. 
Both writers also discuss the possibility of these changes occurring. 
Whether these changes will occur is purely speculative; however, we ad­
mit that these changes are necessary if social problems are to be re­
solved. 
Structural Changes 
The collaborative model calls for the participation of citizens 
in the planning process. Of immediate concern is who will participate: 
all who may be interested, or selected representatives? If representa­
tives, how will they be selected? Another structural issue: how to 
bring persons from urban planning departments and operating agencies to­
gether so that their expertise can be brought to bear on the city's 
problems. 10 
10Needleman and Needleman (1975, Chapter 9) discuss four assump­
tions held by community planners that confl ict with persons in operat­
ing agencies. These contradictions involve 11(1) multiple versus single­
purpose objectives, (2) service versus unit-cost concern, (3) bureau­
cratic enfranchisement versus product delivery as the measure of suc­
cess, and (4) 'outside l versus 'inside l reference groups" (p. 252). In 
their concern for the total quality of life in a specific community most 
community planners assume an expanded role that leads them into conflict 
with operating agencies (p. 323). Needleman and Needleman offer some 
penetrating insights into the resistance of operating agencies, the re­
sponse of community planners, and the response of the planning depart­
ment. Conflicts such as these must be resolved to ensure a collabora­
tive approach to social problems. 
198 
Friedmann (1973) addresses the question of institutional arrange­
ments in a general way. He envisions task-oriented working groups that 
would be temporary, small, interpersonal, self-guiding, and responsible. 
(See pp. 196-97.) Groups would be joined to others through clusters of 
networks. At another level members of the groups would participate in 
assembly meetings. Then each assembly would delegate some members to 
meet in still higher level assemblies. Technical secretariats would 
provide information to the groups, and technical experts would partici­
pate in the activities of both groups and assemblies. 
Although Michael (1973, pp. 199-280) is concerned primarily with 
organizations, he too deals with the structural changes that he believes 
are necessary. However, he does not formulate concrete proposals. He 
does maintain that different management styles are needed: ones that 
"forego conventional hierarchical means of control in favor of more 
self-regulating, self-organizing processes" (p. 201). 
A "Program Planning Model" developed by Delbecq and Van de Ven 
(1971) may be instructive along these lines, for it has been used suc­
cessfully in business, industry, government, and education. When used 
by a government agency, first-l ine staff, external resource persons, 
internaJ specialists, key administrators, resource controllers, and 
organizational staff are all involved in the planning process. The in­
terfacing of these diverse persons in a joint effort is essential to 
the model. All are involved in the final approval and evaluation of 
the program; otherwise each group participates in only certain phases 
of planning. However, monitoring and evaluation of the implemented 
program are not part of the model. 
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Although this model deals with planning for a specific group or 
organization, and does not deal with an entity as complex as a community 
or a city, it does prove two points. First, diverse groups of people 
can be brought together to plan in a cooperative process. Second, it is 
possible to encourage innovation and creativity in problem solving. 
Methods and experiences such as these can be utilized in the creation of 
a new structure for social planning as well as for useful insights into 
process. 
Working out specific structural arrangements is beyond the scope 
of this dissertation,ll as well as beyond the writer's expertise. Del­
becq and Van de Ven (1971) drew upon contemporary small group theory 
for their model as well as on community planning studies. Organization 
development and the sociology of organizations are other areas that can 
contribute to this task. If social planning is to be successful in 
bringing diverse persons and groups together to collaborate in solving 
social problems--a task that requires both individual and social change, 
then persons from many fields must bring their expertise and commitment 
to the task. Urban planning--or any other single field by itself--is 
not adequate to the need. 
We must learn to solve our problems, but to do so we must learn 
11 1n a review of Godschalkls book (1972) Brooks (1975, p. 360) 
criticizes him for failing to Iitell us how to make citizen participa­
t ion work, II for fa i ling lito provi de us wi th usefu 1 gu i de 1i nes for mov­
ing from 'here' to 'there. 11I In his response to Brooks, Godschalk 
(1975) argues that planners are not really committed to citizen partici­
pation, and that therefore, a theory of citizen participation needs to 
be developed to persuade them of its legitimacy. The next task, ac­
cording to Godschalk, is to back theory with "working methods." My 
position is similar to Godschalk's. 
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lito create the systems for doing so and to discard the structure and 
mechanisms grown up around old problems. The need is not merely to cope 
with a particular set of new problems, or to discard the organizational 
vestiges of a particular form of governmental activity which happen at 
present to be particularly cumbersome. lll!~ design ~ bring into 
being the institutional processes !b.r...2.L.Jih. which ~ problems ~ con­
tinually be confronted and old structures continually discarded" (Schon, 
1971, p. 116, emphasis added). 
The need for new institutions should be evident. The challenge 
is to build them. 
Planning Knowledge and Skills 
The collaborative model has cast the planner in the role of tech­
nical expert, bringing "processed knowledge" to the task of structural 
change, and in a role that requires a high degree of skill in interper­
sonal relations. We will briefly consider how the collaborative model 
challenges--and actually depends upon--the development of knowledge and 
new skills, and especially those that are concerned with managing con­
flict and encouraging innovation. 
Knowledge. The collaborative model is not only responsive to the 
concerns that have been voiced by "humanistic" or "radicaJl' planners,12 
but because it is concerned with objective conditions that are defined 
as social problems, it contains elements from the rational model as 
12Grabow and Heskin (1973) propose a "radical" definition of plan­
n i ng. It is based on "sys tem change and the rea 1 i zat ion of a decent ra 1­
ized communal society which facil itates human development by fostering 
an appreciation of an ecological ethic based on the evolutionary pro­
cess: spontaneity and experimentation" (p. 109). 
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well. We are interested in formulating alternatives, projecting conse­
quences, evaluating alternatives, and selecting a plan that promises to 
be effective. Although our knowledge and the environment--its complexi­
ty and uncertainty--limit rationality, planning for structural change 
requires that planners strive to improve the rational components 13 of 
planning (Oror, 1968, p. 222; Bolan and Nuttal, 1975, p. 3). 
Of prime importance is to construct information systems for col­
lecting and processing information and encouraging the use of feedback. 
Techniques for measurement and evaluation, such as social indicators, 
meaningful criteria, and cost/benefit analysis, also need to receive 
priority attention. Also required are improved ways to handle goal 
formulation and ways of linking goals. Adequate theory--particularly 
that dealing with structural change--needs to be built. 
Much more discussion could be given to areas where planning knowl­
edge needs development, but h'e will assume that planners themselves are 
famil iar with most of these areas and that literature dealing with this 
subject is readily available to them. 14 
Interpersonal Relations. A point that has been repeatedly empha­
sized is that planners need to attend not only to the objective aspects 
130ror (1968, pp. 149-53) also contends that extrarational pro­
cesses are important in policymaking, and that pure rationality is im­
possible to achieve. He argues that to improve policymaking we need to 
know how to strengthen extrarational components (p. 222). These ele­
ments are included in his optimal model. His argument is convincing. 
14For example, Oror (1968) devotes Chapter 17 of his book to a 
discussion of the changes needed to improve policy knowledge. Robin­
son's book (1973) also provides the reader up-to-date articles dealing 
with concrete efforts to improve planning methodology. 
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of social problems and their resolution, but also to the subjective di­
mensions. Fundamental to the collaborative model is the joining of the 
processed knowledge of the planner to the personal knowledge of the cit­
izen. The discussion of the planner's role in Chapter V stressed the 
importance of interactional tasks--particularly important is what has 
been designated as "promoting mutual learning through dialog." This 
role definitely calls for skills that have been lacking in the educa­
tion of planners. Planners will require a great deal of training to be 
able to activate the process of collaborative planning. 
Several planners have discussed the need for new skills and the 
implications these have for educational programs. Table VIII sets forth 
some of the interpersonal skills and knowledge that Friedmann (1969) and 
Rondinelli (1973) maintain are necessary for planners. 
TABLE VIII 
INTERPERSONAL SKILLS AND KNOWLEDGE NEEDED BY PLANNERS 
Friedmann (1969, p. 317) Rondinell i (1973, p. 20) 
Sharpened knowledge of self Persuasion and manipulation 
Consciousness of roles that Communication skills 
need to be played Client analysis 
Insight into his biases, Mediation and negotiation skills 
strengths, and weaknesses Resource mobilization ability 
Understanding of how he Advocacy and organizing abil ity 
appears to others Interpersonal relations 
Increased capacity for Small group decisionmaking 
learning Organization behavior 

Abil ity to empathize Intragroup dynamics 

Ability to I ive with confl ict Social psychology 

Knowledge of the dynamics of Coalition management 

power Entrepreneurial-experience 
Knowledge of the art of Techniques of conflict resolution 
persuasion Sociopolitical exchange processes 
Professionally responsibl~ 
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These two lists are indicative of what new concepts of planning 
demand of the planner. 15 Although we hesitate to cite any of the skills 
as more important than others, it seems that two areas especially need 
attention: techniques of conflict resolution and skil I in fostering 
social change or innovation. 
Management of Conflict. It may appear that the collaborative rnod­
el naively denies conflict. That is not the case: conflict--and even 
deep cleavages--are recognized as existing in our cities; however, the 
collaborative model still requires that conflict be managed,16 and as­
sumes that in most cases it can be. Is this a real istic assumption? 
Deutsch (1969, pp. 23-24), a student of conflict, claims that it 
is. He states: 
In a cooperative context, a conflict can be viewed as a common 
problem in which the conflicting parties have the joint interest 
of reaching a mutua1ly satisfactory solution. There is 
nothing inherent ~~ conflicts which makes it impossible-for 
the resolution of conflict ~ take place in ~ cooperative~­
text through ~ cooperative process ... TP. 23, emphasis added). 
Because urban planners deal with groups whose interests frequent­
ly conflict, they must learn how to foster a cooperative context to 
15 1n a study of community planners Needleman and Need1eman (1975) 
stress the importance of interpersonal skills that are necessary for 
planning with community residents. According to the authors, it is es­
pecially crucial for the planners to be able to establish rapport and 
gain the trust of the community. Conflict, hostility, and minimal suc­
cesses demand that planners have a high tolerance for frustration. See 
especially Chapter 9, liThe Deeper Disillustionment." 
16By "management" of conflict we do not mean the suppression or 
den i a I of conf Ii ct whereby less powerfu I persons and groups are "con­
trolled." For a clarification, see footnote 18 which deals with inte­
gration as the goal of conflict resolution. 
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deal with conflict. 17 This requires that planners draw upon knowledge 
and experiences of other discipl ines. 
An example of a model that may be beneficial to planners is one 
developed by Wedge (1971). It is a process model for intercession in 
intergroup confl ict. Five steps are identified by Wedge: 11(1) the in­
tercessor establ ishes dialogue with each involved party; (2) particular 
interests of the parties are defined and complementary or mutual inter­
ests are identified; (3) members of the confl icting groups are brought 
together on neutral ground in the preserlce of neutral buffers; (4) 
limited cooperation toward achieving 'partial superordinate goals' for 
self-interested purposes is encouraged; and (5) the intercession is 
terminated as soon as communication concerning concrete and limited co­
operative goals is establ ished ll (p. 733). 
From his experiences in the Dominican Republ ic Wedge concludes 
that it is possible to institutionalize linkages between hostile groups. 
With new institutional arrangements that will bring groups together and 
encourage their collaboration, with planners who have heightened inter­
personal skills, and with a commitment on the part of leadership to re­
solving the problems of our cities, there is reason to believe that con­
flict resolution or cooperative problem solving is possible {Deutsch, 
17Deutsch (1969, p. 24) discusses why a cooperative process is 
likely to lead to productive confl ict resolution. (1) lilt aids open 
and honest communication of re1evant information between the partici­
pants. . .• (2) It encourages the recognition of the legitimacy of 
each other's interests and of the necessity of searching for a solution 
which is responsive to the needs of each side. . .. (3) It leads to a 
trusting, friend1y attitude which increases sensitlvity to similarities 
and common interests, while minimizing the salience of differences •.• 11 
(numera1s added). 
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181969; Stagner, 1971; Wedge, 1971; Derr, 1972; Follett, 1940). 
Encouragement of Innovation. Collaboration in itself wil I not in­
sure that efforts to deal with social problems will be successful. Res­
olution of social problems requires social change. Therefore, it is es­
sential that planners also learn how to encourage creativity, flexibil­
ity, and innovation. A I iterature dealing with social change ~Zaltman 
~!l., 1972; Cartwright, 1951; Bennis ~!l., 1969; Kelman, 1961) and 
innovation (Zaltman et !l., 1973) is available for planners to draw upon. 
Taylor (1970) reports a process through which social innovation in 
a vocational rehabilitation project was successfully introduced. An in­
terdisciplinary team was also involved in the process. The model for 
innovation called for a high degree of staff involvement, creativity and 
innovation were encouraged, and the staff enjoyed a great degree of 
fexibil ity. From projects such as this, we can learn how to adapt sim­
ilar methods to the social planning process, and thus encourage innova­
tive approaches to problem resolution. 
In encouraging innovation and social change, in facil itating col­
laborative efforts, the planner must be aware of tendencies he--and 
others--may have to manipulate either the process or the participants. 
18Mary Parker Follett (1940, pp. 30-49) has written on construc­
tive conflict. She discusses domination, compromise, and integration as 
methods of dealing with conflict. The bases of integration are bringing 
the differences into the open, and then taking the demands of both sides 
and breaking them up into their constituent parts. This means getting 
beyond the symbols that might hide the true basis of the conflict. The 
aim is to integrate the two desires, to find a solution in which both 
sides can find something. Interestingly one of the obstacles to inte­
gration that Follett identifies is that "it requires a high order of 
intelligence, keen perception and discrimination, more than all, a bril­
l iant Inventiveness" (p. 45). 
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In discussing this Kelman (1972) acknowledges a dilemma. liThe two horns 
of the dilenma, then, are represented by the view that any manipulation 
of human behavior inherently violates a fundamental value, but that 
there exists no formula for so structuring an effective change situation 
that such manipulation is totally absent" (p. 575). 
In moving into a new role the planner's professional ethics must 
include respect for the other and for his freedom. He must learn how 
to minimize the manipulative aspects of planning situations. 
The Possibility of Collaborative Social Planning 
In describing integration as a way to handle conflict Follett 
(1940, p. 32) wrote: "I am talking enither of what is, to any great ex­
tent, nor of what ought to be merely, but of what perhaps may be. This 
we can discover only by experiment." 
This statement describes well what has been stated in regard to 
collaborative social planning. We have reviewed some of the challenges 
that confront collaborative planning: the changes that are needed in 
individuals, the need for creating new institutional arrangements, and 
the requirement of improved knowledge and new skills for the planner. 
The challenges are indeed formidable, but possible. To paraphrase 
Fo 11 ett, co 11 aborat i ve p I ann i ng "perhaps may be. II Th is we can discover 
only by experiment. 
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I I I. TOWARD A NEW PLANNING PARADIGM 
The theory and model of social planning that has been set forth in 
this dissertation differs radically from present planning practice and 
its underlying theory. What has been presented is a new planning para­
digm. This last section will discuss the notion of paradigm and exam­
ine how it is appl icable to planning. 19 
The Notion of Paradigm 
While we do not maintain that planning is a science, a book on the 
development of science, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Kuhn, 
1970), does present some concepts that will be discussed and then ap­
pI ied to planning. 
Kuhn ~aintains that a science is governed by a specific paradigm 
(p. 175). That paradigm determines the criteria for the choice of prob­
lems which are assumed to have solutions (p. 37). Problems are rejected 
that cannot be stated in terms of accepted conceptual and methodological 
tools (p. 37). Rules also designate how the problem is to be solved as 
well as I imit the nature of an acceptable solution (p. 38). 
190strom (1973) advances and supports the thesis that the field 
of public administration is undergoing a crisis due to the insufficien­
cyof its traditional paradigm. Sociologists too have dealt with the 
issue of whether Kuhn's notion of paradigm is applicable to that field. 
Lebowitz (n.d.) maintains that sociology is preparadigmatic, while 
Ritzer (1975) contends that sociology is a multiple paradigm science. 
Grabow and Heskin (1973) have contrasted a new paradigm, "radical plan­
ning," with the "rational-comprehensive model of modern planning," but 
do not deal with the notion of paradigm itself. 
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Kuhn uses the term paradigm in two ways:20 (1) as standing for 
lithe entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on 
shared by the members of a given community;" and (2) denoting lithe con­
crete puzzle-solutions which, employed as models or examples, can re­
place expl icit rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining puz­
zles of normal science" (p. 175). 
In a period of normal science scientists accept the dominant par­
adigm and their endeavors are mainly puzzlesolving (Chapter 4). There 
exists a " s trong network of commitments--conceptual, theoretical, insti­
tutional, and methodological" (p. 42). In time anomal ies arise. These 
are findings that were not expected or cannot be explained (Chapter 6). 
Crisis occurs when the rules of the dominant paradigm continue to fail, 
and the awa reness of anoma lies deepens and spreads (Chapter 7). The 
paradigm is called into question and its rules become blurred (p. 83). 
Competing articulations proliferate (Chapter 8), and eventually a ~-
lution occurs. The older paradigm is replaced, in whole or in part, by 
a new paradigm (Chapier 9). 
The Paradigm Problem in Planning 
As stated above Kuhn formulated his model as an explanation for 
the development of the physical sciences. His notion of scientific ac­
tivity as puzzle-solving and as research-oriented does not apply in a 
20Kuhn (197C, p. 181) notes that one of his critics found that the 
term paradigm was used twenty-two different ways in his original text. 
Due to this and other criticisms, Kuhn added a postscript in the second 
edition (pp. 174-210)--commenting on some of the criticisms and offering 
some revisions. It is in this postscript that Kuhn clarifies the two 
different senses in which he uses the term paradigm--and which we have 
cited. 
-
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strict sense to planning. However, when paradigm is used as standing 
for lithe entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on 
shared by the members of a given community" (p. 175), then the notion of 
paradigm is applicable to planning, and perhaps, fruitfully so. 
Kuhn1s model also appears applicable: (I) reigning paradigm, (2) 
emergence of anomal ies, (3) crisis--awareness of anomalies spreads, (4) 
response to crisis (with competing paradigms articulated), (5) revolu­
tion--the overthrow of the old paradigm and the establishment of a new 
paradi gm. 
We will use Kuhn's model and examine the nature of the crisis in 
planning and responses to that crisis. 
Crisis. Within the last twenty-five years the urban planning pro­
fession has faced chal lenges on many fronts: the nature of the planning 
problem has expanded from land use to include social phenomena; the 
planner1s role--from value-free expert to one involved in the political 
process; technical skills alone do not suffice; comprehensive, long­
range planning is questioned as an ideal; master plans are no longer in 
vogue; citizen participation, although required, threatens planning; 
and so on. 
When we survey planning endeavors, we see: many urban renewal 
projects have failed to "renew" the city, and have been criticized for 
actua1 Iy creating more serious problems than they may have s01ved; so­
cial programs of the sixties, public housing projects, Model Cities, 
etc., are criticized for "poor" planning or for a lack of p1anning; 
crime is increasing, housing deteriorating, problems worsening, resi­
dents flee the city. Many perceive the city as being in crisis. 
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We have charged that current city planning theory and planning 
techniques are incapable of confronting the problems of cities. To pro­
vide further support for this contention, the views of Jane Jacobs (1961, 
Chapter 22) will be summarized. This will also afford another person's 
insight into the crisis in planning and in the city. 
Jacobs identifies three kinds of problems: (1) problems of sim­
plicity, (2) problems of disorganized complexity, and (3) problems of 
organized complexity (p. 249). Planning, she maintains, can deal with 
problems of simpl icity which are two-variable problems. Planning meth­
ods and tools, such as probability theory and statistical analysis, can 
also deal with the second type of problem, those of disorganized com­
plexity. But Jacobs argues that the problems of the cities are largely 
of the third type. They are problems of organized complexity--with 
mUltiple and interrelated variables, yet according to Jacobs, planners 
have persistently appl ied lithe two-variable system of thinking and ana­
lyzing to big cities" (pp. 435-36). Statistical and probabil ity tech­
niques have been added by planners to deal with these problems, but 
these methods are inadequate since the city's problems are largely of 
the third type (pp. 437-38). 
We could continue to discuss difficulties, but these comments 
should indicate why it is maintained that a sense of crisis exists in 
planning. The point is that the traditional planning paradigm has giv­
en rise to anomalies, that is, problems exist that it cannot address. 
Its concepts, methodology, and the structure of urban planning depart­
ments do not enable planners to handle the city's problems. The aware­
ness of this is spreading, and thus, the crisis. 
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Responses to Crisis. Some of the responses to anomalies have led 
to attempts to adjust the paradigm so that the anomaly would disappear. 
Examples of this kind of response would be expanding the scope of urban 
planning to include planning for social phenomena, admitting that plan­
ners are part of the political process, adding computer simulation to 
planning tools, and striving in various ways to improve the rationality 
of the process. 
The C I eve I and Po I icy P I ann i ng Report (Krumho"1 z ~~., 1975) cited 
in the previous chapter relates the efforts of one city's planners to 
make planning more responsive to the major problems of cities. They-­
and those who espouse advocacy planning--believe that the planning pro­
cess has tended to exclude the socially and economically disadvantaged. 
They find that the dominant planning paradigm--the scope of its prob­
lems, its tools, goals, biases, the role it assigns planners, etc.--is 
inadequate. The Cleveland Pol icy Planning Report can be viewed as the 
response one group of planners has made to the inadequacies of the tra­
ditional planning paradigm. 
A recent study of Needleman and Needleman (1975) offers us infor­
mation and analysis of how planners within urban planning departments 
in major United States cities are currently responding to the needs of 
cities. 21 The authors interviewed 155 planners (out of 173) and all the 
directors of the urban planning departments in Boston, Philadelphia, 
21 The study of community planning by Needleman and Needleman (1975) 
offers insight into how community planning fits within the planning de­
partment, what happens to the structure and goals of the programs over 
time, accomplishments, how community planners deal with citizens, the re­
Iat ions between commun i ty pi anners and operat i ngagenc"i es, and the psy­
chological responses of community planners to their work. 
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Detroit, Providence, Cincinatti, Cleveland, Buffalo, Baltimore, and St. 
Louis. Six cities had establ ished community planning programs which 
directly assigned planners to work with residents of specific areas of 
the city. The authors found that in practice community planners have 
become advocates for area residents. 
We will use this study to illustrate the cleavage that exists 
among contemporary planners and to advance the thesis that a crisis ex­
ists today in the planning profession because "new" planners find the 
"01 d" parad i gm inadequate for the prob I ems of contemporary urban soc i e­
ty. Table IX represents the divergent views of 10'ld" and "new" planners. 
TABLE IX 
COMPAR ISON BETWEEN THE "OLD" AND "NEW" PLANNERS 
"OLD" 	 "NEW" 
IDEAL: 	 Central ized Decentralized 
Comprehensive Area-wide 
Long-range Tends to be short-term 
In the public interest Interests of the area 
LEGITIMATE Physical or 1and Social problems are included. 
SCOPE: use issues Focus is on quality of life 
in the community. 
CITIZEN Restricted Involvement required for 
PARTICIPATION: Publ ic relations implementation 
ROLE OF Value-free technician Committed advocate 
PLANNER: Not involved in imple­ Involved in implementation 
mentation Interpersonal relations key 
Rational ity valued Po lit i ca I ac t i vis t 
ACCOUNTA­ To political officials To citizens, and specifical­
BILITY: and influential ly, to residents of the 
businessmen area 
Isolated from citizens 
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Planners are seen to differ in five areas: (1) planning ideal, 
(2) the legitimate scope of planning, (3) attitudes toward citizen par­
ticipation, (4) the role of the planner, and (5) the accountability of 
the planner. The table needs no explanation. 
Needleman and Needleman's study of planning in six major cities 
shows how the "new" is challenging the "old," lending support to the 
view that a revolution is underway in the planning profession. 
A Revolution in Planning: An Emerging Paradigm 
Community planning has come into existence to meet the needs of 
city residents. It has been sponsored by urban planning departments, 
yet because it challenges the dominant paradigm (and has also come in 
conflict with other agencies and departments), it has encountered stiff 
resistance. Efforts to either suppress or cutback on the programs will 
face strong pressures from community groups (Needleman and Needleman, 
1975, p. 339). Thus, the Needleman's predict that some form of commun­
ity planning will continue to exist until some type of major change in 
planning occurs. 
A Competing Paradigm. Not only is a revolution occurring in plan­
ning practice, but one is underway in planning theory as well. The 
works of various theorists are converging on the qrticulation of a new 
planning paradigm--that is, planning as learning. 
An economist, Dunn (1971), has conceptualized planning as " soc ial 
learning." Social learning, according to Dunn, is "a process of evolu­
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analysis and self-transformation" (p. 245). Dunn's model also requires 
the design of new systems that promote dialog. 
Schon (1971) argues the need for us to become adept at learning. 
He sets forth a model of social change by which we reflect on the exper­
ience of the here-and-now, build theory from this experience, and then 
project it to the next situation. It must be tested by the experience 
of the next situation, and thus, the process goes on. Our task is to 
"invent and develop institutions which are 'learning systems,' that is 
to say, systems capable of bringing about their own continuing trans­
formation" (p. 30). 
Friedmann's (1973) concept of transactive planning, or planning 
as mutual learning, has been discussed previously. Michael (1973) too 
conceives of planning as learning, and contends that we need to "learn 
to plan," as well as "plan to learn." 
22Although Dunn (1971) uses the term "evolutionary experiment," 
he does not mean experiment in the strict or classical sense, but in the 
sense of a test that is systematically conceived and evaluated. He 
views the social experimenter as one who formulates and tests develop­
mental hypotheses. By "devel opmenta I hypothesis" Dunn means "a presup­
position that, if the organization and behavior of the social system 
were to be modified in a certain way, the goals of the system would be 
more adequately realized" (p. 241). He maintains that it is not possi­
ble to test the developmental hypothesis under controlled corlditions, 
for in the real world each situation is unique; rather the developmental 
hypothesis is "tested" by the extent to which goals are realized as a 
result of the "experimental" plan. Problem solving, that is, "hypothe­
sis formulation and testing," as conceived by Dunn, "is an iterative 
sequential series of adaptations of an adaptable, goal-seeking, self­
activating system" (p. 241). 
In Dunn's view, evolutionary ~xperimentation is essential to so­
cial learning--and in this process social analysis and social action are 
merged. (Refer to Chapter 7, liThe Social Learning Metaphor." Dunn's 
argument that the classical or scientific notion of experiment is not ap­
plicable to the soc.ial sciences is a well-drawn one. See pp. 132-37.) 
215 
Although the model developed in this dissertation has been la­
belled a collaborative one, learning is central to it. Learning from 
practice--an experimental approach--since we are not really sure how to 
"sol ve" our problems, and learning from one another--mutual learning-­
since no one person or group of persons can grasp social reality in its 
entirety. Learning in these two senses is essential if social problems 
are to be resolved. Thus, it is argued that planning must become a 
learning process. 
Demise of the "Oldl! Paradigm. The conceptualization of planning 
as learning offers an alternative or competing paradigm; however, it is 
too early to predict whether it will successfully emerge as the domi­
nant one. We do maintain that ultimately the traditional planning par­
adigm will be superseded. 
Two reasons are offered to support this contention. Kuhn (1970, 
p. 110) indicates that paradigm debates always involve the question: 
"Which problems is it more significant to have solved?" The old para­
digm of planning will fail because it does not address urban society's 
most significant problems. The second reason is that the old paradigm 
will continue to give rise to anomalies causing the crisis to continue. 
Older planners, having an investment in the traditional paradigm, are 
not likely to embrace a new one. However, planners new to the profes­
sion will not be committed to lithe old planning." 
New paradigms, according to Kuhn, are the invention of either 
young persons or those new to the field (p. 90). Needleman and Needle­
man found that community planners as a group were much younger than 
their colleagues in the planning department. A gap was found in lan­
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guage, tools, techniques, and educational backgrounds. Many planners 
spoke to the interviewers of "old" and the "new" planning. "There is a 
pervasive sense that young planners are somehow different" (p. 188). 
Community planning may be seen as a response to anomalies or a 
crisis evoked by the dominant planning paradigm, and although it com­
petes with that paradigm, it has too many weaknesses to become the reign­
23ing one. However, "newll planners will continue to be attracted to it, 
since presently it is one of the few alternatives availab1e in practice. 
The findings from this study of community planners support the 
content ion that adherence to the domi nant paradi gm--the "01 d
" 
one-- is 
1essening among planners. Moreover, it indicates that community plan­
ners are ripe for a new paradigm. 
Planning as learning offers planners another paradigm, although 
in its present versions it is still an incomplete formulation. How­
ever, this is to be expected, for as Kuhn claims, liThe early versions 
of most new paradigms are crude ll (1970, p. 156). Thus, planning as 
learning which is in competition with the dominant paradigm is still in 
IIcrude" form. But as more planners begin to explore this emerging para-
digm--as articles and books deal ing with the paradigm multiply, more 
23Needleman and Needleman (1975, p. 241) refer to community plan­
ning as "parochial plural ism. 11 Among some of its weaknesses: (1) Plan­
ning is made a part of city politics with the outcome the result of bar­
gaining and power. (2) Its tendency is toward fragmentation of efforts 
with each community fighting for its self-interests. (3) Often the 
skills of the planner are not util ized. Frequently he becomes merely 
the spokesman or advocate for the community. 
Community planning fails to meet the two criteria by which sev­
eral models were evaluated earl ier in this chapter. It does not take 
into account the objective and subjective dimensions of problems and 
neither does it possess the five characteristics deemed necessary to 
deal effectively with social problems. 
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planners are I ikely to become convinced of its possibilities. Then the­
ory and methods can become more developed, and the necessary institu­
tional arrangements can be created and experimented with. Yet even when 
the paradigm is developed more completely, it is unlikely that older 
planners will embrace the new paradigm, although they may do so. 
Thus, it may require a generation before a new paradigm supplants 
the old one and becomes the reigning one (Kuhn, p. 152). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Collaborative Social Planning: Toward a New Pa·radigm 
This dissertation reflects a bel ief in the inadequacy of the old 
planning paradigm and represents a commitment to a new one. In this 
emerging paradigm planning is conceptual ized as a learning process. We 
have pointed out that Dunn (1971), Schon (1971), Friedmann (1973), and 
Michael (1973) are the leading theorists who have contributed to the 
development of this paradigm. Drawing upon different academic back­
grounds and experiences, each has approached planning from a different 
perspective. Yet the approach of each supports and complements the work 
of the others. 
We too have attempted to contribute to the development of this 
new planning paradigm. We examined the nature of social problems and 
then constructed theoretical concepts and a model responsive to the na­
ture of social problems. 
After an historical consideration of how we have responded to so­
cial problems--and poverty in particular, our analysis led to the con­
clusion that structure as well as theory, i.e., norms, values, beliefs, 
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etc., generate and maintain social problems. Therefore, it was con­
tended that to resolve problems, planning must focus on both structure 
and theory. 
A review of sociological theory and social problems reinforced 
and complemented this historical examination and analysis. Social prob­
lems were conceptual ized as having both objective and subjective dimen­
sions--both of which must be taken into account when planning to resolve 
social problems. 
This exploration and analysis of social problems was the basis for 
a conceptualization of social planning that makes structural change the 
focus of planning efforts as well as one that requires the definitional 
process be incorporated into the planning process. 
Assumptions about the nature of social reality, man, social in­
teraction, knowledge, and the environment were explicated. We also set 
forth the premise that social planning must possess five characteris­
tics: it must be a task-oriented, experimental, cybernetic, dialogic, 
and collaborative process if social problems are to be solved. 
On the basis then of what we hold as lithe nature ll of social prob­
lems and of these five characteristics, a collaborative model was de­
veloped. This model has been compared with other planning models. Ta­
ble VI summarizes our argument that only the collaborative model is in 
harmony with the nature of social problems, and Table VI I indicates 
that it too is the only model that is built on the five characteristics. 
Moreover, when the collaborative theory and model is compared 
with the work of other theorists who have conceptual ized planning as a 
process of learning, differences appear. Although each of 'these the­
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orists deals with planning for social change, we have emphasized social 
problems and the need for structural change. Dunn, Schon, Friedmann, 
and Michael have dealt theoretically with planning as learning, but 
none have developed a specific planning model based on their theory.24 
This dissertation's contribution to the emerging paradigm can be 
seen as a twofold one: first, it offers a different theoretical basis 
for the emerging paradigm, and second, it provides a model--one that is 
consistent with the new paradigm, yet one that is in a form that is fa­
miliar to traditional planners. Our theoretical concepts and concep­
tual model should contribute to the articulation of a new planning par­
adigm. 
Collaborative Socialflanning and the Urban Planner 
We have repeatedly touched--implicitly and expl icitly--on the in­
abil ity of present planning theory and practice to meet the needs of our 
cities. Collaborative social planning has been proposed as being more 
responsive to these needs. Our concluding comments will focus specif­
icallyon how the theoretical concepts and model we have presented can 
benefit the planner. Three ways are pointed out. 
First, as has already been stated, collaborative social pJanning 
offers an end to what many have referred to as the planning dilemma. 
Rather than a hindrance to planning, the participation of citizens is 
regarded as essential to our model of planni~g. The resolution of so­
cial problems requires the coJlaboration of planner and citizens. 
24Frle. dmann 11'y rejects conceptua1·' I • .In phasesactua IZlng panning 
as we did for our model. He holds that action and planning are so in­
tertwined that these steps cannot be isolated (1969, p. 312}. 
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The second benefit is related. Collaborative social planning not 
only requires citizen participation, but also that the particular ex­
pertise of the planner be utilized. Technical knowledge and skills are 
no less important than in the traditional paradigm, yet they are seen 
in a different light. It is recognized that the planner brings a unique 
perspective to the planning task; however, it is not the only one nor 
the most important, but neither is it one that can be disregarded. 
And third, collaborative social planning extends the scope of 
planning, requiring that the significant problems of the city be dealt 
with. Planning truly becomes concerned with the qual ity of life. 
Collaborative social planning has its challenges for the urban 
planner. It demands the development of new attitudes, new knowledge 
and skills. Yet it also promises the planner a great deal. It offers 
him a role in joining together with other persons, bringing his unique 
contributions to the task of planning to resolve the problems of the 
city--not as "a guardian of the city," but as a collaborator and facil­
itator in the process of creating lithe good city." That is the heart 
of collaborative social planning. 
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